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Abstract 
 
Title: Concepts and concreteness in psycholinguistics 
This thesis is about the concrete-abstract distinction (‘concreteness’) as it applies in 
psycholinguistic research and theories of concepts. Concreteness is one of the most-
investigated psycholinguistic variables, and is also the basis for major disputes about 
the nature of the human conceptual system. However, I argue that concreteness is 
not actually a useful construct, and that the units of the conceptual system do not 
neatly match up with words of natural language, as is often assumed in the 
experimental and theoretical literatures.  
I dispute evidence for ‘concreteness effects’, whereby words with high concreteness 
ratings exhibit processing differences relative to words with low concreteness ratings. 
The concreteness measure itself has statistical properties that invalidate it as a 
psycholinguistic tool. I report four new experiments designed to take into account 
these troublesome statistical properties, and maximise the chances of finding a 
concreteness effect. Counterintuitively, in three out of four experiments, the effect 
disappeared, and in the fourth it was extremely small. I suggest that evidence for 
concreteness effects is not as strong as it appears to be. Furthermore, even if the 
effects are real, current explanations of them still fail in various ways. 
I also consider how the concrete-abstract distinction intersects with popular theories 
of concepts and cognition, with an emphasis on two in particular (a Fodorian 
Language of Thought, and a Barsalou-ian Simulator theory). Using the alleged 
‘abstract’ concept JUSTICE as an example, I argue that from the point of view of 
these theories, some abstract concepts are explanatorily vacuous: they do not 
actually offer any insight into behaviour or cognition. I conclude that although many 
‘concrete’ items belong in our theories of concepts, some alleged ‘abstract’ concepts 
aren’t concepts at all. I explore some positive implications of this conclusion for 
theories of word meaning, and for theories of concepts in general. 
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Impact statement 
 
The chief practical impact of this project concerns the psycholinguistic variable, 
concreteness. Concreteness is one of the most-investigated psycholinguistic 
variables, and literally hundreds of concreteness studies are published each year. 
Concreteness is not just used in psycholinguistics: it also features in computational 
linguistics research, it raises issues in the philosophy of mind, and it has even been 
suggested as a potential marker for a rare neurodegenerative disease. However, the 
principle conclusion of this project is that the way concreteness is operationalised in 
empirical work is fundamentally flawed, and that the measure suffers from a large 
degree of uninterpretable noise. Given the widespread use of concreteness 
measures, this is an extremely important issue, because a lot hangs on whether these 
measures work ‘as advertised’. Although this thesis points out some problems with 
the concreteness measure, it also suggests a way around them. This aspect of the 
project has already been published as Pollock (2017). 
Aside from the methodological validity of the concreteness measure itself, the other 
main outcome of this project relates to big-picture issues in cognitive science, 
philosophy of mind, and any number of related disciplines. There is a general model 
of human cognition that is very popular: psychologists, philosophers, and cognitive 
scientists tend to schematise cognitive processes as being made up of cohesive 
parts. This thesis argues that one assumption of this model is needlessly constraining, 
and that we can improve the model by relaxing it. The assumption is that words of 
natural language necessarily pick out elements of a theory of concepts. If this line of 
argument is correct, then it has positive implications for many research programs. For 
example, many challenges in cognitive science are typically attempted from within 
this general model: simulating cognitive processes, explaining how children learn, 
developing theories of utterance interpretation, and so on. My hope is that the 
conclusions of this thesis may make some of these goals more attainable by 
improving the framework with which we think about them.   
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The list of people I would like to thank for helping me with this project is too long to 
present in full here. But I would like to mention my wonderful parents, Kristian and 
Martin, for giving me every opportunity I could have asked for. Thank you to Joey for 
long phone call discussions; thank you to Winston for getting up at 5am on a Saturday; 
thank you to Liam for being good at booze. Thank you to all my friends, who did not 
mind when I was busy and were there when I was not.  
The UCL Pragmatics Reading Group gave me a lot of important feedback over the 
years and shaped my thinking in many ways. Thanks to Tim Pritchard for his insight 
on some key issues. 
On the practical side of things, I am indebted to Wing Yee Chow for help with the EEG 
data collection, and Matthew Jones for statistical advice. Thanks also to my two 
supervisors, Robyn Carston and Sebastian Crutch, who let me do basically whatever 
I wanted and took the result seriously every time. Last, but the opposite of least, thank 
you also to Danielle, without whom I would not be able to get up in the morning.  
 
  
6 
 
Table of contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 3 
Impact statement ..................................................................................................... 4 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. 5 
Table of contents ..................................................................................................... 6 
Table of figures ........................................................................................................ 8 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 2: Concreteness in psycholinguistic experiments .................................. 16 
2.1 Overview of concreteness ....................................................................... 17 
2.2 Evidence and explanations of concreteness effects ................................. 20 
2.3 List memory paradigms ........................................................................... 23 
2.4 fMRI paradigms ....................................................................................... 23 
2.5 EEG paradigms ....................................................................................... 26 
2.6 Other paradigms ...................................................................................... 28 
2.7 Lexical decision paradigms ...................................................................... 28 
2.8 Discussion of Kousta et al. (2011) ........................................................... 30 
2.9 Emotion concepts and the concrete-abstract distinction .......................... 47 
2.10 Summary of Chapter 2 ............................................................................. 52 
Chapter 3: Concreteness and concepts ............................................................. 54 
3.1 The Fodorian Language of Thought Hypothesis ...................................... 55 
3.2 Barsalou’s simulator theory ...................................................................... 58 
3.3 Areas of agreement about concepts ........................................................ 59 
3.4 Concepts as theoretical posits ................................................................. 65 
3.5 JUSTICE in a language of thought ........................................................... 68 
3.6 JUSTICE in a network of simulators ........................................................ 75 
3.7 Consequences of giving up the concept JUSTICE ................................... 79 
3.8 Two important objections to giving up the concept JUSTICE ................... 85 
7 
 
Chapter 4: Concreteness itself ........................................................................... 87 
4.1 The middle of the concreteness scale ...................................................... 88 
4.2 A statistical analysis of Brysbaert et al.’s (2013) concreteness database . 90 
4.3 Stimuli featured in concreteness experiments .......................................... 96 
4.4 Concreteness and multiple linear regression ......................................... 105 
4.5 Other subjective sensorimotor rating scales .......................................... 106 
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4 ........................................................................... 111 
Chapter 5: Concreteness effects in list memory experiments ........................... 114 
5.1 List memory, concreteness, and Dual Coding Theory ............................ 114 
5.2 Methodological issues with list memory concreteness experiments ....... 116 
5.3 Experiment 1 ......................................................................................... 124 
5.4 Experiment 2 ......................................................................................... 132 
5.5 Experiment 3 ......................................................................................... 138 
5.6 General discussion ................................................................................ 141 
5.7 Summary of Chapter 5 ........................................................................... 144 
Chapter 6: Concreteness effects in EEG experiments ...................................... 146 
6.1 Early EEG concreteness experiments ................................................... 146 
6.2 Barber et al. (2013) ................................................................................ 148 
6.3 Experiment 4 ......................................................................................... 153 
6.4 General discussion ................................................................................ 161 
6.5 Summary of Chapter 6 ........................................................................... 165 
Chapter 7: Response to objection 1 (concreteness effects are fragile) ............. 167 
Chapter 8: Response to objection 2 (there is more to meaning than concepts) 170 
8.1 JUSTICE, ‘justice’, and meaning ........................................................... 171 
8.2 Overview of Relevance Theory .............................................................. 173 
8.3 The meaning of ‘dog’ and ‘justice’ in Relevance Theory ........................ 177 
8.4 A sketch of a non-conceptual account of word meaning ........................ 183 
8.5 The meaning of ‘dog’ and ‘justice’ in a non-conceptual account of word 
meaning ........................................................................................................... 185 
8 
 
8.6 Objections to a non-conceptual account of word meaning ..................... 188 
8.7 Summary of Chapter 8 ........................................................................... 193 
Chapter 9: Conclusions .................................................................................... 196 
References .......................................................................................................... 202 
Appendix A .......................................................................................................... 210 
Table of figures 
Figure 4-1 Theoretically possible means and standard deviations for concreteness 
ratings in Brysbaert et al. (2013) ............................................................................ 94 
Figure 4-2 Actual means and standard deviations for concreteness ratings in 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) ........................................................................................... 95 
Figure 4-3 Stimuli featured in Romani et al. (2008) ................................................ 98 
Figure 4-4 Stimuli featured in Binder et al. (2005) .................................................. 99 
Figure 4-5 Stimuli featured in de Groot (1989) ..................................................... 101 
Figure 4-6 Stimuli featured in Kroll and Merves (1985) ........................................ 102 
Figure 4-7 Means and standard deviations of imageability ratings for 6,000 words 
(Cortese and Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012) .................................................. 107 
Figure 4-8 Means and standard deviations of Lynott and Connell’s (2012) Modality 
Exclusivity Norms ................................................................................................ 108 
Figure 4-9 Means and standard deviations of Warriner et al.’s (2013) emotional 
valence norms ..................................................................................................... 110 
Figure 5-1 Stimuli featured in Romani et al. (2008) .............................................. 118 
Figure 5-2 Stimuli featured in Allen and Hulme (2006) ......................................... 119 
Figure 5-3 Stimuli featured in Miller and Roodenrys (2009) ................................. 120 
Figure 5-4 Stimuli featured in Walker and Hulme (1999) ...................................... 121 
Figure 5-5 Stimuli featured in experiment 1 .......................................................... 125 
Figure 5-6 Concrete and abstract stimuli featured in experiment 2 ...................... 133 
Figure 6-1 Stimuli featured in Barber et al. (2013) ................................................ 152 
Figure 6-2 Grand average waveforms for concrete and abstract words at 2 electrode 
sites ..................................................................................................................... 159 
 
Table 2-1 Reproduction of Gernsbacher's (1982) summary of lexical decision results
 .............................................................................................................................. 29 
Table 2-2 - Emotionally neutral abstract words ...................................................... 36 
9 
 
Table 4-1 - Studies included in stimuli analysis ...................................................... 97 
Table 4-2 Concreteness statistics in various experimental paradigms ................. 103 
Table 5-1 - Age of acquisition of stimuli in previous experiments ......................... 123 
Table 5-2 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 1 ...................................... 126 
Table 5-3 Example stimuli from experiment 1 ...................................................... 127 
Table 5-4 Mean words recalled by condition for Experiment 1 ............................. 128 
Table 5-5 Summary of mixed effects model for Experiment 1 .............................. 129 
Table 5-6 Mean differences in words remembered in concrete and abstract 
conditions in various list memory experiments ..................................................... 130 
Table 5-7 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 2 ...................................... 134 
Table 5-8 Mean words recalled by condition in experiment 2 ............................... 135 
Table 5-9 Summary of generalized linear mixed model analysis of experiment 2 . 136 
Table 5-10 Emotional valence of stimuli featured in experiments 1 and 2 ............ 137 
Table 5-11 Mean percentage of participants who reported knowing words featured 
in experiments 1 and 2......................................................................................... 138 
Table 5-12 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 3 .................................... 139 
Table 5-13 Mean words recalled by condition for Experiment 3 ........................... 140 
Table 5-14 Summary of frequentist mixed effects model for experiment 3 ........... 140 
Table 6-1 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 4 ...................................... 158 
Table 6-2 Mean amplitudes in mV between 300-550ms by laterality .................... 159 
Table 6-3 Summary of Bayesian ANOVA for experiment 4 .................................. 160 
Table 6-4 Words featured in Barber et al.'s experiment ....................................... 163 
 
  
10 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis is about the concrete-abstract distinction (‘concreteness’) as it applies in 
psycholinguistic research and theories of concepts. Although, as we shall see, it has 
proven extremely difficult to come up with a rigorous definition of what the concrete-
abstract distinction amounts to, concreteness is almost universally believed to be a 
central issue in work that investigates the human conceptual system. The idea is that 
there is a fundamental ontological distinction instantiated in the mind-brain between 
‘concrete’ (sensorimotorically-derived) concepts, and ‘abstract’ (non-
sensorimotorically-derived) concepts. In this thesis I have two aims. My first aim is to 
show that this belief is simply mistaken, and that actually concreteness is not a useful 
construct in either empirical psycholinguistic work, or in theories of cognition and 
conceptual processing. To do this, I will draw on data from a wide range of 
psycholinguistic experiments, the results of my own replication experiments, and also 
analyses of some popular theories of concepts and general cognition. My second aim 
is, having rejected the utility of concreteness as both an experimental and theoretical 
tool, to replace the concrete-abstract distinction with a more useful way of thinking 
about concepts. Work on concreteness often starts with an assumption about the 
relationship between the concepts we have and the words we know, which we can 
phrase in various ways. We might say that ‘words encode concepts’, or that ‘word 
meanings are concepts’, and so on. This new way of thinking about concepts is likely 
to seem unpalatable at first because it involves rejecting this seemingly reasonable 
assumption.  
That being said, I believe there are substantial benefits to the view that I am 
going to try and motivate in the following chapters. Currently, almost everyone 
accepts that our theories of abstract conceptual content are severely impoverished 
relative to our theories of concrete conceptual content. As we shall see, this generates 
huge problems for otherwise-promising accounts of cognition, and has far-reaching 
implications for other areas of research, such as theories of communication that hold 
that word meanings are concepts.  The most substantial benefit of the position I 
advocate is that it provides a way of avoiding these problems altogether, while 
maintaining the considerable explanatory power of these theories. The view that I am 
going to try and convince you of has two components. First, many of the words we 
know simply do not pick out basic elements of our theories of concepts. Second, in 
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the general case this phenomenon occurs with alleged word-concept pairings which 
received wisdom tells us are ‘abstract’. My solution to the general problems 
concerning abstract conceptual content might be thought of as a methodology for 
determining what concepts there are. If an alleged concept is explanatorily vacuous 
and impossible to incorporate into a theory of concepts, then it is a bad candidate for 
concept-hood, and we should not assume that it belongs in our theory. If a 
problematic ‘abstract’ concept turns out not to be a concept after all, then our theories 
of concepts and cognition have one less problem to deal with for every alleged 
concept that fails this test. 
 I appreciate that at the moment this might seem difficult to swallow, given the 
fundamental importance placed on the concrete-abstract distinction and the wealth of 
experimental data on Concreteness effects. So now I will give an overview of the 
structure of the thesis in such a way that (hopefully) makes it clear how I intend to 
arrive at this conclusion. In Chapter 2, I will give an overview of concreteness as an 
experimental tool; that is, as a psycholinguistic variable. I will explain why 
concreteness is held to be so important, and provide a necessarily partial summary 
of the massive array of experimental findings that speak to this importance. Over 
more than half a century, independent teams of researchers have obtained 
experimental evidence to the effect that words with high concreteness ratings exhibit 
processing differences relative to words with low concreteness ratings. These 
experimental differences are taken to index some fundamental properties of the 
structure of the human conceptual system and the kinds of mental representations 
which constitute its resources. So I will also consider theoretical explanations of these 
experimental findings, focusing in particular on Lexical Decision data as an 
illuminating case study. In Chapter 2 and later in Chapters 5 and 6, where I consider 
the list memory and EEG literatures in greater detail, I argue that these theoretical 
explanations of the data all fail in various ways. I end Chapter 2 with one relatively 
self-contained argument against the validity of the concrete-abstract distinction in a 
particular area. This argument is a response to Kousta et al.’s (2011) recent proposals 
regarding a special role for ‘emotional’ information (information  captured from 
experience of affective states) in individuating abstract concepts. I think that Kousta 
et al. are more than likely correct to suggest that this kind of experience is crucial for 
individuating our emotion concepts and instantiating them in cognitive processes. 
However, if that is the case, then we have no grounds for calling these emotion 
concepts ‘abstract’: from the point of view of theories of acquisition and 
representation, they do not have properties that are interestingly different from the 
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properties of concepts we assume to be concrete. Therefore, in this particular 
instance, we can do away with the concrete-abstract distinction. 
Next, in Chapter 3, I begin to set out my arguments against the assumption 
that words and concepts stand in a reliable correspondence with one another. I 
consider how the concrete-abstract distinction intersects with popular theories of 
concepts and cognition, focusing particularly on a Fodorian language of thought 
(Fodor, 1998, 1975), and a Barsalou-ian simulator theory (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou 
et al., 2008). I show that, although philosophers and psychologists disagree about the 
details of what a theory of concepts should look like, there is actually relatively 
widespread agreement about two absolutely non-trivial issues. Firstly, theorists tend 
to agree that a productive way to model human thought is to imagine it as being made 
up out of cohesive parts. We assume that these parts have properties that allow them 
to play certain roles in cognitive processes, such as categorisation and/or thinking 
about an entity ‘as such’. The term “concept” refers to whatever these parts turn out 
to be. Secondly, as mentioned above, theorists also tend to agree that the words of 
a natural language stand in a reliable correspondence with these parts. So, however 
many concepts we have, we will at least have a DOG concept; a MOON concept; a 
JUSTICE concept, and so on.  
For the remainder of Chapter 3, I argue that if we accept the first proposal, 
namely that concepts are parts of thoughts, then we should reject the second 
proposal, namely that there must be a concept for every word we know. I will show 
that no matter whether you believe the powers of the mind should be attributed to a 
language of thought, or to a network of simulators and frames, every theory works 
relatively well when it comes to concrete concepts. However, as others have pointed 
out, these theories tend to fall apart when it comes to abstract concepts. Using the 
alleged concept JUSTICE, an abstract concept par excellence, I show that the reason 
for this could simply be that these problematic abstract concepts are explanatorily 
vacuous. From the point of view of any given theory, JUSTICE does not actually 
explain any human behaviour or cognition. A theory of cognition can get by perfectly 
well without positing JUSTICE. Concepts are posits that we want to use to explain 
behaviour and cognition, and we should not posit concepts with no explanatory value, 
just as no other scientific theory should entertain posits with no explanatory value. I 
conclude that JUSTICE isn’t a concept at all, because it is not useful to include it in 
our theory of concepts however that theory looks. I suggest that the same strategy 
that eliminated JUSTICE may be used to eliminate other troublesome abstract 
concepts as well. The upshot of this is that the concrete-abstract distinction collapses: 
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perhaps the only distinction to be drawn is between concepts that do happen to 
naturally match up with a word of natural language, and those that don’t. I end Chapter 
3 by acknowledging two major objections to this conclusion. Objection 1 is that there 
must be something psychologically and theoretically relevant about the concrete-
abstract distinction because otherwise we would have no explanation of the vast 
quantity of experimental effects discussed in Chapter 2. Objection 2 is that there must 
be a concept for every word we know, because every psycholinguistic study and 
many popular theories of communication hold that word meanings are concepts: if 
there is no such thing as JUSTICE, then what is the meaning of the word, ‘justice’? 
I spend the remainder of the thesis outlining my responses to these two 
objections. First, I tackle the objection regarding experimental concreteness effects. 
In Chapter 4, through a simple analysis of a relatively new 40,000 word concreteness 
norm database (Brysbaert et al., 2013), I show that concreteness as a 
psycholinguistic variable suffers from a huge statistical anomaly. Words with mean 
values located at the extreme ends of the scale have accurate concreteness scores 
that genuinely track participants’ judgements. However, words with mean values 
located in the middle of scale do not have accurate concreteness scores: their mean 
value is an illusion created by taking the average value of noise. In reality, participants 
were disagreeing about how to rate these words, and were not using concreteness 
as a linear scale, as it is often assumed to be. Even worse, I show that the stimuli 
featured in the ‘abstract’ condition of every concreteness experiment whose stimulus 
list I could obtain did not actually come from the truly abstract end of the concreteness 
scale. Instead, they tended to come from the middle of the scale, where the 
concreteness measure is just noise. This makes the experimental literature extremely 
difficult to interpret, because we have not actually been comparing responses to 
concrete words with responses to abstract words. Instead, we have been comparing 
responses to words that participants agree about (which were also ‘concrete’) with 
responses to words about which they disagree (and therefore have no grounds for 
calling ‘abstract’). 
 In Chapter 5, I report three list memory replication experiments designed to 
address the statistical problems with concreteness outlined in Chapter 4. I chose list 
memory paradigms because concreteness was originally used as an explanation of 
list memory paradigm effects; these experiments formed the evidence base for 
Paivio’s (1991, 1986) classic Dual Coding Theory (DCT); and because list memory 
concreteness effects are relatively consistent in comparison to other experimental 
paradigms. In these new experiments, the contrast between concrete and abstract 
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conditions was maximised, and only words for which the concreteness measure is 
actually valid were featured in those conditions. In one experiment, marginal evidence 
in favour of the null hypothesis of no concreteness effect was obtained. In the second 
experiment, the statistical analyses were inconclusive. In the third experiment, a small 
concreteness effect was obtained. Note that these are surprising findings, given that 
the chances of finding a concreteness effect and the magnitude of these effects 
should have been maximised. 
 In Chapter 6, I report a sentence processing EEG experiment that measured 
responses to concrete and abstract target words. Concreteness effects in EEG are 
especially interesting because historically, behavioural responses (concrete words 
easier to process than abstract words) have not matched up with the ERPs produced 
(concrete words elicit larger N400s than abstract words, and the amplitude of the 
N400 is typically correlated with processing difficulty). As with the list memory 
experiments reported in Chapter 5, the concreteness measures of the stimuli featured 
in this experiment were controlled so that they were accurate reflections of 
participants’ judgements, and the contrast between conditions was maximised. In 
spite of this, reasonably strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis was obtained. 
I close this chapter with alternative explanations for why it is that previous EEG 
studies have found concreteness effects. 
 In Chapter 7, I draw together what I take Chapters 4-6 to show. They show 
that, contrary to what is generally assumed, actually concreteness effects are 
extremely fragile. Counterintuitively, if we maximise the contrast between concrete 
and abstract conditions, the effect tends to disappear. There are alternative 
explanations of reported concreteness effects that do not involve concreteness at all, 
but instead appeal to less controversial and less theoretically problematic 
mechanisms for driving differences across conditions. Even if we accept that 
concreteness effects are ‘real’, we still have to accept that there are huge problems 
with the way we currently operationalise it in experiments, given the statistical 
problems outlined in Chapter 4. We would also still be in the uncomfortable position 
of having to explain why differences between responses to concrete stimuli and 
responses to stimuli for which the measure is uninterpretable should be thought of as 
concreteness effects. I conclude that although Objection 1 has not been definitively 
resolved, a lot more work has to be done in order to show that our experiments really 
do produce concreteness effects, and therefore at the very least Objection 1 is not 
fatal to the view I am trying to convince you of.   
15 
 
 In Chapter 8, I respond to Objection 2: if there is no such thing as the abstract 
concept JUSTICE (and indeed, some other ‘abstract’ concepts), then how are we to 
explain what the meaning of the word ‘justice’ is? My response to this objection is to 
point out that theories of meaning and of communicative success tend to assume that 
word meanings and concepts are the same thing, but that this really is just an 
assumption. There are alternative ways to account for the relationships between 
thought, language, and communicative success that do not require us to hold that 
word meanings are concepts. Instead of conceiving of communicative success as 
being the result of a compositional operation on concepts at the individual word level, 
we can instead account for communicative success by assuming that agents can 
store the inferences and conclusions they drew in responses to past usages of words. 
I argue that not only can this past usage information plausibly bear the same load that 
concepts are currently assumed to bear, but that actually in some ways a past usage 
account is superior to a conceptual account. Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 
1998, 1995) is an extremely influential and powerful theory of communication that 
holds that word meanings are concepts. I show how Relevance Theory can be 
adapted in a relatively straightforward way so that a necessary, as opposed to 
contingent, link between words and concepts is severed. In this way, I hope to have 
offered a way of dealing with objection 2. In Chapter 9, I draw the various strands of 
my arguments together, and sketch out how we might treat concepts going forward.  
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Chapter 2: Concreteness in 
psycholinguistic experiments 
 
Concreteness has become one of the most-studied variables in the psycholinguistic 
literature. Since Paivio et al. (1968) published one of the first large-scale databases 
of word concreteness norms, so-called ‘concreteness effects’ have emerged in a 
variety of investigations of many different cognitive processes. There are hundreds of 
experimental reports that purport to show that words with high concreteness ratings 
exhibit processing differences relative to words with low concreteness ratings. In this 
chapter, I will give an overview of what concreteness is, how it is operationalised in 
psycholinguistic experiments, and what role it plays in theories of cognition. I will offer 
a necessarily partial survey of the experimental literature on concreteness effects, 
although I will consider a range of behavioural and neuroimaging paradigms 
conducted over a period of many decades. 
 In this chapter, I pay special attention to lexical decision studies because of 
what I believe to be a curious gap between data and theory with respect to this 
paradigm (in Chapters 5 and 6, I focus on list memory and EEG experiments in more 
detail). Although recent experimental reports on concreteness effects frequently 
begin with an introduction to the effect that concrete words elicit faster reaction times 
than abstract words in lexical decision, a consideration of the entire lexical decision 
literature and a close look at the studies that are often cited reveals that this simply 
isn’t true. Furthermore, Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1991, 1986) was often used in 
order to explain these effects, even though Paivio himself stressed that Dual Coding 
Theory as he conceived of it does not make predictions about lexical decision 
experiments (Paivio, 2013). Perversely, even if we did have strong evidence for 
concreteness effects in lexical decision, we currently have no way of explaining why 
these effects occur; and the theory that is most tested with respect to these effects 
does not actually predict them. As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, this kind of issue 
comes up in relation to other experimental paradigms as well. I end this chapter with 
one relatively self-contained argument against the validity of the concrete-abstract 
distinction, which is a response to Kousta et al.’s (2011) recent proposals regarding 
an important link between what they call ‘emotional’ information, and abstract 
concepts. I argue that if we accept their proposals (and I agree that they are 
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plausible), then we have no grounds for calling emotion concepts ‘abstract’ in the first 
place. This is because we can tell the same kind of causal story about the acquisition 
and instantiation of a standard concrete concept as we can of an emotion concept as 
we can of any standard concrete concept. 
2.1 Overview of concreteness 
First, let us consider what a word’s concreteness rating actually is, how it is 
derived, and what implications the word concreteness measure has for theories of 
the structure of the human conceptual system. A word’s concreteness rating is 
derived by simply asking a group of participants, typically numbering between twenty 
and thirty, to rate that word for concreteness on a Likert scale. A low score indicates 
that a word is highly ‘abstract’, whereas a high rating indicates that a word is highly 
‘concrete’. The norming instructions that were given to participants in the original 
Paivio et al.  (1968) study are reproduced below. These instructions provide an 
operational definition of ‘concreteness’ and ‘abstractness’ for participants: 
Nouns may refer to persons, places and things that can be 
seen, heard, felt, smelled or tasted or to more abstract 
concepts that cannot be experienced by our senses. The 
purpose of this experiment is to rate a list of words with 
respect to "concreteness" in terms of sense-experience. Any 
word that refers to objects, materials or persons should 
receive a high concreteness rating; any word that refers to an 
abstract concept that cannot be experienced by the senses 
should receive a low concreteness rating. Think of the words 
"chair" and "independence." "Chair" can be experienced by 
our senses and therefore should be rated as high concrete; 
"independence" cannot be experienced by the senses as 
such and therefore should be rated as low concrete (or 
abstract).  
Spreen and Schulz (1966, p. 460), reused in Paivio et al. (1968) 
This operational definition of concreteness has not changed very much over the 
years, although different norming databases do feature different instructions. In 
Brysbaert et al.’s (2013) recently published 40,000 word concreteness norm 
database, the guidelines given to participants were as follows: 
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A concrete word comes with a higher rating and refers to 
something that exists in reality; you can have immediate 
experience of it through your senses (smelling, tasting, 
touching, hearing, seeing) and the actions you do. The easiest 
way to explain a word is by pointing to it or by demonstrating 
it (e.g. to explain 'sweet ' you could have someone eat sugar; 
to explain 'jump' you could simply jump up and down or show 
people a movie clip about someone jumping up and down; to 
explain 'couch', you could point to a couch or show a picture 
of a couch). An abstract word comes with a lower rating and 
refers to something you cannot experience directly through 
your senses or actions. Its meaning depends on language. 
The easiest way to explain it is by using other words (e.g. 
There is no simple way to demonstrate 'justice'; but we can 
explain the meaning of the word by using other words that 
capture parts of its meaning). 
 
Note that, although in the more recent Brysbaert et al. instructions, some 
characterisation of abstractness is given (‘[an abstract word’s] meaning depends on 
language’), in both of these passages, abstractness itself is barely defined at all for 
participants. A concrete word gives us ‘immediate (sense) experience’ and ‘refers to 
objects’, whereas an abstract word is more or less just “any word that isn’t concrete”.  
That is, the definition of abstractness is essentially negative. Others have pointed this 
phenomenon out (Crutch and Ridgway, 2012; Hamilton and Coslett, 2008; Wiemer-
Hastings and Xu, 2005), but it seems to me that concreteness researchers see it as 
a challenge that will be solved eventually without too much trouble, rather than a 
fundamental problem that would have to be dealt with before any theoretical 
explanation of concreteness effects could possibly work. I will return to this issue 
throughout this thesis, but for now I simply want to point out that this really is a 
remarkable state of affairs. For more than 50 years, we appear to have been able to 
design experiments that show that stimuli with property X exhibit processing 
differences relative to stimuli with property Y. The problem is that we can’t actually 
say what property Y is. It seems strange to attribute fundamental structural properties 
to the mind-brain based on a distinction that has simply never been clearly drawn in 
the experimental literature.   
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In any case, the mean value of all participants’ ratings is taken to be an 
accurate approximation of a word’s position on an abstract-concrete continuum. The 
existence of concreteness effects, whereby words with high scores exhibit processing 
differences relative to words with low scores, is taken to be evidence that this 
abstract-concrete continuum is neuropsychologically instantiated. By assumption, 
words and concepts are closely linked such that the effects produced in concreteness 
experiments that feature words are taken to be indicative of how conceptual 
processes work, and what conceptual mental representations are like. So, if a 
participant encounters the word “canary” in an experimental task, then their response 
to this word tells us something about the concept, CANARY. Or, perhaps more 
realistically, if we compare responses to a group of concrete words to responses to a 
group of abstract words, we might be able to make inferences about the properties of 
and differences between concrete and abstract concepts in general. To see that this 
assumption really is very widely held in the psycholinguistic literature, we only need 
to look at any of the discussion sections of any of the experimental reports featured 
in this chapter. For example, one of Kousta et al.’s (2011, p. 14) stated aims is to 
show how ‘[emotional information]… contributes to word representation and 
processing, particularly for abstract concepts’. They attempt to show this with 
evidence provided by a lexical decision task, in which all a participant has to do is 
make decisions about letter strings presented to them on a computer screen. Barber 
et al. (2013) use the same methodology and talk of their single-word stimuli as 
‘referring to concepts’. Barber et al. use their lexical decision data to draw conclusions 
about the nature of the mental representations involved in recognising words in the 
task, and in their discussion section they explicitly take these mental representations 
to be conceptual in nature. Likewise, Binder et al. (2005) also take lexical decision 
data to be informative about concepts. 
The idea that recognising or processing a word automatically “activates” a 
concept that corresponds to that word is common throughout the psychological 
literature, and is not just found in lexical decision studies. For example, Geng and 
Schnur  (2015) report an odd-one-out identification task, Romani et al. (2008) report 
a list memory task, de Groot (1989) reports a word association task, and so on, and 
all of these researchers also draw conclusions about conceptual processing or 
structure on the basis of their data. For the moment, I am not arguing that this 
approach is flawed, although that will be one of the conclusions I arrive at by the end 
of this thesis. For now, I am simply pointing out the close connection between single 
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lexemes of English and concepts that is assumed throughout the psycholinguistic 
literature that observes the concrete-abstract distinction. 
2.2 Evidence and explanations of concreteness 
effects  
If there are reliable behavioural and neuroimaging effects that can be 
attributed only to the manipulation of word concreteness as it is operationalised in 
traditional concreteness norms, then there needs to be a neuropsychological model 
that explains why these effects obtain. So one of the main tasks facing 
psycholinguistic theories of conceptual representation is the construction of an 
account of how it is that concrete and abstract concepts differ in terms of their 
informational content and structure, such that this difference would produce 
concreteness effects. Generally, theorists propose that concrete and abstract 
concepts are ‘represented differently’. That is to say, the structure, the content, and/or 
neural architecture that supports concrete items in the conceptual system are 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively different to those that support abstract items. 
Although I will end up arguing that the concreteness measure might not actually index 
anything psychologically relevant, I do want to acknowledge that prima facie it does 
seem like something that might do so. If there are properties that define a cognitively 
relevant ontology of concepts, concreteness seems like a good candidate: if for the 
time being we accept that words and concepts are closely aligned, it seems intuitively 
highly plausible that there is something about what constitutes a concept of 
‘elephants’ (highly concrete) that is different to what constitutes a concept of 
‘paradoxes’ (highly abstract). 
So, what kind of evidence for concreteness effects has been obtained, and 
what have theorists tried to infer about the conceptual system on the basis of this 
evidence? A complete list of concreteness effects and their theoretical explanations 
might be thousands of articles long. But here is a representative sample of the work 
that has been done. Initially, concreteness effects were obtained in paired associate 
recall paradigms in which participants were presented with sequences of pairs of 
words or phrases (Begg, 1972; Nelson and Schreiber, 1992; Paivio et al., 2000, 
1994). After a sequence of pairs had been presented, participants were required to 
recall as many words as they could from the sequence. The precise task demands 
could vary somewhat. In some experiments, participants were given no cues, and 
simply asked to write down or repeat whatever words they could recall. In other 
experiments, participants were provided with the first word of each pair during the test 
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phase, which functioned as a cue. They then only had to try and recall the other 
member of each pair. The relationships between the words in each pair were also 
manipulated in various ways. Both words in a pair could be concrete; or both could 
be abstract; or the cue could be concrete with an abstract target; or vice versa; or 
they could be semantically related; and so on.  A consistent finding in these 
experiments was that participants were better at remembering items from concrete 
word pairs than they were at remembering items from abstract word pairs. 
Paivio (1991, 1986) developed his highly influential Dual Coding Theory 
partially as an explanation for why these memory concreteness effects occurred. In 
brief, DCT posits two types of representational unit: imagens and logogens. Each type 
of representational unit features in different classes of cognitive process, called 
‘codes’ in the context of the theory. There is a ‘verbal’ code, and a ‘non-verbal’ code. 
The verbal code operates over ‘logogens’, whereas the non-verbal code operates 
over ‘imagens’. Imagens and logogens are specialised for the storage and processing 
of two different types of perceptually-derived information, and as a result they have 
different properties and relational structures. Logogens are completely content-less: 
they are simply sensorimotor recordings of hearing or seeing a word, and they 
function like labels. Logogens have associative connections with other logogens, as 
well as referential connections with imagens, which are stored mental representations 
of sensorimotor experience of objects and events. In DCT, a word (i.e. a content-less 
logogen) is concrete to the extent that it has referential connections with content-ful 
imagens. A word (logogen) is abstract to the extent that it lacks such connections, 
and is only associatively connected to other content-less logogens. In DCT, a 
referential connection is any connection between the representations of different 
types (i.e. between an imagen and a logogen, as opposed to between two logogens). 
The reason that concrete words are easier to recall than abstract words is because 
they allow participants to employ a strategy that helps with recall: a participant can 
leverage the imagens that are referentially connected with a concrete logogen in order 
to generate mental imagery. This mental imagery leaves a relatively large cognitive 
footprint, which makes the logogens that ultimately triggered the imagery easier to 
recall. In the case of abstract logogens, there are less referentially-connected 
imagens on which to deploy this strategy, and so they are harder to recall.  
I should note here that although this formulation of DCT is completely explicit 
throughout all of Paivio’s work (2013, 1991, 1986), often his theory is misinterpreted 
on two fronts. Firstly, many researchers seemed to have assumed that DCT is 
committed to the claim that concrete words should always enjoy a processing 
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advantage over abstract words no matter what experimental task is involved. For 
example, in the lexical decision literature we shall shortly examine in some detail, it 
is often claimed that DCT predicts that concrete words should be recognised faster 
than abstract words (Barber et al., 2013; Kousta et al., 2011; Kroll and Merves, 1985). 
However, Paivio denies this and has quite consistently claimed that DCT predicts that 
concreteness effects should only occur when a task is such that a processing strategy 
on the part of the participant could make use of the structural properties of imagens 
and logogens (Paivio, 2013). Secondly, some modern theorists take DCT as a starting 
point for their own accounts of cognition and concepts (Barsalou et al., 2008; Dove, 
2011), but they seem to misunderstand how Paivio conceived of logogens and 
imagens. For example, Dove (2011) writes that: 
DCT claims that mental images are the basic constituents of 
the verbal and non-verbal systems… Perceptual symbols 
[Dove’s preferred construct] differ from mental images in a 
number of important ways: for instance they need not be 
conscious, they can be schematic, and they are often 
multimodal. 
 But Paivio (1986) actually states that mental images are not the basic constituents 
of either system: mental images are generated from imagens under task constraints, 
but it is imagens themselves that the non-verbal code operates over. He also explicitly 
states that both verbal and non-verbal codes may operate over their respective kinds 
of mental representation in an unconscious, schematic, and multimodal way, and he 
emphasis that the term ‘mental imagery’ can apply to imagery generated from 
imagens of all modalities, and not just the visual modality. So it is unclear that the 
theory that Dove proposes is actually different to traditional DCT in this respect. In 
Barsalou et al.’s (2008) update of Barsalou’s (1999) original Perceptual Symbol 
Systems theory, they state that ‘[DCT] assumes that deep conceptual processing 
occurs in both systems [i.e. both the verbal and non-verbal systems]’. Again, this 
seems somewhat at odds with what Paivio seemed to think: in Paivio and Sadoski 
(2011) he reiterated his view that logogens are ‘relatively meaningless’ and that the 
sole content-bearing mental representations in his theory were imagens.  
There is a broad point to be made here, which is that it is hard to overstate 
the influence of DCT on modern theories of concepts and accounts of concreteness 
effects. The fundamental DCT idea that we can model the processes of the mind-
brain as operating over different kinds of mental representation appears again and 
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again (Barber et al., 2013; Barsalou et al., 2008; Dove, 2011; Kousta et al., 2011). 
And although what a particular theorist means to include under the umbrellas of 
‘sensorimotor experience’ and ‘linguistic experience’ will vary, it is still true to say that 
these two broad categories of mental representation are the same as the ones 
suggested by Paivio more than 50 years ago.  
2.3 List memory paradigms 
That issue aside, since these relatively early pair associate recall studies, a 
new series of list memory studies have also reported concreteness effects (Allen and 
Hulme, 2006; Miller and Roodenrys, 2009; Romani et al., 2008; Walker and Hulme, 
1999). In these studies, participants were simply presented with lists of words, 5 to 8 
words long. Each study contained multiple experiments on different sets of 
participants, so these four reports alone produced more than 10 different instances 
of concreteness effects. Each list was either composed entirely of concrete words, or 
entirely of abstract words. After each list had been presented, participants had to 
recall as many words as they could. Again, there were many different subtle 
modulations to the paradigm, such as distracting the participant with a concurrent 
task; requiring them to recall the list in a specific order; and so on, but the 
concreteness effect itself was more or less consistent across these manipulations. 
Participants were better able to recall concrete words than abstract words, unless the 
task demands were so high that performance was extremely poor for both types of 
stimulus. I return to a fuller discussion of these experiments in Chapter 5, but for now 
I note that in paradigms that require participants to recall lists of words that they have 
just been presented with, concreteness effects seem to be extremely prevalent.  
2.4 fMRI paradigms 
Concreteness effects have also been investigated extensively using both fMRI 
(Binder et al., 2005; Fiebach and Friederici, 2004; Jessen et al., 2000; Kiehl et al., 
1999; Pexman et al., 2007; Skipper-Kallal et al., 2015) and EEG (Barber et al., 2013; 
Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios and Holcomb, 1994; West and Holcomb, 2000). These 
methods from neuroscience are often combined with traditional behavioural 
measures such as sentence verification tasks and lexical decision, and the typical 
behavioural advantage for concrete words is often obtained (although Barber et al. 
(2013) is an exception to which I return when I discuss the lexical decision data). The 
typical aim of these studies is to assess patterns of brain activation elicited by target 
concrete and abstract words in order to determine whether there are statistically 
significant differences between these patterns. The thinking goes like this: Dual 
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Coding Theory (or some more recent development of it1) predicts that the patterns of 
brain activation produced in response to concrete words should be different to the 
patterns of brain activation produced in response to abstract words. Dual Coding 
Theory’s reason for this prediction is that concrete words are referentially connected 
to more imagens than abstract words, and will ‘trigger’ or ‘activate’ these imagens. 
Abstract words tend not to be referentially connected to imagens to the same extent, 
and so will not trigger as many of these representations by default. This should show 
up in fMRI as topographical differences in the magnitude of the BOLD response to 
the target words across conditions.  Or, in EEG studies, this should show up as an 
interaction between the magnitude of the ERP waveform at a given time-point and 
the locations of electrodes placed on the scalp. Partly in response to the rise of 
currently-popular Embodied Cognition frameworks, terminology has moved on so 
that, instead of talking of imagens and logogens, researchers talk of ‘multimodal’ 
representations and ‘linguistic’ representations. Concrete words are assumed to 
activate more multimodal representations (mental representations derived from 
sensorimotor experience) than abstract words, which tend to activate networks of 
linguistic representations. Either way, the rationale for predicting a concreteness 
effect in these neuroimaging studies is the same. A concreteness effect should 
manifest as a topographical difference in patterns of brain activation because of what 
Holcomb et al. (1994, p. 723) call the ‘spatial distinctiveness principle’, which is the 
assumption that ‘two or more distinct cognitive systems in the brain will tend to be 
more spatially distinct within the brain than will a single cognitive system.’ The 
assumption here is that whatever ‘linguistic’ representations are, they belong to a 
different ‘cognitive system’ to that of the multimodal sensorimotor representations.  
So, what are the results of these neuroimaging studies? In the fMRI literature, 
it is clearly the case that statistically significantly different patterns of brain activation 
have been found between responses to concrete words and responses to abstract 
words. The problem, as some of these researchers have noted, is that the patterns 
themselves are different in nearly every experimental report. Part of this is almost 
certainly due to the fact that researchers used different tasks and paradigms, and so 
that explains some of this variability. However, if there really are two spatially distinct 
cognitive systems which house mental representations of different types, and the 
concrete-abstract distinction aligns with these two systems, then I do not think we 
                                               
1 I should stress here that not all of these researchers take themselves to be conducting tests of the 
original DCT as Paivio proposed it, although some do (e.g. Barber et al., 2013; Fiebach and Friederici, 
2004; Kounios and Holcomb, 1994).  
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would expect variability of the magnitude which we do in fact find. Binder et al. (2005) 
report that both concrete and abstract words activated areas in the left temporal lobe. 
Concrete words elicited greater activation in the angular gyrus and dorsal prefrontal 
cortex bilaterally. Abstract words elicited greater activation in the left inferior frontal 
gyrus, and Binder et al. conclude that ‘processing’ of abstract concepts occurred 
‘almost exclusively’ in the left hemisphere. Kiehl et al. (1999) report that both concrete 
and abstract words activated the bilateral fusiform gyrus, anterior cingulate, left 
middle temporal gyrus, right posterior superior temporal gyrus, and left and right 
inferior frontal gyrus. They also report that abstract words elicited greater activation 
in the right anterior temporal cortex, and interpret this as ‘support for a right 
hemisphere neural pathway in the processing of abstract word representations’. 
Jessen et al. (2000) found greater activation for concrete words in the lower parietal 
lobes bilaterally, the left inferior frontal lobe, and in the precuneus. Pexman et al. 
(2007) et al. found ‘more widespread cortical activation’ for abstract words than 
concrete words, in areas covering temporal, parietal, and frontal cortices.  
For any one of these studies, we can pick another that found a conflicting 
result. Binder et al. find that abstract words ‘almost exclusively’ activate areas in the 
left hemisphere, whereas Kiehl et al. interpret their results as showing that abstract 
words preferentially activate an area in the right hemisphere. Pexman et al. find that 
abstract words elicit greater activation in areas distributed across much of the cortex, 
whereas Jessen et al. find greater activation for concrete words in more areas than 
abstract words. Binder et al. highlight the role of the left inferior frontal gyrus for 
abstract word ‘processing’. Kiehl et al. find that the same area is equally involved in 
both concrete and abstract conditions. Jessen et al. find that the same area is more 
activated for concrete words. This situation is markedly different to what we saw with 
the list memory paradigms. In those studies, the same concreteness effect was found 
repeatedly: concrete words are easier to remember than abstract words. However, 
for the fMRI data, we seem to get a different result every time. Note that this 
observation does not just apply to classic Dual Coding Theory’s predictions, but to 
modern investigations of the concrete-abstract distinction as well. Classic Dual 
Coding Theory predicts a relatively stable difference in brain activation across 
conditions that is reliably localised to certain areas, and we certainly don’t find that. 
But the trouble is that we don’t seem to find any reliable difference between concrete 
and abstract conditions, and sometimes experiments produce results that are in direct 
conflict. If an experimental contrast does not produce reliable effects, then that 
suggests that any neuropsychological theory that is built on this contrast may be 
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incorrect. This is especially true when it comes to concreteness, because 
concreteness is the basis for claims about fundamental structural properties of the 
human mind-brain. If these claims were true, we would expect these fundamental 
structural properties to manifest themselves in such a way that it was possible to 
detect them consistently. I will end this discussion of concreteness fMRI studies with 
the observation that, although we may have found a way to generate p-values below 
0.05 when it comes to comparing regions of brain activation, this does not mean that 
we have come up with evidence in favour of there being a consistent experimental 
effect. In Chapter 4, where I consider some problems with the concreteness measure 
itself, I offer a speculative explanation for why these variable patterns of brain 
activation have been obtained.  
2.5 EEG paradigms 
In the EEG literature, the picture is healthier, although the experimental results 
here are marked by a rather counterintuitive finding. EEG experiments record ‘event 
related potentials’ (ERPs) while participants are engaged in a task. ERPs are tiny 
voltage changes measured by electrodes placed over the scalp, time-locked to the 
presentation of a stimulus (that is, the ‘event’). The result is a waveform, with time on 
the x-axis and amplitude on the y-axis. There will be such a waveform for every 
electrode placed on the scalp. A typical stimulus in linguistic tasks is a single word 
located in the centre of a computer screen. Over the last few decades, certain types 
of stimuli and experimental paradigms have been shown to produce consistent 
patterns of ERPs, called ‘components’. In some cases, specific properties of stimuli 
have been shown to modulate these components in specific and predictable ways. 
Researchers try to isolate properties of stimuli that have reliable modulatory effects, 
and then they try to infer things about cognitive processes on the basis of the 
properties of the stimuli that have been so isolated.  
In concreteness research, a particularly important component is the N400 
(Barber et al., 2013; Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios and Holcomb, 1994; West and 
Holcomb, 2000). This component is called the N400 because it is a negative-going 
deflection in voltage that peaks approximately 400ms after a stimulus has been 
presented. The N400 is important for a number of reasons. It was discovered by Kutas 
and Hillyard (1980), who showed that when participants read sentences presented 
one word at a time, semantically anomalous words (“I accidentally burnt the socks”) 
elicited a large negative deflection peaking 400ms after the word had been presented, 
whereas semantically congruent words (“I accidentally burnt the toast”)  elicited a 
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smaller negative deflection. Note that the difference here is relative: all content words 
will produce an N400, but words with different properties will produce N400s of 
different relative amplitudes. In later work, it was shown that this modulation was not 
driven by physical characteristics of the stimuli, because N400s to words that are 
semantically congruent but appear in an unexpected colour are the same as those 
that appear in an expected colour. The N400 is therefore taken to be at least partly 
sensitive to the contribution a word makes to the interpretation of the sentence it 
appears in. A number of other modulators of the amplitude of the N400 have been 
found since. For example, words that are less frequent elicit larger N400s than words 
that are more frequent (Van Petten and Kutas, 1990). N400 amplitude is also 
sensitive to priming, such that primed stimuli elicit smaller N400s than un-primed 
stimuli (Kutas and Federmeier, 2000);  and to cloze probability, such that words with 
high cloze probability elicit smaller N400s than words with low cloze probability (Kutas 
and Hillyard, 1984). Because the N400 appears across a wide range of tasks, and is 
modulated by a wide range of stimulus properties, it quite widely accepted that it is 
probably the result of more than one cognitive process (or neural generator).  
Note how, in all of these cases, the N400 amplitude is correlated with how 
difficult a particular stimulus is to process. It is well known that low frequency words 
elicit slower reactions than high frequency words; that un-primed stimuli are generally 
processed slower than primed stimuli; that unexpected stimuli are harder to respond 
to than expected stimuli. However, the curious thing about concreteness EEG 
research is that it has been consistently found that concrete words elicit larger N400s 
than abstract words in a variety of language processing tasks (Barber et al., 2013; 
Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios and Holcomb, 1994; West and Holcomb, 2000). This 
is curious because, as we saw in previous sections, the majority of the time it has 
been found (or, claimed) that concrete words are easier to process than abstract 
words: they are easier to remember and supposedly recognised faster in lexical 
decision. The theoretical interpretation of these behavioural findings is that there is 
something about how the human conceptual system is structured that makes it the 
case that concrete stimuli are easier to process than abstract stimuli in these 
experimental paradigms. This being so, we would expect the opposite result when it 
comes to the EEG data. We should expect N400s to abstract words to be larger than 
N400s to concrete words, because N400 amplitude seems to be correlated with 
processing difficulty, and most of the psycholinguistic literature suggests that abstract 
words are harder to process than concrete words. I will return to a fuller discussion of 
the EEG concreteness literature in Chapter 6, where I report my own concreteness 
28 
 
EEG experiment. For now though, it is fair to say that there are consistent 
concreteness effects in EEG paradigms: concrete words, somewhat paradoxically, 
elicit larger N400 amplitudes than abstract words. 
2.6 Other paradigms 
Before turning to a more in-depth discussion of the lexical decision data, I 
want to briefly stress that behavioural concreteness effects have turned up in a very 
large variety of paradigms, and are not just confined to lexical decision and list 
memory. Geng and Schnur (2015) report an odd-one-out decision task; Sabsevitz et 
al. (2005) report a semantic similarity judgement task; Sadoski et al. (1997) examined 
how well participants could define concrete words versus abstract words; Skipper-
Kallal et al. (2015) simply asked participants to ‘think deeply’ about words while 
undergoing fMRI; Holcomb et al. (1999) report a word-by-word sentence congruency 
judgement task; and so on. Independent teams of researchers operating over a period 
of decades, using very different methods, have all found evidence that seems to point 
to the existence of concreteness effects. That is surely something that has to be 
explained, and the most natural explanation is that the concreteness measure that 
we used to obtain these effects really is indexing something psychologically 
important. Much of this thesis will be spent arguing that, unfortunately, this is 
incorrect, and that there are other reasons that these statistically significant results 
have been obtained. A lot of my empirically-grounded arguments will be based on an 
analysis of a huge concreteness norm database that appeared only recently 
(Brysbaert et al., 2013), and the people who conducted the studies cited in this 
chapter did not have access to this resource and so could not have raised the issues 
I am going to discuss.  
2.7 Lexical decision paradigms 
There are probably more lexical decision concreteness studies than any other 
kind. Here is a non-exhaustive list: Barber et al. (2013), Binder et al. (2005), Connell 
and Lynott (2012), Fiebach and Friederici (2004), James (1975), Kounios and 
Holcomb (1994), Kousta et al. (2011), Kroll and Merves (1985), Paivio and O’neill 
(1970), Richards (1976), Rubenstein et al. (1970), Winnick and Kressel (1965). 
Recent lexical decision studies often begin with the claim that, historically at least, 
concrete words elicit faster decision latencies than abstract words (Barber et al., 
2013; Kousta et al., 2011), although Binder et al. (2005) is a notable exception. The 
question is: why is it that participants are faster to respond to words that label concrete 
objects than they are to respond to words that don’t? This finding is especially 
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mysterious because you might think that lexical decision experiments would be 
unlikely to produce any concreteness effect at all. In lexical decision, all a participant 
has to do is verify whether isolated letter strings constitute words of English. As Paivio 
(2013) noted, Dual Coding Theory actually predicts that there should be no difference 
in decision latency between concrete and abstract words, because in order to verify 
either word type, a participant’s cognitive system simply has to activate the 
appropriate logogen, and nothing else. The structural properties that differentiate 
concrete and abstract words in DCT are not relevant to the task, and so should not 
show up in it.  
You also might think that more modern theories that couch explanations in 
terms of multimodal experience and linguistic representations would say much the 
same thing as DCT. However, modern theories tend to explain a decision latency 
advantage for concrete words via a mechanism that involves a facilitatory effect of 
semantic access that occurs to a greater degree for concrete words (e.g. Binder et 
al. (2005). The idea is roughly that encountering concrete words triggers by default 
more mental representations that constitute what we might call “the meaning” of those 
words, and that this activation feeds back to decision mechanisms somehow in such 
a way as to facilitate a choice about whether a letter string constitutes a real word. 
However, as Connell and Lynott (2012, p. 453) note, it is simply not true that a 
convincing majority of lexical decision experiments produce a decision latency 
advantage for concrete words. Consider Table 2-1 below, which is a reproduction of 
Gernsbacher’s (1984) summary of relatively old lexical decision results: 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-1 Reproduction of Gernsbacher's (1982) summary of lexical decision results 
Study Experiment Result 
(Winnick and Kressel, 
1965) 
n/a Concrete worse than abstract 
(Paivio and O’neill, 1970) n/a Concrete worse than abstract 
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(Richards, 1976) 1 Concrete better than abstract 
(James, 1975) 1 Concrete better than abstract 
 2 Concrete better than abstract 
 3 Concrete equal to abstract 
 4 Concrete equal to abstract 
(Rubenstein et al., 1970) n/a Concrete equal to abstract 
(Richards, 1976) 2 Concrete equal to abstract 
 
In the experiments displayed here: nearly a third of the time response to concrete 
words is worse (slower; contained more errors) than abstract words, a third of the 
time response to concrete words is better than abstract words, and a third of the time 
there is no statistically significant difference between the conditions. As with the fMRI 
data, we can pick any study we like and find another that produced conflicting results. 
Gernsbacher (1984) reports her own lexical decision experiment and concludes that 
concreteness is not actually driving any performance differences across conditions. 
Instead, she claims that word familiarity is the real locus of the effect, and because 
familiarity had been frequently confounded with concreteness, this is the reason for 
the inconsistent results. The most recent concreteness lexical decision experiments 
now suggest that there is no difference between concrete and abstract decision 
latencies (Brysbaert et al., 2016), or that after partialling out the effects of other 
variables, there may be an advantage for abstract items (Barber et al., 2013; Kousta 
et al., 2011). If we place more credence on the results of these newer studies than 
the older studies (perhaps because of improvements in stimulus controls and 
statistical methodology), then we obviously should not endorse any theory that was 
designed to account for a decision latency advantage for concrete words over 
abstract words. 
2.8 Discussion of Kousta et al. (2011) 
 So, in more recent studies that produced a latency advantage for abstract 
words, what is the explanation provided for this abstractness effect? I will consider 
Barber et al. (2013) in detail in Chapter 6, because their lexical decision results were 
acquired while they recorded EEG, and in Chapter 6 I report my own EEG experiment. 
For now I will focus on Kousta et al. (2011), who explore the hypothesis that the 
Emotional Valence associated with the referent of a word may be the crucial factor 
underlying a lexical decision advantage for abstract words over concrete words. This 
hypothesis was primarily motivated by two previous findings. Firstly, Altarriba et al. 
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(1999) found that emotion words (e.g. ‘anger’), concrete words, and abstract words 
all pattern differently when rated on various norming scales. This difference in rating 
patterns is taken to be potentially indicative of a psychologically relevant type 
distinction between emotion words and abstract words: emotionally valenced words 
tend to have low concreteness ratings but this might not make them ‘abstract’ in the 
same sense as non-emotionally valenced abstract words. Secondly, Kousta et al.  
(2009) found that words which participants associate any kind of emotion with, 
positive or negative, are responded to faster than emotionally neutral words in a 
lexical decision experiment. In Experiment 1, Kousta et al. (2011) found that abstract 
words elicited shorter decision latencies in a lexical decision task than concrete 
words. Taken together, these findings suggest the possibility that the reason that 
abstract words were responded to quicker than concrete words in Kousta et al.’s 
Experiment 1 might be because emotionally valenced words have an advantage over 
neutral words, rather than because of an abstractness advantage per se.  
 In their Experiment 2, Kousta et al. (2011) selected words with neutral 
emotional valence that ranged from highly abstract (e.g. minute, number, joy) to highly 
concrete (e.g. office, guest, voice). They reasoned that if the ‘abstractness’ effect 
found in their previous analyses was really an emotional valence effect, then this 
effect should disappear when emotional valence was held constant and neutral. 
Although the procedure of Experiment 2 was the same as that of Experiment 1, 
Kousta et al. use a different statistical analysis. In Experiment 1, Kousta et al. 
conducted an ANOVA that directly compared a concrete condition to an abstract 
condition. In Experiment 2, Kousta et al. employ a Multiple Linear Regression analysis 
(MLR). So, in experiment 2, the question is not whether abstract words are responded 
to faster or slower than concrete words across experimental conditions, but whether 
these variables turn out to have a statistically significant effect in a multiple linear 
regression model, when emotional valence is held constant and neutral and a host of 
other predictor variables are also included in the model. There could be an issue here 
with multicollinearity. 
 In brief, the problem of multicollinearity applies in regression analysis when 
two or more predictors are correlated with each other and with the dependent 
variable. As well as other variables known or suspected to impact lexical decision 
latencies, Kousta et al. enter both concreteness and imageability into the same 
models, and these two variables are highly correlated. One way of thinking about 
what MLR does is that it asks the following question: once all of the other predictor 
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variables in the model are known, what is the value of adding predictor variable X? It 
asks this question for every predictor variable included in the model. To relate this to 
the present situation, when we include imageability in the MLR analysis, we are 
asking: once I already know a word’s frequency, age of acquisition, length, 
concreteness, etc…, what is the predictive value of knowing that word’s imageability 
score? If two or more of the predictor variables are correlated with each other and 
with the dependent variable, this generates huge problems. Concreteness and 
imageability are so highly correlated that Kousta et al. (2011, p. 16) note that ‘it is 
invariably assumed [in the literature] that the psycholinguistic constructs of 
concreteness and imageability tap into the same underlying theoretical construct’. If 
concreteness and imageability are included in the same model, then because they 
are correlated, their association with reaction time might well be masked. This is 
because the MLR is asking: ‘once a word’s imageability is known, what is the value 
of also knowing its concreteness?’ and ‘once a word’s concreteness is known, what 
is the value of also knowing its imageability?’. The answer to these questions is ‘not 
much’, because concreteness and imageability are highly correlated, so they are not 
providing different information. It is possible that by excluding imageability from the 
analysis, the predictive value of concreteness would rise (or vice versa). 
Multicollinearity problems can quite routinely result in predictor variables being 
assigned coefficients of the wrong polarity, which is especially troubling given that 
Kousta et al. (2011) make arguments on the basis that imageability is negatively 
correlated with reaction time, whereas concreteness is positively correlated. These 
considerations should not serve to completely invalidate Kousta et al.’s findings. They 
should simply motivate caution in the interpretation of their models. 
Statistical methodology aside, Kousta et al. (2011) find that neither 
concreteness nor Imageability predicted log reaction time when Emotional Valence 
was kept constant and neutral, which is exactly what their hypothesis predicts. 
Surprisingly, despite the fact that Emotional Valence was held nearly constant (values 
for all words were between 4.25 and 5.75 on a 1-9 point scale), Emotional Valence 
was still a statistically significant predictor of reaction time. The higher the Emotional 
Valence of a word, the faster participants tended to respond to it. This result is also 
in line with their hypothesis that Emotional Valence underlies the advantage for 
abstract words reported in Experiment 1 and the MLR analyses. Kousta et al. report 
a final lexical decision experiment, Experiment 3, in which concreteness, Imageability, 
and Emotional Valence of words all varied across their respective scales. The 
procedure was the same as that of the previous lexical decision experiments, and the 
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data were analysed with MLR. Kousta et al. (2011) reasoned that if their hypothesis 
is correct, then in an MLR of the data from this experiment, concreteness and 
Imageability should not be statistically significant predictors of reaction time when 
Emotional Valence is included in the model. However, when Emotional Valence is 
removed from the model, concreteness and Imageability should be statistically 
significant predictors. This is what one would expect if the reason for the advantage 
for abstract words is because abstract words tend to have higher Emotional Valence 
than concrete words, and Emotional Valence is the real reason for the effect. Once 
again, this is exactly what Kousta et al. (2011) find.  
To summarise, in Experiment 1 and Regression Analyses 1 and 2, Kousta et 
al. (2011) find a processing advantage for abstract words over concrete words in that 
abstract words were responded to faster in a lexical decision paradigm. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, Kousta et al. (2011) tested the hypothesis that the reason for 
this abstract word advantage was not due to abstractness per se, but due to an 
advantage for Emotionally Valenced words over Emotionally Neutral words. They 
tested this hypothesis by running lexical decision experiments in which Emotional 
Valence was either held constant, varied and included in an MLR model, or removed 
from an MLR model, and assessing the statistical significance of concreteness and 
Imageability in each model. They take their results to strongly support their 
hypothesis. In a model that includes Emotional Valence, concreteness and 
Imageability are not statistically significant predictors. In a model with Emotional 
Valence removed, concreteness is statistically significant, and the higher the 
concreteness, the slower participants are to respond. Ultimately, the extent to which 
one would want to rely on these findings will be a function of the extent to which one 
accepts MLR as a suitable tool for confirming experimental hypotheses. Although 
Kousta et al. (2011) provide an impressive array of converging results and 
meticulously controlled experimental stimuli, these undeniable strengths are 
tempered somewhat by the controversy surrounding MLR analysis in general (Flom 
and Cassell, 2007; Hurvich and Tsai, 1990; Ryan, 2008, p. 269; Whittingham et al., 
2006). Putting this issue to one side, we shall now turn to the theory of abstract 
conceptual content that Kousta et al. (2011) advance on the basis of these results.  
Kousta et al. (2011) identify their theory as being part of the ‘embodied 
cognition’ framework. Embodied cognition theorists hold that the neural systems that 
support higher level cognitive processes such as conscious thought are the same as 
(or significantly overlap with) the neural systems that support perception and action. 
Often, embodied cognition theorists talk of cognition being ‘grounded in’ perception 
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and action. Embodied cognition is generally taken to be in opposition to so-called 
‘amodal’ theories of cognition. In amodal theories of cognition, the processes that 
realise cognition and the information that these processes operate on are 
fundamentally distinct from the processes that support perception and action, and the 
information derived from the sensorimotor systems. For the amodalist, cognitive 
phenomena are thought of as resulting from mental processes often characterised as 
functions. These functions are expressions in a language-like system that operates 
symbolically, somewhat like a computer language, or a logical calculus. For the 
amodalist, the mind is instantiated by the brain, but this might not be the only way of 
instantiating a mind. If we had total knowledge of the functions that govern cognition, 
it might not be inconceivable in principle for scientists of the future to build an artificial 
mind (although this might turn out to be impossible in practice). On the other hand, 
for embodied theorists this task would be harder, and perhaps impossible in principle. 
The embodied theorist holds that cognition is fundamentally intertwined with 
perception and action, so a human-like mind would need to be realised in a body able 
to sense and physically act like a human. A human mind could not be instantiated 
simply by some very sophisticated software running on some very sophisticated 
hardware, unless that configuration was somehow human-like in just the right way 
(note that this leaves open the possibility that there may be lots of other ways of 
instantiating something which we would want to call a mind; it just wouldn’t be a 
human-like mind). I absolutely do not want to claim that all embodied theorists and 
amodal theorists would accept this conception of the debate: it is simply one way of 
thinking about the issues that are at stake.  
As Kousta et al. (2011, p. 24) note, embodied theories have often been 
criticised on the grounds that they cannot possibly provide an account of abstract 
conceptual content (Goldinger et al., 2016; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). Putting 
aside the issue that no one seems to be quite clear on exactly what the properties of 
abstract concepts are, the criticism is that if cognitive processes and the information 
that features in these processes are all fundamentally related in type to sensorimotor 
processes and information, then it is unclear how we come to be able to think and 
talk about abstract entities. This is because, despite the confusion just noted, one of 
the characteristics generally attributed to the things we think about using our abstract 
concepts is that we cannot have sensorimotor experience of the categories they apply 
to. If we arguably cannot derive our abstract concepts from sensorimotor experience, 
and if cognition is ‘grounded in’ sensorimotor experience, then how is it possible for 
concepts of paradoxes, injustices, or theories to feature in our mental lives? Kousta 
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et al. aim to provide a solution to this very important problem with their new theory. 
They propose that affective information (information pertaining to emotional states) 
plays a key role in the ‘representation of’ abstract concepts. They do not make it 
explicit what they mean by the phrase ‘representation of’, but I take them to mean 
that affective information is (partly) constitutive of the content of abstract concepts. 
This is supposed to get around the general problem of abstraction that faces 
embodied cognition theories: we can acquire and think with abstract concepts 
because their content is at least partially constituted by affective information derived 
from introspective bodily states. This information is not fundamentally different in type 
from the information available during actual experience of an emotional state. In this 
way, Kousta et al. hope to maintain the core tenets of embodied cognition while 
providing an account of how abstract concepts are acquired and realised in cognitive 
processes. Kousta et al. (2011) take their experimental results to strongly support this 
theoretical claim. Their thinking is that a lexical decision reaction time advantage 
attributable to the emotional valence associated with a word is evidence that affective 
information is constitutive of the content of the concept that the word is (generally) 
associated with. 
Along with emotional-experiential information, Kousta et al. claim that there 
are two other types of information relevant to the content of concepts. These are 
sensorimotor information and ‘linguistic’ information. Sensorimotor information is 
simply information directly derived from bodily senses. Embodied cognition theorists 
hold that this information is somehow stored and deployed in cognitive tasks in such 
a way that its format does not change, and that at least some of the systems devoted 
to perceiving are also involved in cognition. Kousta et al. (2011) claim that all three 
types of information (sensorimotor, emotional, linguistic) help constitute the content 
of both abstract and concrete concepts. The difference between the content of 
abstract and concrete concepts is a matter of the extent to which each type of 
information features. Linguistic and emotional information figures more prominently 
in abstract concepts, whereas sensorimotor information is statistically more 
preponderant in concrete concepts. Although the nature of sensorimotor information 
and emotional-affective information is straightforward enough, it is difficult to 
summarise exactly what Kousta et al. (2011) take ‘linguistic’ information to be, and 
this will be the focus of an objection I raise to their account shortly. Now, however, I 
want to consider a simpler problem with their account of (abstract) conceptual 
content. 
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The problem is simply that there are many words with low concreteness 
scores, but neutral emotional valence scores. Table 2-2 below contains some 
examples: 
Table 2-2 - Emotionally neutral abstract words 
Word Emotional Valence Concreteness 
Imperative 5.21 1.36 
Interpretation 5.6 1.4 
Concept 4.89 1.41 
Extent 5.57 1.44 
Theory 5.65 1.47 
Motive 5.32 1.5 
Intent 5.86 1.52 
Fate 5.38 1.53 
Paradox 5.4 1.54 
Irony 5.19 1.59 
 
Concreteness scores are taken from the Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms, and 
Emotional Valence sores are taken from Warriner et al. (2013). Warriner et al., like 
Kousta et al. (2011), use a 1–9 scale for scores of Emotional Valence. A 1 indicates 
negative emotional affect, 5 indicates neutral emotional affect, and 9 indicates 
positive emotional affect. Kousta et al. (2011) claim that abstract words tend to be 
more emotionally valenced than concrete words, and that extreme emotional valence 
scores are indicative of some kind of emotional, experiential information that is both 
constitutive of the content of abstract concepts and relevant for the processing of 
abstract words in lexical decision. Kousta et al. clearly allow that some abstract words 
are not associated with emotional affect. For example, they hypothesise based on 
their theory that ‘abstract words with affective associations should be acquired earlier 
than are neutral abstract words’ and provide some preliminary statistical evidence in 
favour of this hypothesis (Kousta et al., 2011, p. 26). An obvious question here is: 
what constitutes the content of these emotionally neutral abstract words? And 
relatedly, how could they be acquired? 
 It seems unlikely that the answer could be sensorimotor information, because 
one of the defining characteristics of abstract words in their theory is that they tend 
not to be constituted by sensorimotor information. It is also unclear that emotional 
affect could explain how these words are acquired, because their defining 
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characteristic is neutral emotional affect. These items are not associated with any 
kind of emotionally charged bodily state at all, so it is arguably unlikely that emotional 
information plays a role in whatever conceptual content they have. It is highly 
plausible that one of the things that separates the concepts HAPPY and SCARED is 
that the former is derived from a positive emotional state that comes with ameliorative 
physiological processes whereas that the latter is derived from a negative emotional 
state that comes with unpleasant physiological processes; and that information 
derived or stored from these processes partly constitutes the content of those 
concepts. However, it is much less plausible that the same thing could be said of the 
concepts THEORY and IRONY, taken from the table above. A potential response to 
this point is that even though it may not seem like it, neutral emotional affect really 
does provide the kind of information required to make this kind of distinction: neutrality 
of emotional affect provides some kind of content-constitutive information in and of 
itself. However, I do not think this response will work, because the whole point of 
Kousta et al.’s (2011) theory is to explain how it is that the content of concrete and 
abstract concepts differs in such a way as to explain why (emotive) abstract words 
elicit shorter decision latencies than concrete words. For Kousta et al. (2011), 
concrete concepts are supposed to come with less emotional affective content than 
abstract concepts. Degree of emotional affect is operationalised in their experiments 
as a 1 to 9 scale, with 5 indicating a neutral emotional affect. Abstract items tend to 
feature at the polar end of this scale, whereas concrete items tend to feature in the 
middle. If neutral emotional affect is just as content-constitutive as polarised 
emotional affect, then we have lost both the very measure by which concreteness is 
supposed to be different from abstractness, and the proposed explanation for Kousta 
et al.’s experimental results.  
 It seems like the only possibility we are left with is ‘linguistic’ information, 
which brings me to my second objection to Kousta et al.’s account. Unfortunately, it 
is just not clear what Kousta et al. mean by ‘linguistic’ information. On the one hand, 
they note in a section subtitled ‘Integrating experiential and linguistic information’ that 
‘we learn a great many words from being told or reading about them’ (2011, p. 26). 
However, they then indicate that they have in mind something like the lexical variables 
that feature in psycholinguistic experiments. They write: 
…linguistic factors such as number of letters, orthographic 
neighbourhood size, orthographic regularity, and frequency of 
occurrence also consistently predict lexical decision 
latencies... Although these variables on their own do not 
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account for the abstractness effect… it is important not to 
discount linguistic factors that may relate to processing of 
abstract and concrete words.  
Kousta et al. (2011, p. 26), emphasise mine 
In addition, in their closing comments, they suggest that initial concept acquisition by 
pre-syntactic children is accomplished via world-to-word mapping. A child notices 
contingences between how the world is at a specific time and what words are spoken, 
and uses these contingences to learn simple vocabulary like ‘dog’ and ‘mum’.  
However, once some syntactic knowledge is acquired, children are able to perform 
structure-to-world mappings that especially aid in the learning of abstract words. 
These ideas are based on the work of Gleitman and colleagues (Gleitman, 1989; 
Gleitman et al., 2005). Finally, Vigliocco et al. (2009, p. 223) suggest that linguistic 
information may also be realised by ‘verbal associations arising through co-
occurrence patterns’. Before considering the first three candidates for what counts as 
‘linguistic’ information, I want to spend some time on this latter possibility because it 
is a currently-popular idea in theories of the conceptual system (Barsalou et al., 2008; 
Connell, 2018; Louwerse, 2011). I am going to argue that ‘distributional’ approaches, 
as these kinds of view are often called, are not particularly helpful when it comes to 
explaining the content of abstract concepts.  
 ‘Distributional’ theories of language processing and/or the conceptual system 
are based on important findings that have emerged in computational linguistics over 
the last 20 years. In a seminal paper, Landauer and Dumais (1997) demonstrated 
that with a large enough input text corpus (many millions of words), some well-
understood statistical techniques can derive a matrix of ‘distances’ between all of the 
word types in that corpus. They called their model Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA). 
This result was important because these output distances more or less tracked 
human judgements about the ‘semantic similarity’ of the referents of the words.  Any 
English-speaking human can tell you that the meanings of the nouns ‘idea’ and 
‘notion’ are similar (or, less controversially, that speakers of English use them to talk 
about similar things), especially when considered relative to the strength of the 
similarity that holds between the meanings of the nouns ‘wheelbarrow’ and 
‘incantation’. It is remarkable that statistical models can do quite well at this task even 
when the only information they have comes from examining surface strings in large 
corpora of natural language, and computing co-occurrence information for pairs of 
words. The algorithms that are used to solve these tasks have moved on since the 
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introduction of LSA, and their predictive success has improved. No one can dispute 
that with a large corpus of text and a cleverly designed statistical model, it is possible 
to extract a lot of interesting information that at first glance might not have seemed 
likely to be there. It is also indisputable that the brain is sensitive to some kinds of 
statistical information when it comes to language processing (see any demonstration 
of the word frequency effect). However, it is simply not the case that these kinds of 
model will help us to explain the content of abstract concepts.  
 The first reason that one might think that distributional approaches can help 
us to explain anything about the human conceptual system is simply because their 
predictive accuracy (their ability to track human judgements and succeed at tasks) is 
high. If a model is successful, the thinking goes, then it must be in some sense 
isomorphic to the real thing. But this is just a fallacy: the predictive success or aptitude 
of a model on its own does not provide any evidence that the model somehow 
‘corresponds to’ the phenomenon that is being modelled. At the time of writing, the 
open-source Stockfish chess engine running on commercially available generic 
computer hardware is superior in ranking to the current world champion, Magnus 
Carlsen. Stockfish achieves this by calculating many millions of board positions per 
second, and selecting the move that optimises some evaluation functions 
programmed into it by its creators. It does this by representing positions as multiple 
series of 64 bits, where each type of piece is given its own bitboard, and moves can 
be computed with bitwise operations on these bitboards. No human player does 
anything like this. There is no way they could, given that they are human. In fact, 
historically speaking at least, the better this kind of chess engine got, the less human-
like it became, because getting better was often the result of being able to crunch 
through more board positions per second than before. Human grandmasters 
calculate relatively few lines for any given position, and they certainly do not analyse 
anything close to millions of positions per move. Stockfish is excellent at playing 
chess, but it doesn’t provide us a good model of how humans make chess decisions 
just by virtue of being good at this task. 
 So what we need is a theoretical argument that shows that distributional 
approaches do provide a convincing mechanism for explaining abstract conceptual 
content, and this argument needs to be independent of the predictive success of the 
models. I will now provide an argument that distributional approaches don’t do this. 
The first thing to note is that not all proponents of distributional approaches believe 
that they do provide the mechanism we are after. For example, Barsalou et al. (2008, 
p. 249) state: 
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We assume that linguistic strategies are relatively superficial 
... Rather than providing deep conceptual information, these 
strategies provide shallow heuristics that make correct 
performance easily possible. When the retrieval of linguistic 
forms and associated statistical information is sufficient for 
adequate performance, no retrieval of deeper conceptual 
information is necessary. 
For those that do appeal to distributional approaches as a mechanism for abstract 
conceptual content however, the main problem is that it is just not at all clear how co-
occurrence information provides our conceptual system with any content in and of 
itself. Instead, any content this information provides is just parasitic on other sources 
that themselves do not explain what abstract conceptual content is. Searle (1980) 
and Harnad (1990) provide convincing demonstrations of this form of argument, 
known as the Chinese Room and Symbol Grounding problems, respectively.  
In Searle’s version, a man who doesn’t speak any Chinese is placed in a 
closed room. He has a large stack of papers next to him with lots of Chinese symbols 
written on them. He receives pieces of paper from an inbox at one end, on which are 
written more Chinese symbols, and he has to combine all of his bits and pieces of 
paper according to some instructions that are written on the wall. The man then places 
his result in an outbox. Now, it just so happens that his bank of Chinese symbols, the 
input symbols he receives, and the instructions written on the wall, are adequate to 
make the output he produces interpretable as a response to the input, for native 
Chinese speakers. He can do this, even though he’s just manipulating Chinese 
characters according to some instructions written on the wall. Searle thought it was 
clear that the man does not ‘know’ Chinese, in any interesting sense: the man couldn’t 
understand or tell anyone what any of the symbols ‘meant’. Now, let me extend 
Searle’s thought experiment a bit. Suppose that the man is stuck in the room for a 
very long time. So long, that he stops needing to refer to the instructions on the wall: 
he knows the symbol manipulation operations by heart. He also forms associations 
between the symbols. For example, he comes to realise that symbol A very frequently 
occurs with symbol B, but that so far it has never occurred with symbol C. He has 
spent so long in the room that he has a sense of the strength of the pairwise 
correlations between all of the symbols in his inputs, instructions, lexicon, and output. 
I contend that the man has not acquired any ‘abstract’ conceptual abilities whatsoever 
in virtue of learning these word-form associations. At the risk of belabouring the point: 
the co-occurrence models that are doing incredible work in computational linguistics 
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are analogous to the man in the Chinese Room. That does not make them 
uninteresting or useless. Nothing could be further from the truth. However, it does 
make it difficult to see why we should believe that distributional approaches are likely 
to explain how we acquire and think with alleged abstract concepts, such as 
JUSTICE.  
Now, a proponent of a distributional approach to abstract conceptual content 
may well object to this line of argument. They may object that of course it’s not just 
co-occurrence data that constitutes or explains abstract conceptual content. They are 
allowed to appeal to all kinds of sensorimotor information, plus syntactic information, 
plus the co-occurrence data, in the course of giving this explanation. That’s true, but 
it doesn’t seem to me that the co-occurrence data is doing anything in these 
explanations. For example, shortly I will consider the possibility that syntactic 
information is what Kousta et al. mean when they talk of linguistic information. We 
shall see that to the extent that syntactic information does provide a mechanism for 
acquiring abstract conceptual content, it does so completely independently of co-
occurrence data. And I do not think an appeal to sensorimotor information will work 
either: the whole reason for appealing to linguistic information in the first place in order 
to explain abstract conceptual content was because it is difficult to see how 
sensorimotor experience could do this.  
Now I’ll consider the other three candidates here for what linguistic information 
in Kousta et al.’s (2011) theory should be identified with. It could be whatever 
information it is that we acquire and store when we encounter linguistic stimuli that 
we find intelligible. It could be psycholinguistic variable information such as word 
frequency and orthographic rules. Or it could be syntactic knowledge. Indeed, it could 
be a combination of all three factors. However, at first glance it seems highly doubtful 
that the first two candidates can help to provide any account of something like 
conceptual content, abstract or concrete. To say that the linguistic information that 
partly constitutes the content of the concept CONCEPT is whatever information it was 
that we acquired when we heard someone use the word ‘concept’ seems circular in 
the extreme. It is precisely the nature of this information that is at issue in the first 
place. Regarding psycholinguistic variable information, just how could word frequency 
(or any of the other such variables) be a part of what constitutes the content of the 
concept CONCEPT, even in principle? It is not clear how tacit knowledge of how many 
times a word has been encountered (or spelling rules, etc.) could get someone any 
closer to being able to think using the alleged concepts FATE, or PARADOXES, or 
INTERPRETATION. The most promising candidate is therefore syntactic information, 
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and so I will assume that this is the kind of thing Kousta et al. (2011) have in mind 
when they talk of linguistic information. Referring to the work of Gleitman et al. (2005), 
Kousta et al. (2011) do briefly sketch out how in principle syntactic information might 
help children acquire certain concepts after certain ‘basic level’ concepts have been 
acquired. This is arguably the most interesting and substantive proposal in their 
theory, and so I shall devote the remainder of this section to discussing it. I shall 
conclude that although the ideas that Kousta et al. advance in this respect are 
plausible in some respects, their theory as it stands just does not seem to apply to a 
large class of abstract concepts. In part, this is due to a confusing mismatch between 
what Kousta et al. mean by the term ‘abstract’ and by what Gleitman et al. (2005) 
mean by ‘abstract’, as well as a failure to maintain a distinction between vocabulary 
acquisition as opposed to concept acquisition. Nothing I shall consider here will falsify 
their theory: I am simply arguing that it is incomplete.  
Gleitman et al. (2005) aim to provide an answer to the question of how children 
acquire ‘hard’ vocabulary. As they note, it has been widely demonstrated that children 
tend to acquire certain types of vocabulary before others. The very first words children 
learn are universally those words that refer to ‘basic level’ objects, such as ‘dog’ and 
‘mum’. These ‘easy’ words can be viewed in contrast to ‘hard’ words, such as 
cognitive verbs like ‘know’ and ditransitive verbs like ‘give’. These ‘hard’ words tend 
to be acquired later. Gleitman et al. propose an explanation of why it is that certain 
words are hard and acquired late, and why it is that certain words are easy and 
acquired earlier. I shall give a very short overview of this explanation here, focussing 
only on those elements that relate to Kousta et al.’s (2011) theory of abstract 
conceptual content. I will not be able to do full justice to Gleitman et al.’s ideas, which 
involve a combination of ingeniously constructed experiments and consideration of 
syntactic theory. In brief, the explanation is that easy word-concept mappings can be 
acquired simply by observing environmental contingencies in the manner mentioned 
above. What makes a verb like ‘know’ harder to acquire than a noun like ‘dog’ is that 
environmental contingencies alone simply cannot provide enough data with which to 
make the required mapping. The claim here is that there are no cues in a child’s 
environment that, on their own, could enable him or her to realise that the English 
word ‘know’ should be mapped onto the concept KNOW. However, once some basic 
level nominal concepts and rudimentary syntactic knowledge is in place, children can 
integrate information from tactic syntactic knowledge and environmental 
contingencies, and the basic level physical Kind concepts that they have already 
acquired in order to map more complex vocabulary onto concepts, and in so doing 
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learn ‘hard’ words. This tacit syntactic knowledge takes the form of constructs like 
verb subcategorization frames and argument structure. For example, just tacitly 
knowing that a certain verb takes two arguments and that subjects tend to be causal 
agents or experiencers provides a surprisingly large amount of information about what 
concept that verb should be mapped to. Once again, I stress that this is an extremely 
impoverished formulation of Gleitman et al.’s (2005) account. However, we are now 
in a position to assess the extent to which Kousta et al. (2011) are can rely on these 
ideas to relate ‘linguistic’ information to the content of emotionally neutral abstract 
concepts.  
The first thing to note is that, although there is some overlap, Gleitman et al. 
(2005) mean different things by the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ than Kousta et al. 
do. Gleitman et al. (2005, p. 26) make this explicit in a footnote. They point out that 
although it is widely accepted that the term ‘concreteness’ is associated with 
vocabulary referring to basic level entities and that these basic level entities have 
some properties that makes their accompanying vocabulary easier to learn, it is also 
the case that there are very many concrete entities that are more difficult to learn 
vocabulary for than others. For example, partitives (‘trunk’ versus ‘elephant’), 
superordinates (‘animal’ versus ‘dog’), proper names (not realising that ‘Daddy’ is a 
name for a specific man), and ‘situation-restricted’ terms (‘passenger’ versus ‘man’) 
are all hard vocabulary in that they are acquired relatively late (examples taken from 
Gleitman et al. (2005)). They state that ‘concreteness is itself a term in need of 
considerable sharpening’ and that they are simply using this term as a ‘nickname’ for 
whatever properties there are that ‘easy’ vocabulary turns out to have (Gleitman et 
al., 2005, p. 26). So for Gleitman et al., while concreteness does certainly have some 
connection with some physical essence of items in our conceptual repertoires, they 
really want to reserve the term for ‘easy’ vocabulary. By the same token, in their 
narrative, Abstractness is just whatever properties there are that make some words 
‘harder’ than others to acquire.  
This terminological nuance makes it difficult to relate some aspects of Kousta 
et al.’s theory to that of Gleitman et al., because it does not seem like they are using 
concreteness and Abstractness to refer to the same properties. And furthermore, 
while Kousta et al. are trying to explicate what it is that constitutes Abstractness (i.e. 
emotional affect), Gleitman et al. seem to not want to commit to anything on this front. 
Indeed, for most of their article, they prefer to use the terms ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ instead 
of ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’. This mismatch between different notions of Abstractness 
can be seen in Kousta et al.’s (2011, p. 26) discussion of the early acquisition of 
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certain abstract words referring to emotional states. They note that the words ‘good’ 
and ‘happy’ tend to be acquired at a relatively young age. But it is precisely the fact 
that these words are acquired early that makes them not abstract in the sense 
favoured by Gleitman et al. (2005). However, despite this confusion, Kousta et al.’s 
suggestion that basic level emotion words such as these are acquired on the same 
basis as basic level Kind words such as ‘dog’ is interesting and plausible. They 
suggest that ‘abstract words denoting emotional states, moods, or feelings also fall in 
the same category [as basic level physical Kind words] for which a mapping from the 
word to the world (albeit the internal world) is possible’ (2011, p. 26). So although 
their claims may carry some weight with respect to some abstract concepts, we still 
do not have an explanation for how emotionally neutral abstract concepts are 
acquired and constituted. That Gleitman et al. (2005) do not provide this explanation, 
and did not intend to in the first place, can be seen by considering two more points of 
confusion regarding the terminology that features in the theories under discussion. 
Firstly, Gleitman et al. almost exclusively focus on the acquisition of certain verbs with 
complicated argument structures and subcategorization frames, such as ‘know’ and 
‘chase’, and their aim is to explain the acquisition of these verbs with reference to 
syntactic theory in such a way as to account for what makes them ‘hard’ to learn as 
opposed to ‘easy’. The emotionally neutral concepts that I take to be problematic for 
Kousta et al.’s (2011) account are simple nominal concepts such as IDEA or MOTIVE. 
It could be the case that an explanation regarding the content and acquisition of these 
concepts can be made in terms of tacit syntactic proficiency in recognising argument 
structure and subcategorization frames, but we do not have such an explanation yet.   
The second point of confusion here is between concept acquisition and 
vocabulary acquisition. I take Kousta et al. (2011) to be offering an explanation of the 
content and acquisition of concepts. Roughly, the question might be phrased as, ‘how 
does a child come to understand what anger is, and/or think using the concept 
ANGER?’. But this is a separate issue to the question of how it is that a child acquires 
the word ‘anger’ and its syntactic properties. Gleitman et al. (2005, pp. 25–26) make 
the explicit claim that ‘a considerable part of the bottleneck for vocabulary learners is 
not so much in limitations of the early conceptual repertoire but rather … determining 
which phonetic formative expresses which concept’. Gleitman et al. assume that a 
child must have already acquired a concept in order to be able to map it to the 
appropriate vocabulary, and cite a range of studies that purport to show that infants 
have acquired concepts before they have acquired the relevant vocabulary. Indeed, 
they specifically take aim at theories that assume that concept acquisition just is 
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vocabulary acquisition. Their goal is to provide an explanation of how concepts that 
a child has already acquired can be mapped onto vocabulary that they do not yet 
know. Recall that Kousta et al. hold that ‘linguistic’ information partly constitutes the 
content of abstract concepts. I do not want to argue that this claim is definitely false, 
but rather I want to point out that they have not provided an explanation of what this 
linguistic information is or how it does provide concept constitutive information. The 
problem is that it is not obvious how linguistic ‘syntactic’ information could help 
constitute the content of concepts that need to have been already acquired in order 
to acquire this syntactic information. As far as I can tell, Gleitman et al. (2005) do not 
provide this explanation. 
An important question we have not considered so far is: why would the 
emotional affective information that is supposedly constitutive of an abstract concept 
speed up lexical decision time? This is similar to the question we asked previously 
about explanations for why concrete words supposedly elicited shorter reaction times 
than abstract items. What is the process by which the positive emotional experiential 
information constitutive of the concept HAPPY speeds up a lexical decision to the 
letter string <happy>? If there is such a process, then this would imply something 
quite remarkable about how the human brain stores information relating to 
orthographic word forms, namely that the availability of a word form to the processing 
and decision procedures of the mind-brain is ranked in order of degree of emotional 
valence of its associated concept. It could be that Kousta et al. (2011) have such an 
explanation, or independent evidence that this implication is true, but they do not 
seem to provide one in their text. In a reply to Paivio’s (2013) commentary, Vigliocco 
et al. (2013) do briefly consider this issue, but I am not sure that their explanation 
suffices. They state:   
… one can argue that lexical decision is not an appropriate 
task to assess predictions by DCT because lexical decision 
only taps into early processes, whereas the engagement of 
the imagistic system would occur later (Paivio, 2013, pp. 282). 
Semantic effects are, however, consistently observed in 
lexical decision, whether reflected in the thousands of studies 
in which semantic priming is observed… or reflected in 
numerous other studies showing the effects of semantic 
variables at the single word level. 
Vigliocco et al. (2013, p. 289) 
46 
 
It is true that ‘semantic’ effects have been frequently reported in lexical decision 
studies, but it is important to note that there is some debate as to what produces these 
effects. For example, Shelton and Martin (1992) argue that priming in lexical decision 
does not really reflect a ‘semantic’ effect at all, but is due instead to distributional 
relations between lexical items (the word ‘cat’ primes ‘dog’ because ‘cats’ is frequently 
followed by the words ‘… and dogs’, but not because of some overlap in content 
between the concepts CAT and DOG). Vigliocco et al. (2013) cite Lucas’ (2000) 
review on semantic priming in support of their case, but even if we accept that such 
priming truly is ‘semantic’ in the sense that it results from a causal effect of some 
conceptual content on the availability of other conceptual content, it is still not the 
case that this could explain Kousta et al.’s (2011) results. This is because Kousta et 
al. (2011) simply did not run any experiments in which priming should arise at all. 
They presented their stimuli in a randomised order for every participant, and any 
prime-target relations that occurred would have been accidental. Indeed, one of the 
reasons that the presentation of stimuli in lexical decision tasks is randomised is to 
eliminate the effects of any chance ordering of word pairs that might give rise to 
priming that is not of experimental interest.  
Vigliocco et al. (2013) also cite Balota et al. (2007), Chumbley and Balota 
(1984), and James (1975) as examples of different kinds of ‘semantic’ effects in 
lexical decision, which are not based on priming. However, I just can’t see how these 
particular studies provide support to the idea that high emotional valence speeds up 
lexical decision latencies. Chumbley and Balota (1984) found that there was a 
statistically significant correlation between the time it takes participants to produce an 
associated word, given a stimulus word, and lexical decision latencies to those 
stimulus words. This is a completely different kind of ‘semantic’ effect to the one that 
Vigliocco et al. (2013) are positing (that the availability of a word form to the 
processing and decision procedures of the mind-brain is ranked in order of degree of 
emotional valence of its associated concept). Balota et al. (2007) is a report of the 
English Lexicon Project, which is a database of lexical decision reaction times. But 
none of the other variables included in that project seem to be ‘semantic’; instead they 
are patently non-semantic variables such as word length, frequency, and 
orthographic neighbourhood density. Finally, James (1975), as we saw above, 
investigated concreteness effects on lexical decision, and did not consistently find 
such effects. 
The upshot of all of this is that even if we accept that abstract words do elicit 
shorter decision latencies than concrete words, we have not yet achieved a satisfying 
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explanation of why this difference should occur. Furthermore, as we saw above, there 
are other lexical decision studies that purport to show a decision latency advantage 
for concrete words (Binder et al., 2005), as well as studies that suggest that there is 
no difference (Brysbaert et al., 2016). I take all this to show that, for the present 
moment at least, we just should not rely on lexical decision data in order to inform our 
theories of concepts with respect to the concrete-abstract distinction.  
2.9 Emotion concepts and the concrete-
abstract distinction 
I will now offer a relatively self-contained argument against the validity of the 
concrete-abstract distinction as it applies to emotion concepts. I appreciate that I have 
been quite critical of Kousta et al. (2011) so far. But I want to stress that I think their 
proposals regarding emotion concepts such as ANGER, FEAR, and HAPPY are 
interesting and plausible suggestions. As mentioned above, accounts of abstract 
conceptual content tend to be thin on the ground, and so any progress in this regard 
is something to welcome. However, I think that if we examine the logic of the concrete-
abstract distinction with respect to Kousta et al.’s ideas, the motivation for making the 
distinction in the first place collapses. As we saw in the introductory sections of this 
chapter, abstractness is rarely defined in a rigorous way. Our concrete concepts have 
something in common, which is that they are presumably acquired on the basis of 
sensorimotor experience. However, the only property that abstract concepts seem to 
have in common is that they ‘aren’t concrete’. I now want to argue that, actually, we 
have no reason to hold that emotion concepts aren’t concrete. In fact, Kousta et al. 
have provided a clear account of exactly how it is that emotion concepts aren’t 
abstract.  
Many theorists (e.g. Paivio (1986), Dove (2016, 2011) Barsalou (2003), and 
Kousta et al. (2011)) emphasise that sensorimotor experience is a central source of 
conceptual content. However, all of these theorists, arguably even Paivio, are also 
more or less explicit that sensorimotor experience should not be thought of as relating 
only to the five canonical bodily senses. Although Kousta et al. stress the point the 
most, Barsalou, Dove and Paivio all make mention of introspective and ‘affective’ 
states too. Barsalou, and Kousta et al. both explicitly claim that the mind-brain can 
‘capture’ information contained in affective mental states. The key element of Kousta 
et al.’s theory of abstract conceptual content is that the mental representations 
‘captured from’ these affective mental states help to constitute the content of abstract 
concepts, and not concrete concepts. Barsalou (1999) suggests something similar. 
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In this section, I argue that this move is a mistake. If this idea about capturing 
information derived from affective states is even close to correct, then the way that 
the concrete-abstract distinction tends to be drawn is not only vague, but it is 
inconsistent. And if a distinction is vague and inconsistent, then we should probably 
abandon it. My view is that it is not consistent for these theorists to maintain that DOG 
is concrete in a way that emotion concepts are not. I shall argue for this view by 
providing a rough characterisation of how embodied cognition theory says we acquire 
the concept DOG in terms of sensorimotor experience, and then showing how the 
same characterisation could just as well apply to FEAR (an emotion concept). I then 
consider two potential objections, and some responses to them.  
Imagine a human, Isobelle, who has never had any experience with any dogs 
or dog-like animal, but has otherwise typical cognitive function. One day, Isobelle 
encounters a dog. Light reflected off of the dog travels through the lens of Isobelle’s 
eye and hits her retina. There, a formation of light sensitive cells passes this sensory 
impression along the optic nerve in the form of action potentials and neurotransmitters 
released across synaptic gaps, towards the visual cortex in the occipital lobe. The 
dog barks. This barking causes compressions in the air in the form of a wave. This 
wave strikes Isobelle’s ear drum, and the resulting vibrations are propagated through 
a complicated series of tiny bones until they reach the cochlea. Spirals of miniscule 
hairs arranged by their responsivity to different frequencies then pass this sensory 
information to the auditory nerve, towards auditory cortex in manner analogous to the 
light sensitive cells of the retina. The information instantiated in various neural 
assemblies in the visual and auditory cortex that were stimulated as a result of the 
physical process of experiencing the dog starts to become ‘bound’ together as a 
concept. This is how Isobelle acquires the DOG concept. When Isobelle thinks about 
dogs, this neutrally instantiated information is what allows her to do so, by virtue of 
the fact that it is sensorimotor information derived from her physical experience(s) of 
encountering a dog. The fact that Isobelle’s DOG concept was acquired this way, 
through a physically instantiated interplay between an external stimulus, cells, and 
electrochemical signals, means that neuropsychologists label it a ‘concrete’ concept.  
Barsalou, Dove, and Kousta et al. are not exactly clear on how, or at what 
point in these strings of events, the sensory information is ‘captured’ and made 
available to cognitive processes. But if the embodied cognition account is true then 
hopefully at some point in the future, the fields of neuroscience and neuroanatomy 
might be able to tell us. Now, let’s assume this account is indeed broadly correct. I 
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think that there is no basis for claiming that FEAR is any less ‘concrete’ than DOG. In 
order to demonstrate this, let’s imagine that Isobelle has never been afraid before:    
One day, Isobelle is suddenly and without warning plunged into total darkness, 
and hears an ear-splitting animal scream accompanied by ominous industrial noise. 
In response to this unexpected stimulus, Isobelle’s sympathetic nervous system and 
hypothalamus release a cocktail of chemicals and hormones through her body and 
bloodstream, such as adrenaline, noradrenaline, and dozens of others. These 
chemicals cause, among other things, her heart rate to quicken and her blood 
pressure to rise. Her breathing also speeds up. Various muscles tense up, and other 
muscles relax. Her blood sugar level rises. This sudden combination of muscle 
tensing and chemical bombardment causes a hot, nauseous feeling that seems to 
emanate from her stomach.  Veins are constricted so that blood is diverted away from 
her extremities and towards major muscle groups, causing a characteristic chilling of 
her fingers and toes. All of these sensations, among others, are ultimately transferred 
through nerve cells and received as electrochemical signals in her brain distributed 
through assemblies of neurons. It seems plausible to me that this is at least part of 
the story of how Isobelle comes to be able to think about being afraid: she has 
experienced fear. The information instantiated in neural assemblies that were 
stimulated in response to fear-inducing events can capture this experience and 
become bound together as a concept. When Isobelle thinks about being afraid, this 
neutrally instantiated information is what allows her to do so, by virtue of the fact that 
it is sensorimotor information derived from her physical experience of fear-inducing 
events. My argument is that the fact that Isobelle’s FEAR concept was acquired this 
way, through a physically instantiated interplay between an external stimulus, cells, 
and electrochemical signals, means that we have no grounds for wanting to claim that 
FEAR isn’t concrete. 
Suppose that the sketches just provided are a reasonable (but partial) 
summary of how embodied cognition accounts explain concept acquisition. I do not 
see much reason to suppose that the neural assemblies that responded as a result 
of the chemical and physical activity produced by the fear-inducing event ‘capture’ 
this experience in a different way to how the neural assemblies in visual cortex can 
capture the experience of light reflecting off of a dog. Kousta et al. (2011) consistently 
indicate that emotion concepts are ‘abstract’ and therefore qualitatively different to 
‘concrete’ concepts. But it seems to me that this is the wrong way to go. Much of the 
discussion about the qualitative distinction between concrete and abstract concepts 
concerns how they are ‘represented in’ the brain. The general consensus is that they 
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must be ‘represented differently’. Often, the kind of evidence that gets deployed in 
support of this consensus is based on measurements of neural activity (Barber et al., 
2013; Binder et al., 2005; Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios and Holcomb, 1994). But I 
think that the FEAR story shows that any of the concepts that theorists refer to when 
they render emotion words in capital letters (FEAR, ANGER, LOVE, etc.) just should 
not be thought of as abstract at all. That is because, from the point of view of 
electrochemical signals propagating throughout assemblies of neurons and nerve 
cells, there isn’t any reason to suppose that the content of thoughts that feature DOG 
is ‘represented differently’ to the content of thoughts that feature FEAR (or any other 
affective concepts). 
I will now consider some objections to the point I have been trying to make. 
Perhaps the most obvious objection is that there is still a clear difference in how FEAR 
and DOG are mentally represented: neuroimaging investigations show that spatially 
distinct structures in the brain respond to reading emotionally laden words such as 
‘fear’ and (more) emotionally neutral words such as ‘dog’ (Maddock et al., 2003). And 
if different neural structures are implicated, then surely that indicates that there are 
qualitatively different kinds or formats of representation at play, because of the spatial 
distinctiveness principle we saw before (Holcomb et al., 1999). So perhaps we might 
maintain that FEAR is importantly distinct from DOG on these grounds, and we might 
as well label this distinction using the familiar concrete-abstract terminology. 
However, I don’t think this objection goes through if we want to maintain the rest of 
the claims made by embodied cognition theories. That’s because there are spatially 
distinct structures implicated in processing all kinds of stimuli, and there doesn’t seem 
to be any principle that separates the structures implicated in experiencing emotions 
(or reading emotionally-laden words) from the structures implicated in perceiving 
dogs, other than sheer stipulation.  
Consider again the story about Isobelle and her DOG concept. The auditory 
and visual cortex are pretty spatially distinct. The visual cortex is located towards the 
back of the brain, in the occipital lobe. The auditory cortex is located on the upper 
side of a portion of the temporal lobe, in the lateral part of the brain. Neuroscientists 
can reliably localise neural responses to visual and auditory stimuli to these regions. 
My point here is that the same argument about spatially distinct structures 
representing the DOG and FEAR concepts should just as well apply to the different 
kinds of sense experience we have of dogs. If spatially distinct structures indicate 
different kinds or formats of representation (or different kinds of concept), then we 
should say that there is a DOG(AUDITORY) concept, and a DOG(VISUAL) concept, 
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and a DOG(TACTILE) concept, and so on, as opposed to a single DOG concept. But 
this idea does not seem to be popular in the literature. Rather, the prevailing 
assumption is that there is just one DOG concept, and that it is made up of both 
auditory and visual mental representations, among others. Again, I think it would just 
be stipulative to claim that visual and auditory mental representations are ‘concrete’ 
but affective mental representations are qualitatively different and ‘abstract’, when the 
acquisition of the concepts they constitute can plausibly be traced back to the same 
kinds of biophysical processes. Moreover, there are other pairs of domains for which 
different neuroanatomical regions are implicated in processing or categorisation of 
stimuli. Neuroscientists find that different areas of the brain preferentially respond to 
seeing pictures of animals versus pictures of tools (West et al., 2001). But, as far as 
I know, no one has been tempted to suggest that this indicates that there is a 
fundamental distinction between the formats of the mental representations that 
support the visual categorisation of tools and those that support the visual 
categorisation of animals. 
A counterargument here could be that there are some bodily sense 
apparatuses that are primary in some respect. Perhaps the five canonical bodily 
senses; sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell. So it could be that a concept is concrete 
if it is acquired and mentally represented on the basis of some primary sense data 
coming from these five senses. The FEAR concept wouldn’t be counted as concrete 
because it was acquired on the basis of some non-primary, body-internal sense data 
(such as the feeling of hot nausea caused by the contraction of various muscles and 
the diversion of resources away from the digestive system during bouts of fear). I 
have two responses to this counterargument. Firstly, I think it is still purely stipulative. 
We would need some evidence or reason to believe that stimulation of body-internal 
nerve cells produces qualitatively different kinds of mental representation to 
stimulation of body-external nerve cells. Secondly, without this evidence, this 
stipulation doesn’t take on any explanatory role in maintaining the concrete-abstract 
distinction. The only theoretical element that this stipulation preserves is the concrete-
abstract distinction with respect to DOG and FEAR. And the very point I am arguing 
is that in this case, there might not be a need to draw the distinction in the first place.  
There is another issue that I want to consider here, and it has to do with the 
often-proposed relationship between ‘linguistic’ representations and abstract 
concepts. Paivio (1986) proposed a kind of linguistic representation, the logogen, in 
an attempt to explain the content of abstract concepts. Dove (2011, 2014) especially 
seems convinced that ‘linguistic’ representations are the key factor in explaining what 
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abstract conceptual content is and how it is acquired (solving the ‘problem of 
abstraction’). As we saw above, Kousta et al. (2011) propose that ‘a statistical 
preponderance of affective and linguistic information [underlies] abstract word 
meanings’ relative to concrete word meanings. Let us allow for a moment that 
‘abstract’ conceptual content does distinctively and importantly depend on some kind 
of linguistic representation, and that this is partly what separates abstract conceptual 
content from concrete conceptual content. Now, there is even less reason to suppose 
that FEAR is abstract in a way that DOG is not (or, conversely, that DOG is concrete 
in a way that FEAR is not). This is because the FEAR story shows that Isobelle’s 
experience of fear, and subsequent simulation of it, doesn’t have to have anything to 
do with linguistic processing at all. It seems implausible to suppose that we can’t have 
a concept of a given emotional or affective state until we have learned that there is a 
word in our language that refers to that state. So there is nothing for a ‘linguistic’ 
representation to do when it comes to acquiring a concept of an emotion, or what it is 
to be in a certain emotional state. The upshot of all of this is that for any affective state 
for which we want to posit a concept, that concept should not be labelled abstract: 
there is no principled ontological distinction in embodied cognition between concepts 
of dogs and fear. And, I want to stress that this is actually a positive outcome, because 
if you endorse an embodied cognition account, the set of concepts that has 
traditionally been considered hard to explain is now smaller. 
2.10 Summary of Chapter 2 
I now summarise what we have seen so far. Concreteness is an important 
psycholinguistic construct that has been investigated extensively for decades. In 
psycholinguistic experiments, concreteness is a property of words, and words are 
assumed to have close and reliable connections with the concepts we have. A 
concrete concept is a concept that has been acquired on the basis of sensorimotor 
experience. What an abstract concept is has proven very difficult to define, although 
theorists tend to associate them with ‘linguistic’ and ‘affective’ mental representations. 
In list memory experiments, concreteness effects are reliably obtained whereby 
concrete words are easier to remember than abstract words. In EEG experiments, 
concrete words reliably elicit larger N400 amplitudes than abstract words, despite the 
fact that N400 amplitudes are thought to correlate with processing difficulty, and the 
typical assumption is that concrete words are easier to process than abstract words. 
Although statistically significant experimental contrasts are often obtained, the fMRI 
data on concreteness effects is highly variable and there are many inconsistent 
findings. In lexical decision experiments, results are even more variable. Sometimes 
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these experiments produce an advantage for concrete items, sometimes they 
produce an advantage for abstract items, and sometimes there is no concreteness 
effect at all. This arguably invalidates theoretical explanations predicated on the idea 
that concrete words elicit shorter reaction times than abstract words in these tasks 
(Binder et al., 2005; Connell and Lynott, 2012). Kousta et al. (2011) obtained evidence 
for an advantage for abstract items, and proposed that this advantage is due to the 
fact that abstract concepts are constituted by information derived from emotional 
affective states to a greater degree than concrete items. Even if we were to favour 
their finding over the dozen or so other conflicting findings in the literature, I have 
suggested that, without some explanation of what the causal effect of emotional 
valence is on decision latencies, we should be cautious about endorsing their theory 
as it stands. I have also presented an argument that if we accept Kousta et al.’s (2011) 
fundamental point that information derived from emotional affective states can 
provide the mechanisms for acquiring concepts and instantiating them in cognitive 
processes, we should not hold that these particular concepts are abstract. That is 
because these concepts seem to have the same properties as concrete concepts, 
and so with respect to emotion concepts, there is no reason to draw the concrete-
abstract distinction. 
 In the next chapter, I consider how theories of cognition and concepts 
intersect with the concrete-abstract distinction. I will argue that no matter which theory 
we endorse, some proposed abstract concepts do not actually do any explanatory 
work in these theories. Consequently, we should not hold that words and concepts 
stand in a reliable correspondence with one another. Furthermore, this 
correspondence is least reliable when it comes to those words which we tend to label 
as ‘abstract’. I think this argument provides evidence against the utility of the 
concrete-abstract distinction, as it is operationalised in psycholinguistics.  
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Chapter 3: Concreteness and 
concepts 
 
In the previous chapter, we considered concreteness as a psycholinguistic variable; 
the experimental effects that have been attributed to it; and some explanations of 
these experimental effects. We also saw that pretty much universally, psycholinguists 
assume that words of English match up with concepts in a regular and relatively 
automatic way, such that when a participant encounters a word in an experimental 
task, they will undertake processing that operates over a concept that corresponds to 
that word. In this chapter, I consider various theories about what concepts are, what 
properties they have, and what role they play in cognition. I show that philosophers 
and theoretically-minded psychologists tend to agree with psycholinguists about the 
relationship between words and concepts. I will pay particular attention to two kinds 
of view: a Fodorian (1998, 1975) language of thought and a Barsalou-ian (1999; 2008) 
simulator account. I single out these kinds of view because in an important respect 
they represent opposing schools of thought about the properties that conceptual 
mental representations have. Fodor believed that concepts are amodal, arbitrary 
symbols that enter into syntactic relations with each other in order to produce 
thoughts. Barsalou believes that concepts are simulators of experience, and that the 
mental representations involved are not arbitrary, in the sense that they are the same 
or similar in format to the mental representations involved in the experience from 
which a simulator was derived. I want to convince you that no matter which kind of 
view you want to endorse, the concrete-abstract distinction does not actually amount 
to anything. I will consider the case of the alleged concept JUSTICE, an abstract 
concept par excellence. I will demonstrate that it is explanatorily vacuous both as a 
symbol in a Fodorian language of thought, and as a simulator in a Barsalou-ian 
embodied cognition framework. By this, I mean that as a component of either theory, 
JUSTICE does not allow us to explain or predict anything about human behaviour or 
cognition. Since this is the main job of a concept, I conclude that there is no such 
concept, and that therefore the relationship between words and concepts is not as 
reliable as it is generally assumed to be.  I end the chapter by acknowledging two 
major objections to the arguments I am about to make. The chapters following this 
one contain my responses to these objections.  
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. To start, I provide a summary of 
Fodorian and Barsalou-ian views on concepts and cognition. I also briefly consider a 
range of other views. I show that although there is certainly disagreement when it 
comes down to the details, there is actually quite a strong consensus across the 
philosophical and psychological literatures regarding three non-trivial issues. With this 
general understanding of the differences and similarities between Fodor and Barsalou 
in place, I move on to make my arguments against the explanatory utility of JUSTICE. 
I show that every theory we have considered so far has a reasonable story to tell 
about concepts we think of as concrete, such as DOG. Theories can explain how 
DOG is acquired, and they have sensible proposals about what properties DOG has, 
such that it can play certain roles in cognition and behaviour. However, there is no 
theory that has a reasonable story to tell about the alleged concept JUSTICE, and 
there are no sensible proposals about how JUSTICE is acquired or what properties it 
has such that it plays a role in anything. I suggest that we simply have not been 
thinking about concepts in the right way. Concepts are parts of theories of cognition: 
they are theoretical posits. We use concepts to explain behaviour and cognitive 
processes. I rehearse some thought experiments designed to show that the reason 
that we cannot say how JUSTICE is acquired, or what properties it has, is that 
JUSTICE does not play an explanatory role in our cognitive theories. If a theoretical 
posit does not play an explanatory role then it does not belong in a theory, and we 
should abandon it. I conclude that we should not posit JUSTICE, and I suggest that 
the same strategy I employ here might be used to rule out other alleged abstract 
concepts which cause trouble for our theories of cognition.  
3.1 The Fodorian Language of Thought 
Hypothesis 
Typically, when psychologists talk about concepts, they (knowingly or not) draw 
on a framework inspired by Fodor (1998, 1975). They draw on this framework in two 
ways. Firstly, Fodor took word-level linguistic structures to reveal concepts that we 
possess.2 So one way of deciding what basic-level concepts there are is to see if 
there is a word for something in the language(s) that we speak. On this approach, it’s 
                                               
2 The reader (or indeed Fodor himself) might object to this characterisation of his view. It might be 
difficult to pin Fodor down on what he thinks the precise relationship is between the number of 
words we have and the number of concepts we have. I would point out that others have also 
suggested that this is the most straightforward way to read him (Margolis and Laurence, 2015; 
Rescorla, 2017; Sperber and Wilson, 1998). 
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natural to suppose that English speakers have a JUSTICE concept because there is 
an English word, ‘justice’. Spanish speakers also have a JUSTICE concept because 
there is a Spanish word, ‘justicia’. Note how the distinction between words and 
concepts is supposed to work: both English and Spanish speakers have a JUSTICE 
concept, and not different concepts, despite the fact that each language has a 
different word for justice. This property of concepts is called ‘publicity’: concepts are 
‘public’ in the sense that two people can (and generally do) have the same concept 
Type in their respective conceptual repertoires. The view that publicity is a necessary 
property for concepts to have is endorsed fairly frequently (Fodor, 1998; Prinz, 2004), 
although Barsalou (1999, 2017) is harder to pin down on how public he thinks 
concepts are: he sometimes says that ‘simulators’ - his term for concepts - are 
‘shared’ but other times he uses weaker phrases such as ‘highly similar’. Publicity is 
frequently endorsed because it’s often supposed that concepts must be shared in 
order to explain how it is that humans understand and reason about each other. If we 
didn’t have the same concepts, the thinking goes, then we couldn’t communicate 
properly, because if we didn’t have the same concepts, then we would be incapable 
of thinking the same thoughts. I return to this issue later on, but for now, it’s fair to say 
that the word-concept approach is intuitively appealing because it suggests why some 
concepts seem ‘basic’ in some sense; it suggests a way of delineating a kind of core 
conceptual library. No one has a basic-level SUSPICIOUS UNCLE LIVING IN OHIO 
concept because there isn’t a lexemic structure in any language (I assume) that 
corresponds to whatever it is that SUSPICIOUS UNCLE LIVING IN OHIO applies to. 
As we will see, pretty much every theory of concepts assumes that words have a 
close connection to concepts. 
The second main contribution Fodor made to psycholinguistic theorising about 
concepts is his notion of what the relationship between thoughts and concepts is. 
Fodor was very keen to stress that concepts are ‘compositional’. This means that they 
are ‘constituents’ of thoughts, and they combine in systematic ways to produce the 
content of the thoughts of which they are a part. So thoughts are made up of different 
concepts. In turn, these constituent concepts may themselves be composed of 
concepts. Ultimately though, thoughts will decompose down into atomistic concepts 
that are not themselves made up of constituent concepts: these are the basic-level 
concepts that a natural language might more or less reveal. Fodor viewed concepts 
as atomistic in a relatively strict sense: on Fodor’s view, there is no level of analysis 
below that of the concept. For him, the concept is the fundamental unit of cognition, 
and by ‘fundamental’ I do not simply mean ‘most important’; I mean that basic-level 
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concepts are the terminal of the hierarchy of cognitive constructs. Modern 
psychological approaches to concepts use the idea that words reveal concepts, and 
that concepts compose, but in general they do not treat concepts as atomic. Indeed, 
much of the current work on the concrete-abstract distinction is based on the 
assumption that concepts must be ‘made up of’ other mental representations (e.g. 
sensorimotor representations), and one of the key challenges is to specify what kinds 
of mental representations make up each of our concepts, and how they do so.  
In any case, on Fodor’s view, concepts are units in the language of thought. 
Concepts can enter into syntactic relations with one another in order to produce 
thoughts. If the concepts DOG, LOVE, and others enter into the right syntactic 
relations with one another, specified in the language of thought, then a cognitive agent 
has a thought expressible with the sentence, “I love dogs”. This syntactic relationship 
between concepts is a crucial component of Fodor’s view because he claimed that 
this is the only way of accounting for what he called the ‘productivity’ and 
‘systematicity’ of thought. Thought is ‘productive’ in that we seem to be able to 
entertain an unlimited number of them. Thought is ‘systematic’ in that that are 
important regularities about the thoughts we are able to have. If someone can think a 
thought expressible with the sentence “I love dogs”, then, Fodor suggested, they will 
always be able to think a thought expressible with the sentence “dogs love me”. Fodor 
believed that the only way for these two properties to obtain was if the structure of 
thought was relevantly similar to the structure of language; which is to say that thought 
has a syntactic structure, of which concepts are constituents.  
Very importantly, on Fodor’s view concepts are really just arbitrary symbols. 
We use English words (“dog”) to depict them, but the concepts that feature in 
cognitive processes do not have any content in and of themselves. There is no 
necessary relationship between the sensorimotor experience from which a concept 
was acquired, and the format of that concept as a mental representation: this makes 
Fodor’s theory an amodal view of concepts. You might wonder how this could possibly 
be the case. Surely a concept must have some kind of content, because concepts 
must apply to things out there in the world. If a concept is just an arbitrary symbol, not 
completely unlike a series of 1s and 0s in machine language, then how would a 
concept do this?  Another important component of Fodor’s theory, which we shall 
return to later, is the mechanism by which concepts are ‘individuated’. To say what 
individuates a concept is to say what makes it the case that a concept is the concept 
that it is. In other words, what makes it the case that a DOG concept is a concept that 
picks out dogs, rather than, say, cats, or theorems? Fodor’s answer to this tricky 
58 
 
problem was that the thing that individuates the DOG concept is that it is 
nomologically locked to dogs, out there in the world. There is a law-like connection 
between DOG and dogs. The DOG concept, an arbitrary symbol, is tokened by dogs; 
it is causally related to dogs in a very specific way. That’s what makes a DOG concept 
a DOG concept, according to Fodor. This solution to the problem of concept 
individuation has a potentially surprising upshot. You might ask how or why the 
human mind-brain becomes nomologically locked to something, or anything, in the 
first place. Why do arbitrary symbols in the language of thought become 
nomologically locked to certain categories and not others? Fodor’s (1975) answer to 
this problem was to assume that many concepts, and/or perhaps the nomological 
lockings themselves, are innate. Our mind-brain just is the kind of thing that becomes 
nomologically locked to the categories that it does in fact become locked to. 
3.2 Barsalou’s simulator theory 
Barsalou’s (1999; 2008) account looks quite different to Fodor’s. In brief, 
Barsalou’s view is that neural assemblies that respond to perceptual stimulation are 
able to store aspects of the experience of this stimulation for later use. Repeated 
exposure to categories of objects and events results in a distributed network of stored 
sensorimotor representations that can be called upon to simulate the experiences 
from which they were originally derived. So, for example, after I have experienced a 
dog in various ways (seeing one, hearing one, etc.), a distributed assembly of neurons 
captures this experience and becomes bound together in a simulator. On this view, 
having a DOG concept is having a simulator — a distributed neural assembly 
containing sensorimotor representations of experience of dogs — that is capable of 
partially simulating this experience.  It is these modal, sensorily-bound simulations 
that constitute (or generate) the units of thought.  
There are number of important caveats and nuances in Barsalou’s theory. In 
the first instance, Barsalou (1999) is careful to stress that a simulation will always be 
imperfect in various ways. So, a specific simulation of dogs that features in a thought 
I have about dogs will always be a somewhat vague approximation of the experience 
from which I constructed the dog simulator. This imperfection results from the fact 
that simulators and simulations are ‘dynamic’ in that they are constantly changing. 
Any new experience of dogs has the potential to change the structure of my existing 
dog simulator. Furthermore, every specific simulation of a dog that my dog simulator 
produces is highly task- and context-dependent. If simulations from different 
simulators interact with each other in a certain way, then it is even possible for these 
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simulations to change the structure of the simulators that generated them via a 
feedback mechanism. On this view, every time I have a thought that is about dogs, 
the specific simulation of dogs that is instantiated is temporary and ‘one-off’. In the 
general case, the simulations that feature in thought A will not be the same as the 
simulations that feature in thought B, even if these simulations come from the same 
simulator(s). This is because when a simulator is active (generating a simulation that 
will feature in a cognitive process), only a subset of the total network that constitutes 
that simulator will ever be engaged, and this subset is so task- and context-dependent 
that it will never be perfectly re-instantiated. Typically, networks of simulators will be 
activated during cognitive processing in such a way that there may be an enormously 
complicated interplay between parts of different simulators, feedback between 
simulations and simulators, dynamically changing simulations, and so on. 
Another important point to stress is that, as Barsalou (2016) has recently 
emphasised, he does not use the term “sensorimotor experience” in a narrow way. 
He has never claimed that experience in the five canonical bodily senses is the only 
thing that can play a role in the acquisition of concepts, or their instantiation in 
thoughts. Instead, he allows that the whole range of information derivable from any 
bodily state can constitute simulators that play these roles (such as emotional-
affective states, interoceptive states, and proprioceptive states). Probably the most 
important difference between Fodor and Barsalou is that Barsalou endorses an 
embodied, or situated, cognition view. On this sort of view, the mental representations 
that feature in thoughts are not amodal: they are relevantly like the mental 
representations produced by actual sensorimotor experience of an object or event. 
They retain this sensorimotor character when they feature in cognitive processes that 
take place in the absence of these objects and events. For embodied cognition views, 
the thing that makes a DOG concept a DOG concept is that it is made up of 
sensorimotor representations derived from perceptual experience of dogs. So there 
is a non-arbitrary connection between the format of the mental representation, DOG, 
and the category it applies to, namely dogs.  
3.3 Areas of agreement about concepts 
We will return to specific details of both of these views when it comes to my arguments 
against the explanatory utility of JUSTICE, but for now I just hope to have outlined in 
broad strokes what each kind of theory involves. Drawing on a range of other thinkers 
and proposals, I now want to show that in some respects, there is actually quite 
widespread agreement about what properties concepts and thoughts have in both the 
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psychological and philosophical literatures. In what follows, the term ‘unitary cognitive 
resource’ will be crucial to much of my exposition, and so I introduce this section by 
outlining what I mean by it. By ‘unitary cognitive resource’, I mean a set of mental 
representations, and the brain structures that underwrite them, that form a cohesive 
whole in the context of a psychological theory. The stress in the previous sentence 
has intended significance: many views of concepts might hold that as neuro-
psychologically instantiated objects, concepts aren’t unitary or cohesive. However, I 
am referring here to concepts as elements of our psychological theories and 
explanations. I appreciate that this distinction might seem somewhat obscure, so let 
me try and flesh it out a bit: 
Unitary cognitive resources can occur in thoughts, and they have properties 
that allow them to play causal roles in the thoughts in which they occur. If a 
philosopher or psychologist interested in concepts has rendered a word in capitals, 
italics, or quotation marks, then it seems to me quite likely that they are alluding to 
what I mean by a ‘unitary cognitive resource’. The idea is that my DOG concept is a 
unitary cognitive resource in that whatever structures and processes there are in my 
brain that enable me to reliably categorise and cognise about dogs as such, they are 
sufficiently cohesive across different instances of my categorising and cognising 
about dogs that we can try and build a theory of them. With sufficient knowledge of 
the brain and the appropriate technology, perhaps we could in principle (although 
maybe not in practice) specify exactly which structures in my brain are the ones that 
underwrite my ability to categorise and cognise about dogs as such, or we could 
construct an algorithm that specifies how these structures will change in response to 
stimuli and other processes taking place within my brain. There is some kind of ‘core’ 
to these structures, and the mental representations that they underwrite, that make 
them identifiable as my DOG concept, or as the instantiators of my DOG concept in 
cognitive processes.3 I want to stress that the kind of psychological entity I am trying 
to describe here is compatible with basically any mainstream theory of concepts of 
any level. For example, if you think that concepts are neutrally instantiated as stores 
of information that are widely distributed throughout the brain, that is perfectly 
compatible with concepts being unitary cognitive resources as I conceive of them. 
The word ‘unitary’ is not supposed to imply ‘necessarily atomic’ or ‘localised to specific 
parts of brain tissue’, or ‘completely static’. It is just meant to imply that the brain 
                                               
3 Note that Machery (2009) and Barsalou (2017) use the word ‘core’ to refer to a putative kind of 
content that is central and potentially automatically activated when a cognitive process features a 
given concept. I do not have this notion of ‘core’ in mind here.  
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structures that underwrite possession of, say, a DOG concept, are in principle 
identifiable as those brain structures at time t and t+1.  
With this notion in place, I shall outline the received view of concepts in 
psychological and philosophical research, and show how the received view treats 
concepts as unitary cognitive resources. I will then argue that this received view fails 
in principle to provide theories of some ‘abstract’ concepts, because its fundamental 
assumptions are incorrect. The received view assumes that for more or less every 
word of English, we possess a unitary cognitive resource; a concept that corresponds 
to that word’s meaning. I do not argue that there are no such things as concepts or 
unitary cognitive resources. I simply argue that postulating abstract concepts such as 
JUSTICE has not helped us to explain phenomena or develop our theories of 
cognition, and so we do not have any justification for postulating them. 
Although the philosophical literature has produced many different views about 
what concepts are, what they are like, and what they do, an important trend has 
emerged across theories and proposals. This trend is to talk of concepts as if they 
were unitary cognitive resources in the sense just outlined. Dove (2014, p. 373) 
explicitly rejects Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis, but he still talks of concepts 
in a fundamentally Fodorian way, referring to concepts such as DEMOCRACY, 
ENTROPY, and JUSTICE (using capital letters notation). Carston (2012) uses more 
explicitly Fodorian language: ‘concepts… are constituents of thoughts’. Likewise, 
Burge (1993) describes concepts as ‘the sub-components of thought contents’. 
Barsalou (2008) proposes that linguistic representations are labels or pointers that 
trigger the activation of a relevant simulator in cognitive tasks. The ‘meaning’ of a 
word is generated by the simulator(s) that is triggered upon encountering that word. 
Barsalou (2008) states that ‘simulators are roughly equivalent to concepts’.  
At first glance, Barsalou’s view of concepts might seem very different to the 
others, but for my purposes I don’t think this is really the case. Barsalou’s view still 
suggests that there is a correspondence between (English) words and simulators, 
such that each word is connected to a unitary cognitive resource (or set of such 
resources). So I think Barsalou’s concepts are still unitary cognitive resources, 
despite the fact that, on his view, concepts generate the constituents of thoughts, 
rather than feature in thoughts themselves. But that isn’t really incompatible with the 
fundamental idea that thoughts can be analytically decomposed into constituent 
parts, or schematised as a collection of cohesive ‘chunks’. Furthermore, these parts 
or chunks can be traced back to a posited unitary cognitive resource; a concept, and 
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this concept is in a rough correspondence with an English word. Indeed, Barsalou 
(1999) himself uses language such as: ‘[simulators] combine to produce complex 
perceptual symbols combinatorially’. In the context of that discussion, Barsalou 
schematises a thought with the content ‘the balloon is above the cloud’ as involving 
simulators corresponding to balloon, above, and cloud. In any case, if Barsalou (2017) 
would reject the idea that he views concepts as unitary cognitive resources, then that 
is difficult to square with his talk of such ‘concepts’ as TRUTH being flexibly 
‘conceptualised’ in specific situations. It seems like TRUTH must be a unitary 
cognitive resource, or it wouldn’t make sense to talk of the same thing being 
conceptualised differently in different situations.  
A slightly different picture can be found in Camp (2015). She argues that there 
is a useful distinction to be made between concepts and what she calls 
‘characterisations’. On Camp’s view, concepts ‘function as arbitrary, recombinable, 
representational bits’. From what I can tell, Camp’s view of concepts is roughly in 
accord with the positions I have just discussed and the notion of unitary cognitive 
resources. The difference is that Camp identifies a new kind of mental representation, 
the ‘characterisation’, that she believes has been overlooked in studies of human 
cognition. Characterisations are associative, emotionally- and imagistically-charged 
collections of mental representations that are ‘contextually malleable’ in such a way 
as to support and augment the more minimal, language-like (Fodorian), core 
processing subserved by concepts. For the time being I simply want to point out that 
despite her distinction, she still describes a theoretical construct that seems like it 
must be a unitary cognitive resource.  
Machery (2009) outlines another anti-orthodox position that is important with 
regards to the issues I am considering here. Machery suggests that concepts should 
be thought of as bodies of knowledge that are used ‘by default’ in higher order 
cognitive processes. So the DOG concept is the collection of mental representations 
that features as a matter of course whenever a cognitive process is about dogs. If I 
understand him correctly, then I think this definition of ‘concept’ is compatible with my 
notion of a unitary cognitive resource. Machery (2009, p. 15) also alludes to a 
connection between words and concepts: ‘words seem to be associated with default 
bodies of knowledge’, and he uses capital letters notation to refer to concepts 
frequently. But Machery spends an entire book (titled Doing Without Concepts) 
arguing that the ‘concept’ construct is not theoretically useful because the phenomena 
that it has been used to explain are so diverse that there cannot be a category of 
concepts that has the properties that philosophers and psychologists seem to ascribe 
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to it. Instead, we should talk in terms of more fine-grained distinctions between 
empirically-supported constructs such as ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’, and ‘theory’ 
(Murphy, 2004). It is important to note here that, in some ways, Machery’s overall 
position regarding concepts is similar to the point I hope to have made by the end of 
this chapter. However, there are fundamental differences between my view and 
Machery’s. Contra Machery, I believe that concepts are useful constructs in many 
cases, and that they do good psychological and philosophical work. I am also highly 
sceptical that the finer-grained notions of mental representations that Machery prefers 
will deliver us a better account of ‘abstract’ concepts than the ones we have now. I 
simply argue against the view that we possess a concept for every word of English 
(or whatever language), where concept should be construed as a unitary cognitive 
resource. 
Aside from ‘what they are’, another important aspect of a theory of concepts 
is ‘what they do’. Again, here there is broad agreement across various literatures. 
Barsalou (1999, p. 383) suggests that concepts ‘represent  types  and  tokens … 
produce  categorical  inferences [and]  combine  symbols  productively’, among other 
things. Fodor (1998, p. 23) lays out a list of properties that he thinks concepts must 
have. One especially crucial property is that ‘concepts are categories and are 
routinely employed as such’. So, the DOG concept picks out the category of dogs and 
not the category of tigers. And in his classic overview of experimental psychology 
research on concepts, Murphy (2004) spends the entire introduction emphasising the 
role that concepts play in kind individuation and categorisation. One potential 
objection to the picture I am painting here is that Fodor means something different 
when he talks of concepts being ‘categories’ to what Murphy and others mean when 
they talk of the role that concepts play in categorisation as a cognitive process. It’s 
possible to read Fodor as making a metaphysical claim about what concepts are, as 
opposed to a psychological claim about processes that concepts “in the head” feature 
in, and what behaviour they mediate. However, given that Fodor (1998, 1975) 
consistently makes a virtue of referring to the psycholinguistic and language 
acquisition literatures when making his proposals, I don’t think this other reading is 
the correct one. The confusion might rest on Fodor’s view about what makes it the 
case that someone has a concept. Fodor argues that, contra to what he calls 
‘pragmatism’, having a concept of X isn’t ‘having the ability to categorise X’. Instead, 
having a concept of X is having a symbol in the language of thought that is 
nomologically locked to X. As far as I can tell though, Murphy et al. could concede 
this first point and still hold that concepts can (indeed, generally do) feature in the 
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mental processes that instantiate our categorisations. Furthermore, it also seems to 
me that Fodor would agree with Murphy et al. on the latter point. So if there is a debate 
to be had here, I don’t think it’s relevant for our purposes. 
This issue aside, note how the approaches to these two aspects of a theory 
of concepts – what concepts are and what they do – are pleasingly complementary 
in some respects. Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts, and they serve to 
pick out categories in the world. Many of our cognitive processes turn on the ability to 
make appropriate inferences based on category membership (if that’s a tiger, I should 
run). So what better candidate for enabling these inferences than a unitary cognitive 
resource that, among other things, represents (or stands for) categories? You and I 
could almost certainly have a mutually intelligible conversation about dogs. What 
better way of explaining this ability than the suggestion that we both possess a DOG 
concept that picks out the same category of things? Note also how, despite the fact 
that there are substantive differences between theorists concerning the details4, there 
is an extraordinary amount of agreement across the philosophical and psychological 
literatures when it comes down to the basics: It’s useful to think of thought as having 
constituent parts, these constituent parts are (or generate) cognitive stand-ins for 
categories, the words of natural language are in a rough correspondence with these 
constituent parts, and it’s these constituent parts that a theory of concepts has to 
provide an account of.  
To summarise, I think psychologists and philosophers have in mind the 
following picture when they investigate concepts. Concepts are (generators of) 
constituents of thought, and they come with lots of benefits. Perhaps the most 
important of these benefits is that they enable us to categorise things. Note that this 
is not to claim that this is all that concepts do, or that concepts ‘just are’ categories. 
The way to model thought is to think of it as being made up of, or constructed from, 
these constituents. A cognitive process that results in my realising or entertaining the 
proposition that ‘I love dogs’, therefore, contains the concepts DOG and LOVE, 
among others. There is a pretty reliable relationship between concepts and words of 
natural language such that there is roughly a concept in our cognitive repertoire for 
every word we know (putting synonymy and polysemy aside for the time being). 
Concepts are unitary cognitive resources in that they are distinctively cohesive and 
stable. Note that by stable, I do not mean to imply that a psychologist has to believe 
                                               
4 This might be putting it somewhat lightly. Fodor’s review of Murphy’s book ends: ‘Gregory 
Murphy's book tells you most of what there is to the psychology of concepts. Read it, therefore, by 
all means; but don't even consider believing it.’ 
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that the structure or representational makeup of a concept is immutable. Barsalou 
makes it very explicit that he believes the opposite. I simply mean that, in principle, it 
would be possible to ‘track’ brain structures such that at many different time points 
and situations, it makes sense to refer to those brain structures as instantiating the 
same concept. In this picture, it is relatively easy to explain how we acquire our DOG 
concept and what kind of mental representations underwrite our DOG concept. 
Although so far it has proven extremely difficult to account for, it is taken as just 
obvious that we also have a unitary cognitive resource corresponding to, say, 
JUSTICE, and that the structure, acquisition, and format of JUSTICE are among the 
explanatory targets of a theory of concepts (i.e., unitary cognitive resources). In what 
follows, I will argue that this is a fundamental mistake. 
3.4 Concepts as theoretical posits 
In this section, I shall suggest that in at least some cases, the lexemes of 
English (or any other language) are unreliable indicators of what concepts there are, 
if we take concepts to be anything like the things that many philosophers and 
psychologists seem to be talking about. Rendering a word in capital letters in order to 
distinguish that word from a concept may only give the illusion that there are such 
concepts in some cases. We should always bear in mind that concepts are posits. 
They are parts of theories that are supposed to explain something about the mind-
brain. The main job of a concept is to explain how it is that humans can cognise about 
and categorise things. So, the concept DOG – a posit – is supposed to be able to 
explain how we cognise about and categorise dogs. In the philosophy of science, 
different attitudes are taken towards the existence of theoretical posits. Broadly, two 
camps emerge: realism and antirealism. The realist doctrine holds that the theoretical 
posits of our best scientific theories really do exist. The electron is a theoretical posit 
in physics that figures usefully in the explanations of many physical phenomena. The 
predictive and explanatory power of the electron is so great that the realist declares 
that electrons exist, even though we do not and could not actually have any direct 
experience of electrons themselves. Putnam’s (1979) ‘miracles’ argument is a 
standard realist move: it seems incredible to suppose that it’s just a coincidence that 
all of our available evidence is consistent with the existence of the electron. The 
simplest and most plausible explanation is simply that electrons really do exist. 
The opposing view, antirealism, denies this. A popular antirealist argument is 
that the history of any science is littered with explanatorily and predictively successful 
theories that then later turned out to be false. For example, phlogiston was posited in 
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1667 by Johann Becher. Combustible materials contained phlogiston, so the story 
went, which was released during combustion and absorbed by air. This might sound 
quaint, but the phlogiston theory actually did quite a good job of explaining certain 
phenomena observed in combustion. But no one today believes in phlogiston. The 
antirealist then points out that we have no reason to expect that we have miraculously 
discovered the correct theoretical posits at any given point in time: who is to say that 
in the year 2200, the theory of the schmelectron, a posit that provides an explanatory 
and predictive advantage over the old electron theory, will not be taught in secondary 
schools around the world? And so the antirealist concludes that it isn’t safe to assume 
that any theoretical posit ‘really exists’. But importantly, the antirealist can still accept 
the explanatory and predictive power of successful theories. So the antirealist might 
say that the universe behaves as if the electron existed. And for most purposes, that’s 
good enough.  
I am bringing all of this up because, although they seem diametrically 
opposed, the realist and the antirealist actually agree about one crucial issue, and I 
think a lot turns on this issue when it comes to theorising about concepts. The issue 
that the realist and the antirealist agree on is that we should only entertain posits that 
have explanatory value. By this I just mean that theoretical posits need to help us 
predict or explain the phenomena that we are interested in explaining. The 
contemporary realist and the antirealist agree that phlogiston (probably) does not 
exist, and that there are now more successful theories of combustion that do not 
include it. The point at which the realist and the antirealist start debating is the point 
at which a theory is explanatorily successful, or a theoretical posit has explanatory 
value. My aim over the next few sections is to argue that although some proposed 
concepts (theoretical posits) have explanatory value, and potentially belong in 
theories of concepts, some do not. By this I mean that some concepts (e.g. DOG) 
play a clear role in explanations of human behaviour and cognition, whereas other 
concepts (E.G JUSTICE) do not have a clear role at all; in fact, our theories of 
concepts work just the same if we remove JUSTICE from them. I hope to demonstrate 
a methodology for identifying good candidates for concept-hood, and bad candidates. 
I will suggest that there are proposed concepts that are extremely difficult for any 
theory to account for, and the reason for this is these proposed concepts might not 
be concepts at all. I will try to show that, although it is useful to posit concepts such 
as DOG, it might not be useful to posit a broad range of what have been traditionally 
referred to as ‘abstract concepts’. Experimental psychologists, and at least some 
philosophers, believe that cognitive science really is a science. If that’s true, and I 
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agree that it is, then we should treat cognitive science as such, and only posit 
constructs that are useful. I focus on the alleged concept JUSTICE in order to make 
my points, although I suspect the same arguments could be made generally against 
postulating a wide range of ‘abstract’ concepts. I think that it would be much more 
useful to examine certain human cognitive capacities without restricting ourselves 
with the impossible requirement that the explanation of these cognitive capacities 
must be subsumed under a single label in capital letters. 
I am not the first person to note that there are a range of ‘concepts’ that have 
proven particularly difficult to analyse on any theory of conceptual content (Barsalou 
et al., 2008; Crutch and Ridgway, 2012; Dove, 2016; Kousta et al., 2011). These are 
the ‘abstract’ concepts such as JUSTICE, ENTROPY, and DEMOCRACY. I argue 
that the reason these concepts are so difficult to analyse is because they are not 
plausible candidates for concept-hood in the first place. I claim that there is no such 
thing as a building block of thought, JUSTICE, that features in all or even most 
thoughts ‘about justice’. Nor is there a neural simulator that generates all or only 
justice simulations. There is no such thing as a unitary cognitive resource that plays 
a role in justice categorisations, or events that involve justice-or-an-aspect-thereof. 
‘Justice’ is a word that can be used to mean any number of things. But we should not 
let that confuse us into thinking that there is such a thing as JUSTICE. To make this 
argument, I am first going to consider the case of DOG, and show how it is extremely 
useful to posit DOG as part of an explanation of how we categorise and cognise about 
dogs. Then I am going to argue that it isn’t useful to posit JUSTICE as part of an 
explanation of how we categorise and cognise about anything. So even a hard-line 
antirealist shouldn’t think of JUSTICE as being a concept in the first place, because 
JUSTICE is not a useful posit. And concepts, after all, are ‘just’ posits. 
Let us consider the reasons we might want to posit a DOG concept. It is not 
controversial that, having acquired the appropriate sensorimotor experience, we 
would expect most humans to be quite proficient at recognising certain medium-sized 
objects as being members of the set of dogs. With the appropriate training in a given 
language, most humans would also not have much trouble in using the appropriate 
word to pick out this set. It’s extremely likely that any given human would be able to 
report having ‘thoughts about dogs’, and we would understand them to be 
communicating the idea that the object of these thoughts was (members of) this set. 
These facts are obviously in need of explanation. The almost universally-accepted 
explanation goes like this: we posit that human mind-brains have these things called 
concepts. Concepts are the fundamental units of cognition. Concepts function to pick 
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out categories, and they feature in neurocognitive processes in such a way as to 
explain why neurocognitive processes produce the results that they do. Ultimately, 
concepts will be instantiated somehow by our neural circuitry, although exactly how 
this happens is at present something of a mystery. DOG is one such concept. 
Possessing a DOG concept allows someone to categorise and cognise about dogs 
as such. In most cases, acquiring a DOG concept is largely a matter of gaining the 
appropriate sensorimotor experience of dogs and somehow storing this experience 
in the appropriate way (or, if you are a Fodorian, it is entirely a matter of your mind-
brain having a symbol that stands in the appropriate causal relations to dogs).  
This is an extremely compelling explanation, and I think something along 
these lines will produce a powerful psychological theory of concepts (and hence, 
cognition). However, and I stress this again, it is crucial to keep in mind that despite 
how compelling this explanation is, DOG is just a posit. We have observed that human 
beings respond in reliable ways to the presence of dogs, and in order to explain this 
(mental) behaviour (on a loose understanding of what constitutes behaviour), we posit 
the DOG concept. One of these (mental) behaviours might be to realise that there is 
a dog in the room. It is useful to use the posit, DOG, to talk about the 
neurophysiological responses, patterns of brain activation, cognitive processes, and 
behaviour that underwrite this realisation. DOG is just a way of thinking about thought 
in such a way as to aid our explanations and allow us to make (hopefully accurate) 
predictions about human behaviour and descriptions of cognitive processes. The 
electron has turned out to be an extremely useful posit for explaining many physical 
phenomena. It is so useful that we might even be tempted to say that electrons exist. 
The ultimate aim of psychology and neuroscience is to provide an explanation of 
human behaviour and cognitive processes. With regards to these aims, positing a 
unitary cognitive resource that serves to pick out the category of dogs has explanatory 
value, and it could be that you believe that DOG is so crucial to psychological and 
behavioural explanations that we should believe that it exists. But that is all DOG is: 
it is a posit with explanatory value. The question I will now consider is whether 
JUSTICE is a posit with explanatory value. I will argue that the answer to this question 
is ‘no’. 
3.5 JUSTICE in a language of thought 
Let’s consider some popular answers to the question of what properties DOG 
and JUSTICE are supposed to have, such that they can play an explanatory role in 
behaviour and cognitive processes. I want to show that all of these answers and 
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explanations make sense in the case of DOG, but make no sense in the case of 
JUSTICE. As we have seen, one traditionally popular answer is that DOG and 
JUSTICE are symbols in the language of thought (Fodor, 1998, 1975). On Fodor’s 
view, concepts are individuated according to the causal relations that hold between 
them and the mind-external world. So DOG is a symbol that stands for, features in 
inferences about, and categorises dogs, because it stands in certain causal relations 
to dogs ‘out there’ in the world. A tokening of the DOG symbol is caused by dogs, or 
is caused because it stands in the appropriate relations to other symbols that have 
themselves been tokened. The DOG symbol itself is atomic: it cannot be decomposed 
or analysed into constituent parts. It has no structure. Now, consider JUSTICE. On 
Fodor’s view, if JUSTICE is a concept, then JUSTICE must also be individuated by 
its causal relations with the outside world. But here we come up against an immediate 
challenge. It is extremely difficult to give a satisfying account of what it is that 
JUSTICE stands in causal relations to. What is the category of justices? What are the 
things ‘out there’ that cause my JUSTICE concept to be tokened? One response here 
could be to describe some situations that seem to involve some element of justice, 
and look for some commonalities between them. Perhaps those commonalities are 
the things that stand in the appropriate causal relations to JUSTICE. Here are two 
such situations. Given the publicity constraint, we shouldn’t have to worry about 
whether the same concept could be tokened in each case (or, at least, a highly similar 
concept if you think publicity is too strong a constraint). 
A. Suppose a man who believes his chickens to have been waylaid 
successfully accuses someone of the crime, and this unfortunate ends up 
in the pillory. Up until 1837, being locked in a pillory was a common 
punishment in England for various criminal offences.  Upon witnessing the 
public humiliation and physical violence that invariably followed, and 
perhaps even joining in himself, the accuser is satisfied that justice has 
been done. 
 
B. Suppose that a world-class athlete stands accused of taking prohibited 
substances that regulatory bodies believe to be both dangerous and likely 
to convey an unfair competitive advantage over those who have not taken 
them. But, after much diligent work from the athlete’s lawyer, it transpires 
that there was no possible way that the athlete could have taken the 
substances, and that their test results had been confused with someone 
else’s. After the jubilant press conference that follows this announcement, 
the athlete’s lawyer is satisfied that justice has been done.   
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One obvious commonality here is that the rule of law has been carried out in 
both situations. But it is quite clear that JUSTICE cannot just be ‘that mental 
representation which is tokened when an agent understands the rule of law to have 
been carried out’. (Let me stress emphatically that I am talking about JUSTICE here, 
and not justice. I do not have anything definitive to say about what justice is: I take it 
as a virtue of my position that I can avoid having to do so). For one thing, I find it quite 
likely that any number of people reading this would be reluctant to allow that the 
alleged chicken thief’s treatment was just, but they also would not deny that the rule 
of law had been carried out (or what passed for the rule of law in medieval England).  
And so their JUSTICE concept must stand in causal relations to mind-external entities 
over and above carryings-out of the rule of law. It is also not hard to come up with 
situations in which the rule of law has been carried out and yet most people would 
take them to be manifestly unjust. Take, for example, any of the cases in which 
someone has been punished by a judicial system who was in fact innocent. Cases 
where a judicial system convicts an innocent party are not cases in which the rule of 
law has not been carried out: it was the carrying out of the rule of law that secured 
the guilty verdict in the first place (or at least, that is the assumption that most judicial 
systems are predicated on). Perhaps we should say instead that JUSTICE is ‘that 
mental representation which is tokened when an agent understands the rule of law to 
have been carried out, believes that an accused is in fact guilty, and also believes 
that the accused deserved whatever it is that ultimately happened to them’. 
Unfortunately, it isn’t difficult to come up with scenarios in which JUSTICE is 
apparently not only tokened by the punishment or conviction of a guilty party. Witness 
the athlete’s exoneration. Perhaps we could modify our account of what JUSTICE 
stands in causal relations to with the addition of a clause to the effect that JUSTICE 
can also be tokened by situations in which it is discovered that an accused is innocent 
and subsequently exonerated.  
The problem here is that, although we have gone some way towards a sketch 
of when it is that our JUSTICE concept is tokened, we still have not really explained 
anything about human behaviour or mental processes. We are no closer to an 
explanation of how JUSTICE is acquired, or what it’s made of, or how it has the causal 
powers that it supposedly has. All we have done is provide a non-exhaustive list of 
situations, and stipulated that they cause a tokening of JUSTICE (note the capitals). 
I think it’s clear that this does not count as an explanation of cognition or behaviour. 
Also, if concepts are individuated by their causal-relations to mind-external entities, 
then it doesn’t seem unreasonable to enquire what those mind external entities might 
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be, or maybe how we could go about finding out. It’s important to note here that Fodor 
(1998) was quite clear that a lot of concepts are innate, and that basic level concepts 
aren’t amenable to structural analysis anyway. So he probably isn’t bothered too 
much by failing to meet these explanatory targets. But as we saw in the introductory 
paragraphs of this chapter, most of recent psychology rejects both of these ideas 
while still acknowledging some of Fodor’s considerations. So a modern psychologist 
who endorses a Fodor-esque view really does have to explain how JUSTICE is 
acquired, what causal powers it has, and why it has these causal powers. Notice that 
in the case of DOG, these things more or less come for free: having DOG is just 
having a symbol in the language of thought that is nomologically locked to dogs. 
Having DOG explains how you can categorise dogs, because incoming dog-like 
sensorimotor input triggers DOG (by virtue of DOG’s law-like connection with dogs).  
And even if this didn’t worry us, it is not hard to come up with counterexamples 
that suggest that we cannot have exhausted the things that JUSTICE supposedly 
stands in causal relations to. It is also perfectly felicitous to describe as ‘just’ a 
situation in which a piece of cake is sliced evenly so that two equally-deserving 
children each get the same amount. I think the problem here is that any attempt to 
specify some properties of situations ‘out there’ that stand in the appropriate causal 
relations to a mental symbol such that that symbol is JUSTICE will ultimately turn into 
attempts to define justice. But as Fodor (1975) argued at length, whatever they are, 
basic/lexical concepts can’t be definitions, and it is also extremely difficult to define 
anything, let alone ‘what justice is’. My point is ultimately totally banal: the word 
‘justice’ can be used to talk intelligibly about an infinite number and variety of 
situations. But I think that there is an important moral to drawn. We want to explain 
the human (mental) behaviour that accompanies situations which we might describe 
by using the word ‘justice’. But we are not going to get very far by positing a unitary 
cognitive resource that features in all of the cognition and behaviour associated with 
every conceivable way in which the word ‘justice’ might be used. I think it is more 
likely that understanding different uses of the word ‘justice’ in different situations, or 
being tempted to communicate in two different situations by using that word, may 
involve sets of mental representations and cognitive capacities that are more or less 
distinct from each other, and that none of these sets plausibly corresponds exactly 
and only to the posit, JUSTICE. And, as we shall see later, these potentially distinct 
mental representations and cognitive capacities explain human (mental) behaviour 
independently of being subsumed under some JUSTICE concept. 
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Furthermore, it could be that, far from furnishing us with explanations and 
predictions, positing JUSTICE might actually make those goals harder to achieve. 
The aim of psychology is to explain and understand human behaviour and cognitive 
processes. Imagine that you perceive a fitting reward to have been finally bestowed 
upon a long-deserving and hitherto unrecognised friend. I suppose we might allow 
that justice had been done in some sense: your friend has finally been acknowledged 
as the hero she is. This shouldn’t be controversial, because if you find the previous 
sentence intelligible at all, then you must have understood my use of the word ‘justice’ 
at least partially. You might wonder and desire to explain:  
 
1. What mental representations, brain structures, and processes underwrite 
my ability to perceive my friend’s reward, my disposition to want her 
rewarded, and my taking satisfaction in it? 
2. What mental representations, brain structures, and processes underwrite 
my feeling that there was something not quite right about my friend’s 
efforts being unrecognised?  
3. How did these mental representations, brain structures, and processes 
come to be – how did I acquire them? 
 
If you assume that a JUSTICE concept is going to figure usefully in responses 
to some of these questions, then a Fodor-style answer is that an unanalysable, atomic 
unit of the language of thought stands in the appropriate causal relations to entities 
in the outside world such that it is tokened by the act of your friend receiving her 
reward. And that the same unanalysable, atomic unit of the language of thought is 
also tokened whenever you understand a guilty party to have been convicted of a 
crime. As to how this symbol underwrites these cognitive processes, and what 
properties it has that explains how this symbol underwrites cognitive processes 
occurring in seemingly disparate situations, and producing seemingly disparate 
effects, a Fodor-style theory is silent. Basically, in order to explain how human beings 
behave and cognise in all of the different situations that we might describe using the 
word ‘justice’, a Fodor-style theory can only stipulate that the JUSTICE symbol stands 
in the appropriate causal relations to mind-external entities, and enters into the right 
syntactic relations with other concepts. However, it doesn’t seem like we’re going to 
be able to say anything about what these causal or syntactic relations are, and so 
that’s the end of the story.  
73 
 
But this is contrary to intuition and evidence. It does seem to be possible to 
investigate the questions posed in the previous paragraph, although for the time being 
these investigations are surely preliminary. For example, there exist empirical 
investigations of the neural structures implicated in perceiving the rewards of others 
(Lockwood et al., 2015). There exist empirical investigations of children’s 
understanding of what constitutes fair behaviour (Wittig et al., 2013). And there is at 
least one large and influential body of theoretical work that attempts to explain how 
humans mentally represent the cognitive states of other human beings, and how they 
act on the basis of those representations (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). This work, and 
other work like it, seems like a plausible basis on which to start formulating 
explanations of human behaviour and cognition in some of the situations that we 
describe by using the word ‘justice’ (and a great many other words). But these 
explanations do not require us to posit JUSTICE. One response here is to argue that 
other concepts in a language of thought are prerequisites for having JUSTICE, and 
that with these prerequisites in place, JUSTICE does more explanatory work. For 
example, you might suppose that under the right conditions, someone who has the 
concepts, REWARD, PUNISHMENT, and FAIRNESS can acquire JUSTICE. And 
then, JUSTICE can have causal powers partly in virtue of these prerequisite concepts. 
I have two counterarguments to this kind of move.  
First, it’s arguably un-Fodorian: Fodor held that concepts are not individuated 
by their relationships with any other concepts, but solely by their nomological locking 
with something external to the mind. The reason that Fodor rejected the idea that 
concepts can be individuated by their relationships with other concepts was because 
he thought that if that were true, then publicity would be violated. The reason that 
publicity would be violated is that, if some concepts are individuated by things “in the 
head”, then there is scope for concepts being individuated differently for different 
people (because what is “in the head” may vary interpersonally). Now, you might think 
that Fodor was wrong about that argument, and/or you might not think publicity is 
important. In that case, my second counterargument is that the prerequisite concepts 
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, and FAIRNESS do all of their explanatory work 
independently of whether you stipulate that they have something to do with JUSTICE. 
Suppose for a second that there are such things as mind-external properties that the 
mind-brain becomes nomologically locked to, such that we would want to say that 
these mind-external properties individuate the concept REWARD. (And, suppose we 
could say what those properties are). Any agent who possess REWARD has all the 
resources they need to distinguish this category, and have thoughts that feature the 
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concept REWARD. But what we want to know is what the mind-external properties 
that individuate JUSTICE are, and where JUSTICE’s causal powers come from. 
Speaking very crudely, suggesting that JUSTICE is the concept that equals 
REWARD, plus PUNISHMENT, plus FAIRNESS, is not going to give us any 
explanatory power that we didn’t already have. Our explanatory power is going to just 
be whatever explanatory powers that REWARD, PUNISHMENT, and FAIRNESS 
provided us. There is nothing to be gained from stipulating that JUSTICE will 
somehow fall out of these prerequisite concepts, unless we can come up with some 
properties of JUSTICE itself. 
Instead, I think that it should be possible to formulate these descriptions and 
explanations without positing a unitary cognitive resource that potentially corresponds 
to every way in which the word ‘justice’ was used in all of the examples given above, 
and we should be free from the restriction that the same unitary cognitive resource 
has to play a role in all or even most situations we describe by using the word. I claim 
that there is no such unitary cognitive resource: attempts to spell out how JUSTICE 
is acquired or represented, or what kinds of representations it is made of, are futile in 
principle because it is not useful to posit such an entity. Psychologists do not need it 
in order to investigate any of the phenomena they might be interested in. Instead, 
psychologists could (and do) focus on more tractable questions, such as, ‘at what age 
do children move beyond the understanding that ‘fair’ always means ‘equal’ no matter 
the circumstances?’, or ‘is there a neural correlate of the extent to which people take 
pleasure in the success/failure of others’? Depending on what you mean by the word 
‘justice’ in a particular case, answers to these questions might tell us something about 
human cognition and behaviour in that case.  
The word ‘justice’ can be used to communicate about many things, but there 
is no unitary cognitive resource that can usefully figure in explanations of what mental 
representations underwrite our understanding of all these things. The fact that we can 
use the word ‘justice’ to communicate about both an athlete’s legal exoneration and 
an egalitarian distribution of cake should not suggest that we deploy the same unitary 
cognitive resource(s) should we find ourselves in both situations. It should simply 
suggest that we can use the English word ‘justice’ to communicate about a variety of 
things (I examine this issue in detail in Chapter 8). The notion that both sharing cake, 
and acquiring the understanding that an athlete has been cleared of a crime, depend 
on the same unitary cognitive resource should require a lot of evidence, but in the 
psychological and philosophical literatures it seems to have been assumed. 
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Furthermore, no evidence of this sort has been provided by psycholinguistic 
experiments that feature the word ‘justice’.  
3.6 JUSTICE in a network of simulators 
I have just argued that a classic Fodor-style approach to concepts will not 
work when it comes to explanations of certain human behaviour and mental 
processes that we assumed must involve the concept JUSTICE. But what about a 
Barsalou-ian simulator theory? As we have seen, it is relatively straightforward to see 
how DOG might be some structured neuropsychologically-instantiated entity 
composed (mainly) of sensorimotor representations, and how this structure and 
makeup might explain our ability to categorise and cognise about dogs. Now, what 
are the mental representations that JUSTICE is composed of such that it allows us to 
cognise about justice (or situations involving an element thereof)? It’s clear that, 
narrowly construed, sensorimotor representations on their own won’t be able to do 
the job of constituting JUSTICE. We might associate a certain kind of black robe and 
a white wig with a situation that could be felicitously described using the word ‘justice’. 
But I don’t think we would want to say that justice (without capitals) has anything much 
to do with black robes and white wigs in and of itself, and sensorimotor 
representations derived from perceptual experience of black robes and white wigs do 
not seem to be useful in explaining why it is that I might believe sharing cake to be 
just, or how I acquired the mental representations that underwrite that belief. 
However, as Barsalou (2016) has recently pointed out, typically, embodied cognition 
theories aren’t actually committed to the claim that cognition and categorisation has 
to be explained purely in terms of sensorimotor representations even if we take care 
to construe the term widely. Barsalou also proposes that along with simulators, we 
possess another kind of cognitive structure: skeleton blueprints of objects and events 
called frames. 
Barsalou’s frames are an often-overlooked aspect of his theory, and they 
seem like useful constructs for meeting our explanatory aims regarding some 
situations we might describe by using the word ‘justice’. However, I think that these 
frames do their explanatory work regardless of whether we stipulate that they are part 
of an overall concept labelled in capital letters (JUSTICE), and so there is no need to 
make this stipulation. Barsalou (1999, p. 590) describes frames as blueprints for how 
situations and events are constructed, and how parts of an object come together to 
form a whole: ‘a frame is an integrated system of perceptual symbols that is used to 
construct specific simulations of a category’. We might have a frame for any object or 
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event we experience. A going-to-the-shop frame might have slots for a clerk, a 
customer, and a product. Simulators could generate largely 
sensorimotoric/affective/proprioceptive simulations that fit neatly into these slots, and 
the frame provides a way of organising and structuring these simulations in such a 
way as to facilitate task-appropriate behaviour and mental processes. Let’s apply this 
idea to JUSTICE. Perhaps we have a frame that corresponds to ‘courtroom-setting-
in-the-United-Kingdom’. This frame might have all sorts of slots in all sorts of relations 
to each other. One of these slots might be for a person wearing a white wig and black 
robe who stands at the top of the social hierarchy in the context of the frame. Another 
slot might be for a largely stationary official-looking person who occasionally responds 
to instructions from the person in the wig, and so on. Suppose that an array of 
simulators could produce simulations to fit in these slots in such a way as to organise 
a thought expressible by an utterance of “justice has been done as a result of a guilty 
verdict”. I think that positing such a set of mental representations is just as reasonable 
as positing DOG, especially for someone who for whatever reason finds themselves 
in U.K. courtrooms frequently.  
The problem for Barsalou’s account arises when it comes to specifying what 
the relationship is between this courtroom frame and JUSTICE. One option is to say 
that this courtroom frame is part of the makeup of an overall JUSTICE concept (or 
simulator, as he would call it). I think this is a mistake, because this strategy forces 
us into the position that there must be something in virtue of which a UK-courtroom-
setting frame belongs to the same unitary cognitive resource as a simulation of an 
experience of sharing cake. Otherwise, we would have no theoretically motivated 
reason to want to subsume them under the same JUSTICE concept. Why shouldn’t 
we say instead that I have a SHARING CAKE simulator/frame, and a UK-
COURTROOM simulator/frame? Positing these mental representations can explain 
how I can think about UK courtrooms and recognise being in a situation in which cake 
is shared, but there is no need to posit JUSTICE to explain these capabilities. And in 
any case, the problem that faced the classic Fodor-style account comes back in full 
force. The answer to the question of what mental processes and behaviours JUSTICE 
plays a role in becomes, “any and all of the processes and behaviours associated 
with any and all of the situations that we can communicate about by using the word 
‘justice’”. The task of specifying what category JUSTICE corresponds to then 
becomes very difficult indeed, because there doesn’t seem to be a principled way of 
defining what that category is.  
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 The second option is to accept that if this courtroom frame (or cake-sharing 
frame, for that matter) has explanatory value, then it has this explanatory value quite 
independently of a connection to a JUSTICE concept. But if you believe that there is 
such a thing as a JUSTICE concept, and it seems to me that Barsalou does (see 
Barsalou and Weimer-Hastings (2005) especially) then we are again no closer to 
specifying how that concept was acquired, what it’s made of, what behaviour and 
mental processes it plays a role in, or how it plays this role. Indeed, there does not 
seem to be a role for JUSTICE to play. So there is nothing to be gained from 
maintaining that the courtroom frame is part of a JUSTICE concept, because the 
courtroom frame itself can explain how people who possess it can recognise 
courtrooms in the United Kingdom, and behave appropriately when they find 
themselves in one, and form the appropriate beliefs and come to the appropriate 
realisations when things happen in one. We don’t need to embed this courtroom 
frame in anything else in order to explain these behaviours and cognitive processes, 
and there just doesn’t seem to be anything to be gained from stipulating that this 
courtroom frame is part of an overall JUSTICE concept. We haven’t explained 
anything about the acquisition of JUSTICE or what mental representations JUSTICE 
consists of, or how JUSTICE mediates cognitive processes and behaviour. But we 
might have come up with a hypothesis about how human beings acquire concepts 
that mediate being in a U.K courtroom setting, what mental representations those 
concepts consists of, and how those concepts mediate cognitive processes and 
behaviour. And to me that seems like a promising achievement rather than defeatism. 
Note here that I am not committing to anything about the theoretical status of these 
particular courtroom posits: my point is that to the extent that they do turn out to have 
explanatory value, we should be happy to include them in our psychological theories.  
I want to end this section with a thought experiment. It could be that you are 
still sceptical that we could get by without positing JUSTICE despite the problems 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Perhaps it still seems like there really is some 
unitary cognitive resource that the word ‘justice’ picks out, and even though it is very 
difficult to couch our explanations in terms of it, this cognitive resource might figure in 
behaviour and mental processes as a matter of fact. This thought experiment does 
not constitute a knockdown argument, but I hope it does go some way to shoring up 
my position against this kind of intuition:  
Imagine that at some point in the future we invent a ray gun that is capable of 
‘knocking out’ specific concepts. The rest of the cognitive system is left totally 
undisturbed, and only that circumscribed set of mental representations hypothesised 
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to instantiate a particular concept are ‘deleted’, as it were, from someone’s conceptual 
repertoire.5 Suppose we set the dial to the notch labelled ‘dog’, and pull the trigger at 
our test subject. What specific capacities and cognitive processes would we interrupt? 
Granting that the ray gun’s powers are genuine, relatively straightforward answers 
suggest themselves.6 If we placed a dog in front of our test subject, they would not 
be able to recognise it; perhaps they would ask us what this strange new animal was. 
If we ray-gunned many subjects and asked them: “There’s a rare animal called a ‘dog’ 
- do you think it is a four-legged mammal, or a small biting insect?”, perhaps they 
would answer at chance levels (although would they recognise that they had heard 
the sound [dɒg] before?). But they would still be able to recognise a cat, if we placed 
one of those in front of them instead. They would correctly answer questions like, “is 
cow’s milk a staple food in some human cultures?”, and they would probably run from 
a rampaging rhinoceros instead of offering to play chess with it. But what would 
happen if we turned the notch to the dial labelled ‘justice’? Would the subject lose the 
inclination to share anything ever again?  Would they be unable to understand what 
the word ‘punishment’ is supposed to refer to? Would they lose all sense of law and 
order? Would it become apparent that they lacked a sense of empathy? Or all of these 
things? Or is there a specific subset that would be affected, and could we predict with 
any confidence which subset it would be? It could be that intuitions about this thought 
experiment will vary, but my own response is, unsurprisingly, that it is entirely unclear 
what effects the ray gun would have on the subject if we tried to knock their JUSTICE 
concept out. And I think this is again indicative of the vacuity of JUSTICE as a 
theoretical posit.  
                                               
5 If you are a holist who believes that concepts are individuated by their relations to all other 
concepts in the cognitive system, then I think you would probably object that this is impossible in 
principle. In that case, imagine that the ray gun maximally destroys a target concept while minimally 
altering all other concepts. 
6 The reader might wonder if studies of Semantic Dementia (SD) bear on this thought experiment 
(Bonner et al., 2009). SD patients exhibit a specific impairment of ‘semantic’ memory: they lose their 
memories of what objects are, as well as what the referents of words are. Typically, this pattern of 
deficits is presented as a loss of ‘conceptual’ knowledge. However, SD is a rare, hard-to-investigate 
disease; stimulus sets in experiments are small; the number of participants in experiments are also 
small; and conflicting findings are common. Moreover, studies of SD patients that reference the 
concrete-abstract distinction use linguistic stimuli and responses to draw conclusions about the 
conceptual system as a whole. It isn’t clear that losing the ability to recognize the word ‘justice’ 
entails the loss of all of the behaviors and cognitive processes that JUSTICE is supposed to feature in. 
For these reasons, it is probably premature to draw any firm conclusions about sufferers of SD. In 
any case, the SD patient is unlike our ray-gun victim in an important respect. SD patients gradually 
lose whole swathes of their conceptual repertoires, and are not impaired on ‘just’ one item, so we 
could not use them to investigate what would happen if a single concept is lost from someone’s 
conceptual repertoire.   
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To summarise: 'justice' is a word that we can use to try and communicate 
various things. If we want to learn about how human beings respond to moral 
dilemmas, societal rules, perceived crimes and punishments; how children come to 
form beliefs about group behaviour; what mental representations cause or constitute 
our desire that a certain outcome obtain; and so on, then I think doing the relevant 
experiments and sociological investigations will tell us a lot. They will tell us 
about some cognitive processes involved in some of the things that we might try to 
communicate about when we use the word 'justice'. But they won't tell us about 
JUSTICE. JUSTICE is just a posit. It is part of a model that we use to understand 
people. But we should only include it in our model if it is actually helpful to do so.  And 
the upshot of the preceding discussion is that it is not helpful to include JUSTICE in 
our model of how the human mind-brain works. So JUSTICE is not an abstract 
concept – it isn’t a concept at all, because there is no theoretically coherent mental 
particular or behaviour that corresponds to it. Instead, it seems more useful to posit 
other unitary cognitive resources that figure in specific human behaviours and 
cognitive processes, such as deciding to share a lucrative resource, or taking 
satisfaction in the announcement of a punishment, and so on. The behaviours and 
thoughts that occur in situations that we describe by using the word ‘justice’ aren’t 
mediated by a JUSTICE concept. The mental representations and brain structures 
that underwrite these behaviours and cognitive processes do not correspond to a 
single cohesive construct whose organisation and composition will explain such a 
diverse and complicated array of human thoughts and acts. The words of English are 
not always good indicators of what unitary cognitive resources we have. 
3.7 Consequences of giving up the concept 
JUSTICE 
At first glance, it may seem like the position that I am advancing here is 
incompatible with almost every theory of thought and/or concepts there is. This would 
be a consequence so negative that it might be sufficient grounds on its own to reject 
my position. However, I believe that the most popular theories of thought are actually 
compatible with my position. The only requirement of these theories that needs to be 
relaxed is the requirement that words are always useful in identifying what concepts 
(i.e., unitary cognitive resources) there are. So, it could be that thought is language-
like in Fodor’s sense, and that the units over which cognition operates are atomic, 
arbitrary, syntactically re-combinable discrete elements. The only modification that 
my position requires is accepting that sometimes words might identify a discrete 
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element of this theory, but sometimes they don’t. Likewise, it could be that thought is 
the product of dynamic interactions between simulators of sensorimotor experience 
and frames (Barsalou et al., 2008). The only modification that my position requires is 
that sometimes words might identify a cohesive set of such simulators and frames, 
but sometimes they don’t. So currently-popular theories of how the mind-brain works 
are actually mostly untroubled by the arguments I have been making. 
However, there is one important and very unpleasant consequence of my 
arguments. If I am at all correct, then I think it is clear that the experimental techniques 
employed in neuropsychological investigations of ‘conceptual processing’ will not tell 
us anything about JUSTICE, or the difference between concrete and abstract 
concepts generally. Flashing up the word ‘justice’ on a computer screen and 
measuring how long it takes a participant to decide that the letter string <justice> 
corresponds to an English word, as happens very often in psycholinguistic 
experiments, is unlikely to be informative at all about the kinds of cognitive processes 
involved when human beings engage in and make decisions about those situations 
and relations that we might refer to by using the word ‘justice’. This is because we 
can use the word ‘justice’ to talk about an infinite number of things and, as I have 
been trying to argue, there doesn’t seem to be any one thing that corresponds to a 
conceptual ‘core’ that unites all or even most of these things. However, this is 
precisely the kind of evidence that psychologists and psychologically-minded 
philosophers have relied upon when constructing their theories about what JUSTICE 
might be and what properties it has that separate it from DOG. That is to say, this is 
the kind of evidence that is used to support and investigate the distinction between 
concrete and abstract concepts. So the extremely unpleasant consequence of the 
argument I have been making so far is that empirical psycholinguistic work will not 
help us investigate what some ‘concepts’ are or what properties they have, because 
in some cases there is nothing to investigate. We do not possess a unitary cognitive 
resource that corresponds to the word ‘justice’, and so flashing the word ‘justice’ up 
on a computer screen cannot tell us about that resource.  
Before acknowledging some obvious objections to the arguments I have just 
presented, I want to spend some time trying to convince you that instead of being 
completely destructive, the position I am advocating comes with some substantial 
benefits. My position might seem destructive because historically, concreteness has 
been such an important psycholinguistic variable, and there have been many 
attempts to try and incorporate abstract concepts into our theories (Barsalou and 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Borghi et al., 2017; Dove, 2016; Kousta et al., 2011; Löhr, 
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2017; Troche et al., 2014). If I am right, then the utility of a large body of experimental 
work is in question, and some of these attempts might have been for naught. As I 
noted above, many others have pointed out that abstract concepts in general pose 
large problems for our understanding of concepts and cognition (Barsalou and 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Crutch and Ridgway, 2012; Hamilton and Coslett, 2008; 
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu, 2005). Traditionally, the assumption has been that if you 
endorse an embodied cognition account, these problems are especially difficult 
(Goldinger et al., 2016; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). The key insight of embodied 
cognition approaches is that cognition is importantly continuous with perception and 
action, and that this idea plays a hugely useful role in explanations of cognitive 
processes and experimental data (de Vega et al., 2008). The problem that abstract 
concepts pose is that they are by (negative) definition fundamentally non-perceptual, 
and non-actional. Theories of cognition that appeal to perception and action 
mechanisms in order to provide accounts of conceptual processing therefore have an 
especially difficult challenge if they want to account for these concepts. The standard 
conclusion of the amodalist is that embodied cognition must be false for this reason 
(Goldinger et al., 2016; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). However, as Barsalou (2016) 
and Prinz (2004) have highlighted, the problems caused by abstract concepts are just 
as deadly for the amodalist. Simply stipulating that “concepts are amodal” does not 
help us provide a compelling account of abstract concepts: simply using the label 
‘amodal’ does not count as an explanation of how we acquire JUSTICE, or other 
alleged abstract concepts. As I argued above, a classic amodal account like Fodor’s 
(1998, 1975) does more or less as well with DOG as embodied cognition accounts, 
and just as poorly with JUSTICE. So if I am right, then I think all accounts of concepts 
are in a better shape than they were before.  
If we really can’t provide satisfying explanations of the acquisition of JUSTICE; 
or the role it plays in cognitive processes and behaviour; or the mental 
representations that constitute it, then what I take myself to be providing is a principled 
way of avoiding these problems while safeguarding the explanatory success we have 
already achieved. Recall that one of my arguments against the existence of JUSTICE 
in a Barsalou-ian simulator theory was that there are other posits that could plausibly 
explain the behaviour and cognition we wanted to explain, such as a cake-sharing 
frame. It seems to me that the cake-sharing frame is a perfect fit with the rest of 
embodied cognition’s commitments. The cake-sharing frame is plausibly acquired on 
the basis of sensorimotor, affective, and proprioceptive experience of sharing cakes, 
and it is in virtue of this that the cake-sharing frame could play a role in mediating 
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thoughts and behaviours in situations in which I share cake. For this reason it does 
not pose the same problems that JUSTICE does. Likewise, in Fodor’s case, we could 
not tell a satisfying story about what the individuation conditions for JUSTICE are. 
However, I think we could tell a satisfying story about what the individuation conditions 
for CAKE-SHARING are, or at the very least this task will be easier than in the case 
of JUSTICE.  
Now that I have laid out my case, I want to head off two potential 
misunderstandings of the view I am trying to convince you of. I have argued that 
JUSTICE is not a useful posit, because it doesn’t actually help us to explain any 
behaviour or cognition. Because featuring in explanations of behaviour and/or 
cognition is the main job of a concept, I conclude that there is no such concept, 
JUSTICE. The first potential misunderstanding of my view is to confuse it with the 
claim that there is no such thing as justice (note the lack of capitals); or with the claim 
that human beings do not have a sense of right or wrong; or that there is no such 
thing as morality or moral behaviour, and so on. But this is absolutely not what I am 
arguing. Of course most humans have a sense of right and wrong, and most humans 
have strong beliefs about what counts as moral behaviour, and most humans have a 
view about what the right order of things in society is. I am not contesting these facts. 
Rather, I am arguing that if we want to provide a neuropsychological explanation of 
these facts, and hopefully cognitive science will be able to shed some light on them, 
then positing JUSTICE does not help. Instead, we should posit, and investigate, other 
concepts that mediate specific cognitive processes and behaviours (for example, a 
frame that organises thoughts and behaviour in situations in which we share things). 
There is a temptation to say that if we sum up all of these more specific concepts, 
then perhaps a JUSTICE concept will fall out of them somehow. However, I think this 
is a mistake: our theories do not gain any explanatory power if we stipulate that there 
is a JUSTICE concept that subsumes more specific concepts. Instead, the more 
specific concepts do all the explanatory work they are supposed to do independently 
of any alleged connection with a JUSTICE concept. The second potential 
misunderstanding is to confuse the technical sense in which I am using the phrase, 
‘the concept JUSTICE’ with other uses of the phrase ‘the concept justice’. In the sense 
in which I am using this phrase, JUSTICE is an alleged unitary cognitive resource and 
it features only in theories and models of the human conceptual system. It is a 
component of a psychological explanation of the human mind. I am not arguing about 
‘concepts of justice’ as they may apply in ethics, law, sociology, theology, or any other 
discipline. Researchers in these fields may find immense value in couching their 
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investigations in terms of concepts of justice, and work in these fields may inform 
what we might want to say about some unitary cognitive resources in the domain of 
psychology. But I am arguing only about something “in the mind”, or at least in our 
models of the mind, and it is crucial to recognise this. One way to illustrate what I 
mean by this is to consider the following two sentences: 
(1) Humans do not possess the concept JUSTICE. 
(2) Humans have a sense of justice. 
If my view is correct, then the statement expressed in (1) is true. But depending on 
what a speaker means, the statement expressed in (2) may well be true as well. That 
is, there is no contradiction here. 
I have spent a very long time focusing on JUSTICE as an example of an 
abstract concept par excellence. However, I don’t take myself to only be arguing that 
JUSTICE is not a concept. I think we could use the same strategy I have employed 
here to eliminate other alleged concepts that cause trouble for our theories of 
cognition. In this chapter, I have applied this methodology to DOG and JUSTICE. 
DOG, I think, has passed the test, and we should be happy to include DOG as an 
item in our theories of concepts. JUSTICE has not passed the test; JUSTICE should 
not be included as an item in our theories of concepts. The test is to assess whether 
an alleged concept actually helps us meet our explanatory and predictive aims in an 
account of human behaviour and cognition. There are a host of other capitalised 
words to be found throughout the psychological and philosophical literatures that are 
supposed to pick out concepts that are theoretically difficult and ‘abstract’ 
(DEMOCRACY, ABSTRACTION, PRINCIPLE…). I will now briefly show how the 
methodology I advocate here might be extended to other troublesome concepts. Dove 
(2016) recently presented the alleged abstract concept DEMOCRACY as an example 
of a concept that poses ‘a serious challenge’ to embodied cognition views. I am not 
about to provide an argument that embodied cognition is “correct”; instead I want to 
provide an example of the kind of move anybody interested in concepts can make if 
they endorse my view.  
Does DEMOCRACY look like JUSTICE? In many respects, the answer to this 
question seems to be ‘yes’. We can use the word ‘democracy’ to talk about all kinds 
of social hierarchies and complicated relationship structures extending from the 
international level of organisation, all the way down to the level of members of a family 
deciding which particular meal to have for supper. According to the general model, 
DEMOCRACY must be a unitary cognitive resource acquired in such a way that 
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comports with the theories we have, and that could plausibly play a singular role in 
mediating behaviours and cognitive processes in situations that extend from the 
dinner table all the way to the intricate mechanisms by which individuals in certain 
groups instantiate the governance of nation states on behalf of the people they 
represent. And it would also presumably have to correspond to and pick out 
something that we would want to call a ‘category’. If you are a Fodorian, then you 
would like to be able to say what its individuation conditions are, and if you are a 
Barsalou-ian, you would like to be able to say what is part of its network of simulators 
and what isn’t. I am advocating some scepticism towards the assumption that this 
theoretical posit, DEMOCRACY, is going to play a useful role in our theories of 
cognition. Note that, as it stands, this does not decide the issue either way. I think a 
consensus about which words of English pick out explanatorily powerful units of a 
theory of concepts is something that can only be achieved with investigation. So it 
could be that, after some careful theoretical and empirical work, we decide to include 
DEMOCRACY in our theory of concepts. However, we should be open to the 
possibility that the best course of action would be to exclude it. I also think that 
investigations like these can provide interpretable data and useful debate about the 
human conceptual system. One of the things I hope to have convinced you of by the 
end of this thesis is that the concreteness scale probably does neither of these things. 
Instead of assuming that there is at least a concept for every word we know, 
in my view we should step back and think about the specific human behaviours and 
cognitive processes that we want to investigate, and then work out whether and how 
a theory of concepts will interact with these investigations. If an alleged concept 
survives the test I have proposed, then it does work in our theories of concepts, and 
so it should be thought of as a concept. If it does not survive the test, then a theory of 
concepts does not have to worry about it. We should posit other mental 
representations that figure in specific cognitive processes and that mediate specific 
behaviours, and these other mental representations are more likely to be amenable 
to analysis no matter which kind of theory you endorse. I suspect that a number of 
‘abstract’ concepts will not survive the test, and ultimately that the concrete-abstract 
distinction does not amount to anything interesting. Instead, there are just those 
concepts that we have (if you are a realist) or those concepts that work in theories (if 
you an antirealist).  
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3.8 Two important objections to giving up the 
concept JUSTICE 
There are (at least) two very important objections to my position that I wish to 
consider. These two objections are: 
 
1. If some proposed abstract concepts don’t actually exist, then how can it be 
that reliable experimental effects are obtained by measuring responses to 
‘concrete’ stimuli and comparing them to responses to ‘abstract’ stimuli? 
Surely this empirical evidence indicates that there must be something neuro-
psychologically real and theoretically principled about the concrete-abstract 
distinction, and that there is a reliable relationship between words and 
concepts.  
 
2. If there is no unitary cognitive resource corresponds to the word ‘justice’, 
then what is the meaning of the word ‘justice’ – how do we understand each 
other when we use the word ‘justice’, or other abstract words for that matter? 
 
I spend the majority of the rest of this thesis answering these two objections 
and considering issues that my responses raise. In order to respond to objection 1, I 
first look at a simple statistical summary of a very large concreteness norm database 
produced recently by Brysbaert et al. (2013). In doing so, I will be able to demonstrate 
that the concreteness measure has some alarming properties that arguably invalidate 
it as a psycholinguistic tool. I also show that this problem also applies to similar 
variables and other databases, such as Connell and Lynott’s (2012) modality 
exclusivity norms, and imageability (Cortese and Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012), 
which is highly correlated with concreteness. I will also show that concreteness 
experiments to date have not actually compared responses to concrete stimuli with 
responses to abstract stimuli. This severely weakens the force of objection 1. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 I report experiments which were designed to assess the severity of 
the problems I identify with the concreteness measure. Worryingly, under conditions 
that should have maximised both the chances of finding a concreteness effect and 
the magnitude of that effect, these new experiments returned null results in all but 
one case, in which the concreteness effect was very small. In Chapter 7, I will argue 
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that evidence for experimental concreteness effects is not actually as strong as it is 
assumed to be, and therefore that objection 1 is not fatal to the view I am trying to 
convince you of. In Chapter 8, I will deal with objection 2. My response to objection 2 
involves sketching a theory of word meaning that does not identify word meaning with 
concepts. I show how Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1998, 1995), a popular 
theory of communication, can be adapted so that it does not require that word 
meanings and concepts are the same things, in such a way as to maintain its 
considerable explanatory power. I also suggest that in some ways, a non-conceptual 
account of word meaning is preferable to a conceptual one. In this way, I hope to 
have provided a compelling response to objection 2.  
  
87 
 
Chapter 4: Concreteness itself7 
 
Recall from Chapter 3 that a pressing objection to my argument relied on the 
observation that the concreteness measure has produced a huge array of statistically 
significant experimental effects, which we saw in Chapter 2. The objection was that 
because we have amassed such a large number of statistically significant 
concreteness effects, there must be something principled and psychologically 
relevant about the concrete-abstract distinction. If this were true, then we might 
conclude that my suggestion that words might not reliably pick out elements of a 
theory of concepts is wrong, because these effects are all explained by assuming that 
all words do reliably pick out concepts. In this chapter, I start to set out my responses 
to this objection. I begin by offering some theoretical reasons why we should be 
cautious about using concreteness scales in psycholinguistic research. Next, I 
present a statistical analysis of the concreteness norm database produced recently 
by Brysbaert et al. (2013). I show that that for nearly every single word in the middle 
of the concreteness scale, the mean concreteness value of a word does not reflect 
the judgements that individual participants actually made about it. Instead, ratings for 
words in the middle of the scale are essentially noise. Then, I show that for a great 
many concreteness experiments reported in the literature, the stimuli in the ‘abstract’ 
conditions were not actually abstract. Instead, they were simply those words about 
which participants disagreed, and for which the concreteness rating is 
uninterpretable. I also present an argument that the criticisms I raise here should be 
just as worrying to researchers who prefer large scale regression designs, as 
opposed to factorial designs (Connell and Lynott, 2012; Kousta et al., 2011). I wish to 
stress here that my intention is not to single out any of these experiments or 
researchers for criticism. The analysis that I present was only made possible after the 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) database was published. My aim is only to draw attention to a 
problem that I believe has implications for concreteness research. 
I spend the rest of this chapter exploring some implications of these observations, 
and I also consider other psycholinguistic variables that are related to concreteness 
(Connell and Lynott, 2012; Cortese and Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012). I show 
that these variables suffer from exactly the same problematic distribution as 
                                               
7 This chapter is largely based on the ideas discussed in Pollock (2017) 
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concreteness. Finally, I show that this problem is not an issue that is general to all 
subjective rating scales used in psycholinguistics: the Warriner et al. (2013) emotional 
valence norms do not have the same distribution as the other norms. This shows that 
the issue is specific to the scales that are used to investigate or operationalise the 
concrete-abstract distinction.  
4.1 The middle of the concreteness scale 
We saw in Chapter 2 how concreteness norms are generated. A word’s 
concreteness rating is derived by asking a group of participants, typically numbering 
between twenty and thirty, to rate that word for concreteness on a Likert scale. A low 
score indicates that a word is highly ‘abstract’, whereas a high rating indicates that a 
word is highly ‘concrete’. I will now develop some theoretical concerns about the 
validity of traditional concreteness norms before turning to a statistical analysis of the 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) database. Firstly, let us consider the job a participant is being 
asked to do when she is told to rate a word between, say, 1 and 5 on a scale of 
concreteness. She is told that ‘concrete words are experienced by the senses’ (as 
per the norming instructions introduced in Chapter 2), whereas abstract words are 
not. As I noted before, this distinction between concreteness and abstractness is 
widely used, but it is again important to point out that the definition of abstractness is 
entirely negative. The only description offered of what constitutes abstractness is that 
it is ‘not concreteness’. By crude analogy, someone curious about the difference 
between solids and liquids would be rightly dissatisfied with the explanation that 
solidity is a state of matter characterised by structural rigidity, and that liquids are ‘not 
solids’, because this definition does not tell this person much at all about the 
properties of liquids. Attempts to formulate a positive definition of abstractness that 
identifies its properties are rare. Indeed, as has been pointed out a number of times, 
it is only recently that researchers have even started to focus on abstract concepts in 
detail and reverse a historical tendency to focus on concrete concepts exclusively 
(Crutch and Ridgway, 2012; Hamilton and Coslett, 2008; Wiemer-Hastings and Xu, 
2005). This on its own might be reason enough to wonder what the basis is for a 
participant’s decisions when they engage in these rating tasks. But for now I want to 
focus on the middle section of the concreteness scale, which supposedly contains 
those words that are of intermediate concreteness. 
It is reasonable to assume that for a certain class of words, the interpretation 
of traditional concreteness norming instructions is relatively straightforward. A 
participant that is presented with the word ‘apple’ is likely to have seen, touched, 
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smelled, and tasted apples throughout the course of their life, and will 
unproblematically assign apple a high concreteness rating. Similarly, a participant 
that is presented with the word ‘serendipity’ is likely to reason that since serendipity 
is a loose association between some coincidental, non-specified events, and is not 
something that affords direct sensory experience, the word ‘serendipity’ should be 
assigned a low concreteness rating. However, what are the properties that a 
word/concept should have in order for it to be assigned a midscale rating? It is difficult 
to formulate a coherent approach to this task that is predicated on the idea that a 
given object or idea can be ‘half-seen’ or ‘half-touched’. What does it mean to have 
intermediate sensory experience of an entity or idea? That is to ask: what is a 
participant telling us about a word when they rate it a 3 out of 5? They could mean 
any one of the following: 
1) Adding up all of my sensory experience of this object across all five of the 
sensory modalities, I realise that I have seen and heard it, but never touched, smelled, 
or tasted it. So I suppose I’ll rate it a 3. 
2) One interpretation of this word brings to mind something that cannot be 
directly experienced, whereas a different interpretation of this word brings to mind 
something that can be directly experienced. So I suppose I’ll rate it a 3. 
3) Sometimes I associate sensory experience with this word, but sometimes I 
don’t. So I suppose I’ll rate it a 3. 
It is certainly possible to imagine more potential approaches. And there is no empirical 
basis for selecting one of these approaches over another. Furthermore, it is likely that 
different participants will generate different interpretations for some of the words in 
any list of words to be normed. Producing examples of this class of words is trivial. 
When a participant sees the letter-string <deed> presented in isolation, there is no 
way that a researcher can control for the fact that half the participants may interpret 
<deed> as referring to a document associated with proof of property ownership (high 
concreteness value?), and the other half may interpret <deed> as referring to some 
unspecified action, perhaps involving some element of heroism (low concreteness 
value?). This problem is not confined to homographs. Metonymies are ubiquitous in 
English and also introduce ambiguity into the norming process. When asking 
participants to indicate the concreteness value of the concept that the letter-string 
<football> refers to, it is impossible to know whether participants interpreted 
<football> as referring to the ball that is used to play the sport or whether they 
interpreted <football> as referring to the sport itself. It is likely that some participants 
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settled on the first interpretation, while some settled on the latter. And it also seems 
reasonable to allow that different interpretations might be assigned different 
concreteness ratings. The concept of a spherical ball that can indeed be touched, 
heard, and seen is likely to be given a higher concreteness rating than the concept of 
a group endeavour predicated on a system of rules that happens to involve a 
spherical ball. But these interpretations are not separable in traditional concreteness 
norming methodologies, and consequently there are a number of words for which it 
is just not clear what concept it is that the mean concreteness rating is even supposed 
to reflect.  
So far, no one has investigated whether all participants are using the same 
judgement criteria, or whether they are all using different judgement criteria, or 
whether they use one judgement criterion for some words and a different judgement 
criterion for others, or whether different participants are even interpreting words in the 
same way. This point on its own might be enough to motivate the avoidance of words 
with a mean value in the middle of a concreteness-abstractness scale. Given that it 
is not clear what it is that participants are even telling us when they rate a word a 3, 
we might also wonder how often participants actually use values from the middle of 
the concreteness scale when making their judgements. As we shall see below, the 
problems relating to this observation are serious, and midscale words feature 
frequently in concreteness experiments. One of the reasons that this issue is common 
is that until recently, the available databases that provide researchers with 
concreteness rating norms were relatively small. After having to control stimuli for 
nuisance variables such as word length, frequency, age of acquisition, and semantic 
category, the pool of items that fits all these constraints is greatly reduced. Recently, 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) provided a concreteness norm database of 40,000 English 
words, which dwarfs the previously popular MRC database used in most studies 
(Coltheart, 1981). This new, larger database allows a statistical analysis of the 
distributions of concreteness norms across a much larger section of the English 
lexicon. I now present this analysis and use it to develop the concerns raised in this 
section. 
4.2 A statistical analysis of Brysbaert et al.’s 
(2013) concreteness database 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) collected a new set of concreteness norms for 40,000 
English words. Groups of approximately 25 participants rated subsets of the whole 
list of 40,000 words on a concreteness scale of 1 (very abstract) to 5 (very concrete). 
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The instructions given to participants were intentionally different to the original Paivio 
et al. (1968) instructions: ‘the instructions stressed that the assessment of word 
concreteness would be based on experiences involving all senses and motor 
responses’ (Brysbaert et al., 2013, p. 904). This change was made in response to 
criticisms from Lynott and Connell (2012) that, in producing the original concreteness 
norms, participants relied too heavily on the visual and haptic modalities when judging 
how concrete a word was, and neglected auditory, olfactory and gustatory modalities. 
The full definitions from Brysbaert et al. (2013, p. 906) are reproduced here: 
 
A concrete word comes with a higher rating and refers to 
something that exists in reality; you can have immediate 
experience of it through your senses (smelling, tasting, touching, 
hearing, seeing) and the actions you do. The easiest way to 
explain a word is by pointing to it or by demonstrating it (e.g. To 
explain 'sweet ' you could have someone eat sugar; To explain 
'jump' you could simply jump up and down or show people a 
movie clip about someone jumping up and down; To explain 
'couch', you could point to a couch or show a picture of a couch).  
 
An abstract word comes with a lower rating and refers to 
something you cannot experience directly through your senses or 
actions. Its meaning depends on language. The easiest way to 
explain it is by using other words (e.g. There is no simple way to 
demonstrate 'justice'; but we can explain the meaning of the word 
by using other words that capture parts of its meaning). 
 
 The other main difference between the Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms and the MRC 
database norms is that whereas the MRC database norms are based on a seven-
point scale (1 = abstract, 7 = concrete), the Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms use a five-
point scale. This change was introduced on the basis of Laming’s (2003) argument 
that humans are incapable of reliably making use of more than five categories in 
judgment tasks. Instead of providing increased resolution, a scale with more than five 
points really just adds unnecessary noise to the rating process. As an aside, it is worth 
pointing out here that the conclusions drawn by Laming (2003) are actually somewhat 
stronger and prompt further concerns surrounding the instructions given to 
participants in these norming tasks. Laming claims that as well as not being able to 
consistently distinguish between more than five categories, humans are also much 
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less able to make absolute judgements than they are to make relative judgements. In 
this context, the implication would be that participants in concreteness norming 
studies are only able to consistently judge to what degree a presented word is 
concrete or abstract in comparison to a reference word. In the instructions given in 
Paivio et al. (1968) and Brysbaert et al. (2013), participants are given exemplars of 
the extreme ends of the concrete-abstract continuum. In the Paivio instructions, the 
word chair is given as a paradigmatic concrete item, and the word independence is 
given as a paradigmatic abstract item. In Brysbaert et al. (2013), three examples of 
highly concrete items are given (sweet (adjective), jump, couch) and one example of 
a highly abstract item is given (justice). But in neither set of instructions is an example 
of an intermediately concrete item given. So not only is there variability in how 
participants interpret instructions concerning intermediately concrete items, but 
participants are also not provided with a reference intermediate item that indicates 
what might constitute intermediate concreteness. Laming shows that in many 
circumstances, category judgments made without a reference point are essentially 
random. One solution might be to simply provide participants with some examples of 
paradigmatic intermediately concrete items. But in doing this, the researcher is 
effectively imposing their own interpretation of what constitutes ‘intermediate 
concreteness’, and as was demonstrated in the previous section, there is no basis for 
choosing one set of criteria for intermediate concreteness over another set. This is a 
further problem with traditional concreteness norms. 
The mean value of a group of participants’ judgments about the concreteness 
of a stimulus word is assumed throughout the literature on word concreteness to be 
a useful approximation of that word’s position on a hypothesised concrete-abstract 
continuum. I shall now demonstrate that this assumption is false. Consider the 
following example datasets, where each line represents a word rated by four 
participants in a concreteness norming study, and each individual number in square 
brackets represents an individual participant’s judgment about the concreteness of 
that word on a scale of 1 to 5: 
 
[1 1 1 1] Mean = 1, Standard Deviation = 0 Highly Abstract 
[5 5 5 5] Mean = 5, Standard Deviation = 0 Highly Concrete 
[3 3 3 3] Mean = 3, Standard Deviation = 0 Intermediately Concrete 
[1 5 1 5] Mean = 3, Standard Deviation = 2 Intermediately Concrete 
The standard deviation of a dataset is a measure of the average distance between all 
the data points in that dataset and the mean value of all data points in the dataset. In 
norming tasks, the standard deviation of a set of ratings is therefore a blunt index of 
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the extent to which participants agreed with each other about how a word should be 
rated. To make this point clear, consider the first three words in this example dataset. 
Participants all unanimously agreed with each other about the concreteness of these 
words, and therefore the standard deviation of the ratings of these words is 0, and 
the mean rating accurately reflects the participants’ individual judgments. If this 
hypothetical situation occurs in actual concreteness norms, then we can have some 
hope that the concerns outlined in the previous section are unfounded: unanimity of 
judgment might suggest at least some degree of unanimity of interpretation. However, 
now consider the fourth word in the example dataset. Here, the mean value is 3 
despite the fact that not a single participant judged that word to be intermediately 
concrete. In fact, two participants judged this word to be as abstract as possible and 
assigned it a 1, whereas the other two participants judged this word to be as concrete 
as possible and assigned it a 5. Half the participants totally disagreed with the other 
half, and the standard deviation is 2: on average, all participants’ judgments are 2 
scale positions away from the mean value of the dataset. This would be a very 
troubling situation indeed, because it shows that the mean concreteness value of this 
fourth word bears little relation to participants’ responses. These participants were 
either interpreting concreteness norming instructions differently, disagreeing with 
each other about what concreteness is, or were supplying ratings on the basis of 
differing interpretations of the target word. Indeed, a combination of all three factors 
is possible.  
 Recall that in the Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms, 25 participants rated each 
word on a scale between 1 and 5. If a dataset contains 25 numbers (in our case, 25 
individual concreteness judgments), all of which are integers between 1 and 5, then 
there are a finite number of possible combinations of means and standard deviations 
for that dataset. Figure 4-1 below plots all of these possible combinations: 
94 
 
Figure 4-1 Theoretically possible means and standard deviations for concreteness ratings in 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) 
 
Note how, at the extreme ends of the x-axis, only a standard deviation of 0 is possible 
because for a mean value to be 1 or 5, all 25 participants must have rated an item as 
1 or 5, respectively. However, in the middle of the scale, the disagreement that is 
theoretically possible increases, reaching a peak at mean value ~3, standard 
deviation 2. This is exactly analogous to the fourth word in the example dataset 
introduced above, except that in this case the dataset would consist of 12/13 ratings 
of 1, and 12/13 ratings of 5, instead of two ratings of each value. Crucially, it is still 
theoretically possible for a data point to occur with a mean value located in the middle 
of the scale, but with a relatively low standard deviation. To relate this point to 
concerns surrounding concreteness norms, it is still clearly theoretically possible for 
participants to more or less consistently agree that a word is of intermediate 
concreteness.  
Now, consider Figure 4-2 below, which plots the actual mean concreteness 
value and standard deviation of every noun in the Brysbaert et al. (2013) 
concreteness norm dataset (n = 14,592) over the top of the theoretically possible 
combinations depicted in Figure 4-2: 
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Figure 4-2 Actual means and standard deviations for concreteness ratings in Brysbaert et al. 
(2013) 
 
 
The pattern is striking. At the extreme concrete end of the scale, there are many items 
with high concreteness ratings and relatively low standard deviations, indicating that 
participants more or less agreed in their judgments about how to rate these words. At 
the extreme abstract end of the scale, there are likewise words with low concreteness 
ratings and relatively low standard deviations, although not to the same extent as at 
the extreme concrete end. However, in the middle of the scale, there is an obvious 
rise in standard deviation. There are only a handful of words with a mean value near 
3 and a standard deviation even slightly below 1. Indeed, there is a large class of 
words with a standard deviation well over 1 ranging from mean values of 1.5 to 4.5. 
What does this indicate? It indicates that for a great number of items, participants 
were not agreeing in their judgments of how concrete a stimulus word was. At mean 
values of 2 and 4, there are many cases of standard deviations above 1. Ratings on 
this scale can only take integer values between 1 and 5. This means that for many of 
the words with a mean value of 2 or 4, some participants must have been judging 
these words as belonging to opposite ends of the concreteness scale to the position 
that the mean value suggests that word belongs to. This phenomenon is problematic 
for the assumption that concreteness should be treated as a continuous variable. This 
is because in a vast number of cases, participants’ judgments tended not to be 
continuous. They tended to be binary. Participants were using values of 1, 2, 4 and 5 
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in producing these concreteness norms, and tended to avoid using 3. Furthermore, 
in many cases, some participants were judging a word as a 1 (‘totally abstract’), 
whereas others were judging that same word as a 4 (‘somewhat concrete’).  
Given these methodological issues, it might be considered somewhat 
surprising that concreteness effects are so widely reported in the psycholinguistic 
literature. If a large section of the hypothesised concreteness spectrum is actually a 
procedural artefact resulting from erroneously assuming that a mean value 
necessarily reflects the individual data points from which it is derived, then it is unclear 
what phenomenon it is that concreteness effects are actually indexing. One potential 
explanation immediately presents itself: generally, when investigating the effect of a 
variable, researchers try to choose stimuli that maximise a change in this variable in 
order to generate the maximum possible effect. It is therefore possible that empirical 
concreteness research might not suffer too badly from the problem of binary 
disagreements concerning midscale items, because researchers will have aimed to 
pick stimuli from the extreme ends of the scale, and these polar items are less subject 
to disagreement. However, if it turns out that a significant number of concreteness 
studies include stimuli that suffer from the disagreement phenomenon, then this 
poses an explanatory problem concerning evidence in favour of processing 
differences between abstract and concrete items. The typical finding is that there are 
processing advantages for concrete items relative to abstract items, and the typical 
explanation of this finding is that concrete items and abstract items have different 
neurologically instantiated formats and/or structural relationships. If a significant 
number of stimuli included in an abstract or concrete experimental condition actually 
come from the middle of the concreteness scale, then the typical claim that there are 
processing differences between concrete items and abstract items is no longer 
supported by the data. This is because for those words with high standard deviations, 
half of the participants who produced the concreteness measure for that word judged 
it to be abstract, and the other half judged it to be concrete. Therefore, there are no 
grounds for calling these words ‘concrete’ or ‘abstract’ in the first place.  
4.3 Stimuli featured in concreteness 
experiments 
I now present a survey of the stimuli used in empirical concreteness studies 
published over the last thirty years. The mean concreteness rating and the standard 
deviation of the concrete and abstract stimuli in these experiments are plotted against 
the nominal subset of the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness norms. This provides 
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us with a graphical representation of the extent to which stimuli in concreteness 
experiments avoid the disagreement problem, or fall foul of it. Again, I stress that 
these studies have not been singled out for criticism. My aim was to choose studies 
that have at least one of two properties. They have either been frequently cited in the 
concreteness literature and therefore contribute significantly to background 
assumptions made in concreteness studies and the discipline of psychology in 
general, or they attempt to resolve a specific theoretical dispute and therefore make 
substantive claims on the back of the empirical data they report. A representative 
sample of experimental paradigms is also included. A further, more pragmatic reason 
for choosing the following studies over others is that their stimuli sets were, laudably, 
made available for scrutiny. The stimuli of the following studies will be analysed in 
reverse chronological order:  
Table 4-1 - Studies included in stimuli analysis 
Study Paradigm 
Kroll and Merves (1985) Lexical decision 
De Groot (1989) Word association 
Binder et al. (2005) Lexical decision 
Romani et al. (2008) Word recall 
 
Romani et al. (2008) report a series of experiments designed to investigate 
whether concreteness has an effect on how well participants can recall items held in 
Short Term Memory (STM). Participants were read lists of words, and then asked to 
immediately write down the words that they had heard either in the order that they 
had heard them, or in an unordered ‘anything goes’ format. Lists of words were 
supposed to consist entirely of concrete items, or entirely of abstract items. Over the 
four experiments reported, there were a variety of manipulations in order to 
investigate fine-grained distinctions between various hypotheses generated by 
different models of STM, but in general, Romani et al. (2008, p. 312) report 
‘consistent, positive effects of concreteness in tasks tapping immediate recall of items 
in the proper order (serial recall), recall of items independent of order (free recall), 
and recall of item positions (matching span and order reconstruction)’. Now consider 
Figure 4-3 below, which plots the stimuli used in these experiments against the 
nominal section of the Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms: 
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Figure 4-3 Stimuli featured in Romani et al. (2008) 
 
Again, and unfortunately, the pattern is striking. The concrete stimuli, depicted as 
black triangles, are where they ‘should’ be: concentrated at the extreme end of the 
concreteness scale and with relatively low standard deviations. These items are 
unequivocally concrete. However, this is clearly not the case for the allegedly abstract 
stimuli depicted as white triangles. The abstract stimuli have actually been taken from 
across the entire range of the scale, and a great many of them have standard 
deviations well above 1. This presents a problem for the assumption that the 
phenomenon under discussion (the effects of a psycholinguistic variable on STM 
processing) necessarily has anything to do with concreteness. Instead of making a 
comparison between concrete and abstract items, the comparison is actually between 
concrete items on the one hand, and a heterogeneous group of items on the other, a 
large subset of which have mean ratings that do not reflect individual concreteness 
judgments. Indeed, in order for the standard deviations of these items to be as high 
as they are (greater than 1), some participants must have been judging them to be 
relatively concrete. The stimuli that suffer from high disagreement (that is, those 
stimuli with high standard deviations) therefore cannot be said to be unequivocally 
‘abstract’ in the same way that the concrete items are unequivocally concrete. It is 
difficult to argue that, despite these problems, the concreteness effect still necessarily 
obtains, because the comparison here is simply not between concrete items and 
abstract items. 
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Binder et al. (2005) report a lexical decision study in which participants were 
presented with single letter-string stimuli one item at a time, and asked to indicate as 
quickly as possible via a button press whether each letter-string represented a real 
English word, or non-word. Binder et al. (2005) also acquired fMRI data from 
participants performing this task in an attempt to localise distinct concrete and 
abstract brain activation areas. There were three experimental conditions: concrete 
words, abstract words, and non-words. Binder et al. (2005, p. 907) report ‘a reliable 
advantage of concrete over abstract items’ in both the reaction time data and error 
rate data. Concrete items were, therefore, processed faster and more accurately than 
abstract items. Now consider Figure 4-4, which plots the stimuli used in this 
experiment against the entire distribution of the nominal section of the Brysbaert et 
al. (2013) norms: 
Figure 4-4 Stimuli featured in Binder et al. (2005) 
 
Although the pattern is not as pronounced as that seen in the distribution of the stimuli 
used in Romani et al. (2008), it is similar and still concerning. Once again, the 
concrete stimuli are relatively unproblematic, and the vast majority of them are located 
at the extreme end of the scale and have relatively low standard deviations. However, 
the abstract stimuli show a far greater range, and their standard deviations (M = 1.23) 
are still high compared to the standard deviations of the concrete stimuli (M = 0.52). 
A simple independent samples t-test reveals that this difference is statistically 
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significant (t = 10.132, df = 88, p < 0.001). The abstract stimuli featured in Binder et 
al. (2005) are therefore subject to the same criticisms as the stimuli featured in 
Romani et al. (2008). The mean ratings of a large subset of the abstract stimuli simply 
do not reflect participants’ judgments about those stimuli, and as a consequence it is 
not clear that they should be thought of as abstract. Once again, the comparison 
being made is not actually between concrete and abstract items, but rather between 
items that norming participants unanimously agree on as being concrete, and items 
that norming participants disagree about how to rate. It is therefore not safe to draw 
conclusions about concreteness effects on the basis of these stimuli, because 
abstractness has been confounded with ‘disagreement about concreteness’.  
De Groot (1989) reports a series of experiments designed to investigate 
potential interactions between the frequency with which a word appears in written 
discourse, the ‘imageability’ of the referent of that word, and the ease with which 
participants make word associations in response to it. Roughly, the imageability of a 
word is the ease with which one can generate a mental image of the referent of that 
word. Note that de Groot uses the terms ‘imageability’ and ‘concreteness’ more or 
less interchangeably. This practice is common in research on concreteness (and, 
indeed, imageability) because the two variables are highly correlated, despite the fact 
that they were originally conceived of as separate constructs (Paivio et al., 1968). In 
any case, de Groot (1989) reports that on all measures, concrete (i.e., highly 
imageable) items were responded to faster and more consistently than abstract (i.e., 
less imageable) items. Although the strategy of using imageability norms but then 
analysing results in terms of concreteness theories potentially adds to the confusion 
surrounding the reliability of concreteness effects rather than decreasing it, the 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms still provide a measure of the distribution of de Groot’s 
(1989) stimuli across the concreteness scale. Furthermore, as we shall see in later 
sections of this chapter, imageability as a variable suffers from much the same 
problems as concreteness. Consider Figure 4-5, the format of which should by now 
be familiar: 
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Figure 4-5 Stimuli featured in de Groot (1989) 
 
Once again, concrete stimuli tend to have relatively low standard deviations (M = 
0.56), whereas the abstract stimuli are evenly distributed across a larger section of 
the scale, and tend to have high standard deviations (M = 1.24). An independent 
samples t-test reveals that this difference in standard deviation is statistically 
significant (t = -12.186, df = 143, p < 0.001). Therefore, as with the two previous 
studies, there is a confound between the abstractness of the stimuli in the ‘abstract’ 
condition, and the extent to which participants were able to consistently judge the 
concreteness of those stimuli in the first place.  
Finally, Kroll and Merves (1985) report a series of experiments designed to 
isolate the precise conditions under which concreteness effects appear in Lexical 
Decision. They note that previous research on concreteness effects in Lexical 
Decision had provided conflicting results: sometimes the concreteness effect 
obtained, and sometimes it did not. They examine the predictions of Dual Coding 
Theory about the outcomes of stimuli presentation manipulations. Stimuli were either 
presented in blocks by word type, or presented in randomly mixed lists containing 
both abstract and concrete words. Kroll and Merves (1985) report small (and on some 
measures absent) concreteness effects in some experiments, but identify a large 
concreteness effect in an experiment in which blocked concrete items were presented 
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before blocked abstract items. Figure 4-6 below plots the stimuli featured in these 
experiments:  
Figure 4-6 Stimuli featured in Kroll and Merves (1985) 
 
At first glance, the distribution of the stimuli across conditions in Kroll and Merves 
(1985) might appear to be better than the distributions of the previous studies. The 
sample of concrete stimuli is similar to that of the previous three studies. However, 
there are a greater number of abstract stimuli drawn from the extreme end of the 
scale and their standard deviations seem lower. However, an independent samples 
t-test reveals that the difference in standard deviations between the abstract (M = 
1.22) and concrete stimuli (M = 0.74) is still statistically significant (t = -10.285, df = 
189, p < 0.001).  
Crucially, these four experimental reports are not special cases when it comes 
to the properties of ‘abstract’ stimuli. Table 4-2 below presents a number of 
experimental concreteness studies from a wide variety of paradigms, and a summary 
of the concreteness values and standard deviations of the stimuli featured in their 
experiments. The abstract-midscale stimuli pattern applies to every single 
experiment. 
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Table 4-2 Concreteness statistics in various experimental paradigms 
 
 
These studies were chosen simply because they reflect a range of experimental 
paradigms (lexical decision, recall, semantic judgement, word association, picture-
word matching), data types (behavioural, fMRI, EEG), and include both neurotypical 
and patient populations. They also included their stimuli sets in their experimental 
reports, although it is important to note that for Sabsevitz et al. (2005) and Lee and 
Federmeier (2008), only a sample of the stimuli were available. For every study but 
one listed in this table, the mean standard deviation of the stimuli in the concrete 
conditions was below 1, while the mean standard deviation of the stimuli in the 
abstract conditions was above 1. The only exception is Huang et al. (2010), in which 
the standard deviations for both stimuli sets were relatively high. Looking at the 
distributions displayed above in the figures above, it is clear that the only way these 
statistics could be obtained is if the midscale disagreement problem applied to all of 
the abstract stimuli sets of the experiments depicted in table 4-2. 
  
  
                
Concrete   
                 
Abstract 
 
Article 
Type of 
Data 
Experimental 
paradigm Mean  SD  Mean   SD  
 
Kroll and Merves 
(1985) Behavioural Lexical Decision 4.55 0.74 2.17 1.22 
de Groot (1989) Behavioural Word Assoc.  4.66 0.6 2.36 1.24 
Paivio et al. (1994) Behavioural Recall 4.83 0.47 2.29 1.28 
Gee et al. (1999) Behavioural Recall 4.73 0.57 3 1.33 
Binder et al. (2005) fMRI Lexical Decision 4.76 0.52 2.34 1.23 
Crutch and 
Warrington (2005) Patient Word matching 4.83 0.46 3.53 1.18 
Sabsevitz et al. 
(2005) fMRI Sem. judgement 4.86 0.45 2.58 1.31 
ter Doest and 
Semin  (2005) Behavioural Recall 4.72 0.57 2.45 1.26 
Lee and Federmeier 
(2008) EEG Sem. judgement 4.41 0.88 2.27 1.24 
Huang et al. (2010) EEG Sem. judgement 3.82 1.17 2.53 1.21 
Skipper-Kallal et al. 
(2015) fMRI Deep thought 4.44 0.81 2.38 1.22 
Jager and Cleland 
(2016) Behavioural Lexical Decision 4.62 0.64 3.29 1.19 
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This brief survey of empirical concreteness research undertaken over a period 
of three decades shows that no study has avoided confounding the mean 
concreteness ratings of their stimuli with the variability in those ratings (as indicated 
by the standard deviation) to one degree or another. The theoretical problems arising 
from the variability of interpretation inherent in both single-word presentation 
paradigms and concreteness norming instructions indicate that the middle of the 
concreteness scale is unlikely to help us develop an applicable model of the human 
conceptual system. This, in combination with the finding that the ‘abstract’ stimuli in 
concreteness experiments are in many cases not actually abstract, but are instead 
exactly those items that are methodologically problematic, raises an obvious 
question: how and why is it that concreteness effects appear to be so robust despite 
these methodological issues? 
One answer to this question is simply to point out that, actually, concreteness 
effects are not that robust, and the literature is marked by conflicting findings. In 
Chapter 2, we saw that lexical decision experiments have not consistently produced 
concreteness effects, and in some cases have even produced abstractness effects. 
We also saw that the fMRI data is highly variable, and that the very same areas of 
the brain have been argued to be especially essential to the processing of each word 
type over the other. One potential explanation of this variability is that different 
experimental tasks and stimulus lists will necessarily introduce some variability into 
the data produced by different experiments. However, on top of this, we now have 
evidence that the stimuli that were used in these experiments were simply not good 
representatives of the alleged category distinction between concrete and abstract 
words. Concrete stimuli are generally unproblematic, but abstract stimuli are simply 
those words about which participants tended to disagree when the concreteness 
measure was generated. We might expect that responses to these words would be 
inherently more variable in other respects than those responses to words about which 
participants tend to agree. With this additional source of noise in experimental 
designs, perhaps it is no wonder that lexical decision and fMRI paradigms have 
produced such variable results. 
 However, it is still true that in list memory (Allen and Hulme, 2006; Miller and 
Roodenrys, 2009; Romani et al., 2008; Walker and Hulme, 1999) and EEG paradigms 
(Barber et al., 2013; Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios and Holcomb, 1994; West and 
Holcomb, 2000), consistent concreteness effects have been obtained. Participants 
are better at recalling concrete words than abstract words in list memory paradigms, 
and N400 amplitudes to concrete words are higher than N400 amplitudes to abstract 
words. The purpose of Chapters 5 and 6 is to report new experiments that controlled 
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for the problems outlined in this chapter, in order to determine what happens when 
the concrete-abstract contrast is maximised, and concrete stimuli are compared to 
‘truly’ abstract stimuli. Because list memory and EEG paradigms seem to produce 
consistent effects even though they also featured problematic stimuli, these are the 
paradigms we shall focus on.  
4.4 Concreteness and multiple linear regression 
All of the experiments mentioned above are factorial designs in which high 
concreteness stimuli were compared to low concreteness stimuli. The mid-scale 
disagreement phenomenon raises problems for this kind of study, because the stimuli 
featured in the abstract conditions were not unequivocally abstract. Therefore, even 
if we do obtain statistically significant differences between concrete and abstract 
conditions, it isn’t clear that this difference can be attributed to the concreteness 
variable, because it isn’t clear that the variable does indeed separate two distinct 
classes of stimuli. However, you might suppose that large scale multiple linear 
regression (MLR) analyses are immune to these criticisms (Kousta et al., 2011; Lynott 
and Connell, 2012). You might suppose this because these MLR analyses don’t 
compare concrete stimuli with abstract stimuli explicitly; they quantify the variance in 
some dependent measure that is explained when concreteness is added to a linear 
regression model. If a statistically significant portion of variance is explained this way, 
then surely it’s okay to use the concreteness variable in this kind of experiment. I will 
now argue that, unfortunately, this is incorrect for two reasons.  
 The first problem facing MLR approaches is that they assume that 
concreteness is actually a linear variable: it is a requirement of MLR that variables 
are such. However, the pattern of participants’ judgements reported in section 4.2 
shows that concreteness is not a linear variable. Participants do not use the whole 
scale, and tend to pick values from the extreme ends of the scale. Participants treat 
concreteness as a binary variable; not a linear variable. This on its own invalidates 
models that assume that concreteness is a linear variable (the p-values produced by 
these models are arguably uninterpretable). The second issue is that, as we have 
already seen, there are conflicting findings when it comes to the effect of 
concreteness on behavioural measures, even in large scale regression analyses. 
Connell & Lynott (2012) find that concreteness is negatively correlated with decision 
latency. Kousta et al. (2011) find that concreteness is positively correlated with 
decision latency. Brysbaert et al. (2016) do not find a statistically significant effect of 
concreteness on decision latency either way. In my view, this is exactly what we would 
106 
 
expect if the assumptions of these models were inappropriate, and/or if the models 
contain lots of noise. Ultimately, the midscale disagreement phenomenon reduces 
our confidence in the interpretations of large scale regression studies just as much 
as it does for factorial designs.  
4.5 Other subjective sensorimotor rating scales 
Before we move on to Chapters 5 and 6, I want to discuss a potential issue 
with the analyses I have just presented. You might accept that there is a problem with 
the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness database, and that, therefore, we should be 
careful when we select stimuli from it. However, there are other concreteness 
databases (Coltheart, 1981), and other variables that measure very similar things to 
concreteness, such as imageability  (Cortese and Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012), 
and modality exclusivity norms (Lynott and Connell, 2012). Even accepting the 
problem with the Brysbaert et al. database, we shouldn’t assume that these other 
norming databases have the same problem. If these other measures contain 
information that is interpretable right across the scale, and with relatively low 
variability in ratings, then perhaps the worries I have raised in this chapter aren’t so 
pressing after all. We can simply use these other databases instead of the Brysbaert 
et al. database, and the concreteness measure is still valid in the general case. I now 
want to show that, unfortunately, the midscale variability problem applies to all of 
these databases as well: it is general to all subjective rating scales that are designed 
to measure the extent to which participants associate modal (sensory) information 
with words. Perhaps this is not too surprising because they are derived in much the 
same way as concreteness (by taking the mean value of a set of individual 
judgements about depth of sensorimotor experience).  
 Figure 4-7 presents a mean/standard deviation plot of the imageability ratings 
of 6,000 words amalgamated from two databases (Cortese and Fugett, 2004; Schock 
et al., 2012). Imageability is a measure of how easy it is to generate a mental image 
of the referent of a word. It is so highly correlated with concreteness that the two 
variables have often been used interchangeably in the literature (as we saw with de 
Groot (1989)).  
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Figure 4-7 Means and standard deviations of imageability ratings for 6,000 words (Cortese and 
Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012) 
 
The distribution is identical to that of the concreteness measure. A similar pattern 
emerges in Lynott and Connell’s (2012) Modality Exclusivity Norm (MEN). MEN is 
essentially measuring the same thing as concreteness, but it provides more 
information because it features ratings for all 5 primary sensory modalities (sight, 
sound, touch, taste, smell). A low rating indicates that the referent of a word offers 
little experience in a given modality; a high rating indicates that a referent offers a lot 
of experience. Each word is rated on all five modalities. This results in a five element 
vector from which various measures can be derived (mean sensory experience, 
maximum sensory experience, Euclidean distance from origin, and so on). Figure 4-
8 displays mean/standard deviation plots of all 400 words in the MEN for the five 
sensory modalities. 
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Figure 4-8 Means and standard deviations of Lynott and Connell’s (2012) Modality Exclusivity 
Norms 
 
What is striking here is that even with just 400 words, the familiar shape of the 
distribution is clearly apparent. I do not think that we can ignore the fact that all of 
these datasets have the same problematic distribution. It is likely to be a result of the 
question that we ask participants when we generate these measures. When we 
present depth of sensorimotor experience as a scale, we are implicitly committing to 
the idea that is possible for an entity to be ‘half-real’, or ‘half in space-time’, or ‘half-
seeable’. The distributions of these semantic variables tell us that participants tend to 
reject this idea: they do not use midscale values. 
One solution might be to specify explicitly what we want the middle of these 
scales to represent, and to provide examples of midscale words for participants so 
they have something to anchor their judgements to. Whether something along these 
lines would usefully decrease variability in the middle of the scale is an open question, 
but a potential issue here is that it is very difficult (for me) to think of a construct that 
could serve as a midscale anchor between ‘concreteness’ and ‘abstractness’. Even 
more worryingly, there are relatively few words in the abstract half of the scale with 
low standard deviations, and I think this suggests that the concrete/abstract 
dichotomy is just not well formed. Typically, concreteness research has focused on 
nouns rather than adjectives or verbs. Even starting with a set of 40,000 words, the 
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number of nouns in the Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms that have the following 
properties: 
A mean rating of 2 or below (are highly abstract) 
A standard deviation of 1 or below 
Were known by 100% of the norming population 
 
is only 275. Of these, a small but non-trivial number are either idiomatic fragments 
(‘amuck’) or morphologically complex rarities (‘purposefulness’) that we might be 
reluctant to include in stimulus lists. In contrast, there are 2,888 well-known nouns 
with mean ratings of 4 and above, and standard deviations below 1. I think this fact 
should motivate caution concerning the utility of the concreteness measure. 
Ultimately, the measure is supposed to tap into a fundamental, neuropsychologically 
real distinction between different kinds of concept. It is worrying that the rating is only 
interpretable for a small number of nominal ‘concepts’ at the abstract pole. 
 The final thing I want to consider in this chapter is emotional valence norms 
(Warriner et al., 2013). I have shown that there is a serious issue with all subjective 
ratings measures that involve sensorimotor associations to words. Participants don’t 
use the middle values of these scales, and experiments have tended to feature those 
words for which the measure is uninterpretable. We might worry even further that this 
problem applies to all subjective rating scales hypothesised to measure something 
about the ‘semantic’ system. Happily, we can rest assured that this isn’t the case. 
Figure 4-9 below plots the means and standard deviations of the emotional valence 
ratings of words gathered by Warriner et al. (2013) (n = 13,900). Warriner et al. do 
present this plot and touch on this issue, but they do not raise exactly the same point 
as the one I want to focus on here. 
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Figure 4-9 Means and standard deviations of Warriner et al.’s (2013) emotional valence norms 
 
A score of 1 indicates extremely negative emotional valence, 5 indicates neutrality, 
and 9 indicates extremely positive emotional valence. Looking at figure 10, it should 
be possible to select unequivocally negative, neutral, and positive words for use in 
experiments: there are some words at mean ratings 1, 5, and 9 with low standard 
deviations. This is obviously a good thing. It also shows that the midscale 
disagreement phenomenon specifically applies to the concreteness measure and 
other measures based on more or less the same idea, and so it is concreteness 
experiments specifically that the issues I have considered here affect. However, I 
should note that because the middle of the emotional valance scale is a neutral point 
between two extremes, words with high standard deviations are especially 
problematic. This is because a 5 is supposed to indicate emotional neutrality. But if a 
word has a mean of 4-6 but a standard deviation of 2 or more, that means that, on 
average, participants actually associate moderate to large emotional responses with 
that word. Some participants associate positive emotions with the word, but others 
associate negative emotions with it. There are quite a few words that look neutral, but 
in fact are not. Some examples are:  
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Similarly, if a word has a mean emotional valence of, say, 3, but a standard 
deviation above 1.5, that means that some people report a very strong negative 
response to that word whereas some people report little or no emotional response at 
all. So if a researcher is interested in comparing responses to neutral words with 
responses to emotionally valenced words, they should definitely avoid words with high 
standard deviations for emotional valence, because they will add a significant amount 
of noise to the experimental design. One positive thing to note is that for the emotional 
valence measure, a high standard deviation is potentially problematic but it is still 
interpretable. It makes sense that different people will associate different emotions 
with certain words. It also makes sense to think of our emotional responses as 
graded. I think this is a key difference between the sensorimotor experience variables 
and the emotional valence measure.  
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4 
To recap: in this chapter I have started to set out my response to objection 1. 
Objection 1 was that the concreteness measure has produced a huge array of 
statistically significant experimental effects. Because we have amassed such a large 
number of statistically significant concreteness effects, it might seem like there must 
be something principled and psychologically relevant about the concrete-abstract 
distinction. However, in this chapter I hope to have shown two things. Firstly, the 
measure from which these experimental effects were ultimately derived has seriously 
worrying statistical properties that, arguably, invalidate it is as a psycholinguistic tool. 
For almost any word in the middle of the Brysbaert et al. (2013) scale, the mean value 
of the participants’ concreteness ratings does not, in fact, reflect the judgements that 
they made. We therefore have no basis for calling these words concrete or abstract: 
the measure is uninterpretable because participants disagree about how to apply it. 
Furthermore, concreteness is often modelled as a continuous variable in both theory 
and in linear regression models (Brysbaert et al., 2016; Connell and Lynott, 2012; 
Kousta et al., 2011), but participants don’t behave as if it is actually a continuous 
variable. In a survey of concreteness experiments conducted over a period of three 
decades and employing a variety of paradigms and dependent variables, we found 
that every one of these experiments featured stimuli that were not unequivocally 
abstract. Instead, those ‘abstract’ stimuli tended to come from the problematic middle 
section of the concreteness scale. Therefore, there is reason to doubt that 
concreteness effects have actually been demonstrated, because up until this point 
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we have not typically been comparing concrete stimuli with abstract stimuli. I 
suggested that using the problematic midscale stimuli in place of truly abstract stimuli 
may have introduced a large source of unwanted noise into experimental designs, 
and this might partially (I stress partially) explain why in some paradigms, such as 
lexical decision and fMRI, concreteness experiments have produced conflicting and 
inconsistent results. I showed that the same midscale disagreement problem arises 
in other databases constructed from measures that are very similar to concreteness, 
such as imageability and Modality Exclusivity Norms (Cortese and Fugett, 2004; 
Lynott and Connell, 2012; Schock et al., 2012). This indicates that the midscale 
disagreement phenomenon is not specific to Brysbaert et al.’s database, but that it is 
a problem with subjective rating scales of sensorimotor experience in general. Finally, 
we saw that emotional valence rating scales (Warriner et al., 2013) don’t suffer from 
this problem, so it really is just an issue with these sensorimotor scales, and, 
therefore, a problem specific to theories and experiments that make use of the 
concreteness construct.  
I think these considerations seriously undermine the claim that concreteness 
effects are ‘reliable’, because it is not clear that we have actually implemented the 
concrete-abstract distinction experimentally. However, I have not presented evidence 
against the possibility that there are such things as concreteness in psycholinguistic 
experiments. And, although there are certainly problems with some of the ‘abstract’ 
stimuli featured in concreteness experiments, it is still true that a statistically 
significant difference between concrete and ‘abstract’ conditions has been obtained 
in many paradigms and by many different teams of researchers. In the next two 
chapters, I report experiments that were designed to investigate what happens if we 
are careful to maximise the experimental contrast between concrete and abstract 
stimuli, and only choose words for which the concreteness measure is interpretable 
when making this contrast. Note that the expectation here, if there are such things as 
concreteness effects, is that under these conditions the magnitude of any 
concreteness effect should be maximised, and the chances of obtaining them should 
also be maximised. This is because we will have increased the magnitude of the 
experimental contrast by increasing the distance between concrete and abstract 
stimuli, and only choosing those stimuli that ‘truly’ belong in those conditions. In 
Chapter 5, I report three list memory experiments. In Chapter 6, I report an EEG 
sentence processing experiment. I chose list memory and EEG because these seem 
to be the two kinds of paradigm that produced the most consistent concreteness 
effects, as we saw in Chapter 2. Paradoxically, in two out of three list memory 
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experiments, marginal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of no effect was 
obtained. In the third list memory experiment, a small concreteness effect was 
obtained. In the EEG experiment reported in Chapter 6, reasonably strong evidence 
in favour of the null hypothesis of no effect was obtained. In Chapter 7, I draw these 
results together and summarise what I take them to show: evidence for concreteness 
effects is not very strong after all. In this way, I hope to have provided a response to 
objection 1.  
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Chapter 5: Concreteness effects 
in list memory experiments 
 
In this chapter I will focus solely on the question of whether concreteness effects 
obtain in a very specific type of list memory task. First, I shall briefly introduce the 
central issue at hand, namely whether default concreteness effects occur in list 
memory experiments. Next, I present a survey of list memory experiments that 
investigate concreteness effects conducted over the last 40 years. I argue that every 
one of these experiments is flawed in various ways, and that these flaws might 
potentially contribute to an alternative explanation of why default concreteness effects 
are prevalent in the list memory literature. I then report three new experiments that 
were designed to avoid these flaws. Two of these experiments produced marginal 
evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. The final experiment produced a small 
concreteness effect. I discuss the new results presented here in relation to the results 
of previous list memory experiments and consider the theoretical issues that pertain 
to these results. Finally, I conclude that the evidence for default concreteness effects 
in list memory experiments is much less strong than it appears, and that, even if these 
effects do exist, there is currently no adequate explanation of why they would occur.  
5.1 List memory, concreteness, and Dual 
Coding Theory 
In a list memory task, participants read or hear a list of words one after the 
other, and are then required to reproduce as many of those words as possible after 
the list has finished being delivered. A list memory task can either require participants 
to preserve the order of items in the list, in which case it is known as a ‘serial recall’ 
task, or it can allow participants to reproduce items in any order, in which case it is 
known as a ‘free recall’ task. The rationale behind subjecting participants to these 
tasks is that if lists with certain properties are easier to remember than lists with 
different properties, then this differential performance speaks to some fact about the 
nature of memory: the reason that list A was easier to remember than list B might 
have important consequences for theories of cognition, based on their different 
properties. In some list memory concreteness experiments, participants are given 
instructions that are designed to bias them towards certain mnemonic strategies 
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(Paivio et al., 1994). For example, participants might be told explicitly to try and 
generate a mental image of the referent of each word in a list. In this chapter, we are 
interested in default concreteness effects in list memory, where participants are 
simply told to try and remember a list of words without any other guidance. As we saw 
in Chapter 2, historically the most popular theory of conceptual processing based on 
the concreteness-abstractness construct is Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986). DCT 
posits a qualitative and quantitative representational difference between concrete and 
abstract concepts based on the assumption that there are (at least) two types of 
mental representation (imagens and logogens), which feature in two types of 
cognitive process (the non-verbal and verbal codes). DCT holds that differential 
performance on concrete versus abstract stimuli should only consistently occur when: 
either a) participants are instructed to approach the experiment in such a way that 
this representational difference is likely to manifest, or b) the task is constructed in 
such a way that it is impossible for this representational difference not to manifest no 
matter how a participant approaches it. My use of the word ‘default’ is, therefore, 
meant to capture the idea that, in the studies discussed below, concreteness effects 
supposedly emerge even in list memory paradigms that do not overtly encourage a 
processing strategy that would explain why concrete items show an advantage over 
abstract items.  
 Default concreteness effects in list memory tasks, whereby lists of concrete 
items are easier to recall than lists of abstract items, are somewhat consistent, and 
when such an effect is obtained, the explanation of the effect is slightly different to 
that of DCT. For example, Romani et al. (2008, p. 313) suggest that ‘lexical semantic’ 
information facilitates task performance: words with high concreteness values are 
easier to remember than words with low concreteness values because high 
concreteness value words tend to have ‘richer semantic representations’. The claim 
here is that concrete concepts are constituted by representations that are ‘richer’ than 
those constitute abstract concepts, and that this property of richness facilitates recall. 
We shall return to this claim in the discussion section because its seeming 
innocuousness belies a troubling explanatory gap, and it is not quite the same as the 
claims made by DCT. In DCT, it is not the inherent ‘richness’ of concrete items that 
gives them their advantage over abstract items on behavioural measures. Instead this 
advantage is attributed to a type of processing strategy that is likely to benefit from 
the structural properties that concrete items tend to have relative to abstract items. 
The important point is that this advantage does not occur by default from the point of 
view of DCT: under DCT, concrete items do not have properties that make them 
116 
 
intrinsically easier to process than abstract items just by virtue of having those 
properties. One previously popular position, Context Availability Theory (CAT), does 
hold that this advantage should occur by default. However, the architects of this 
theory have themselves reported that DCT offers a better  account of experimental 
data (Schwanenflugel et al., 1992). We shall return to a more in-depth discussion of 
DCT later on, where it becomes relevant to the issues raised by the experimental 
aspects of this chapter. 
Let us now briefly consider the prevalence of default concreteness effects in 
the list memory literature. One very early study reports no difference between 
concrete and abstract items (Brener, 1940). Romani et al. (2008) cite Paivio and 
Csapo (1969) as finding no concreteness effects in list memory tasks despite the fact 
that one of Paivio and Csapo’s experiments can be interpreted as providing evidence 
for concreteness effects. Romani et al. (2008) themselves report a large number of 
list memory experiments, both free and serial recall, that generally show strong 
concreteness effects. Miller and Roodenrys (2009) report a series of experiments 
designed to investigate potential interactions between the effects of concreteness and 
word frequency in serial recall. Their results indicate concreteness effects at both high 
and low word frequencies, and an interaction between frequency and concreteness 
such that concreteness effects are enhanced when words are of low frequency. 
Walker and Hulme (1999) and Allen and Hulme (2006) also each report a series of 
concreteness effects in serial recall. Finally, Morr (1981) tested participants’ recall of 
high and low imagery words. Imagery and concreteness are separate but correlated 
variables. Morr (1981) found no advantage for high imagery (likely to be highly 
concrete) versus low imagery (likely to be abstract) items. Despite some 
inconsistencies then, it would seem that default concreteness effects do frequently 
emerge in list memory tasks.  
5.2 Methodological issues with list memory 
concreteness experiments 
There are some methodological problems present in varying degrees that 
could potentially explain the increased recall of concrete items over abstract items in 
the studies just mentioned. It should be stressed here that the intention is not to argue 
that concreteness effects in list memory tasks are definitely attributable to other 
factors, or that concreteness effects in list memory tasks do not occur. Rather, the 
aim is to highlight the fact that the interpretation of the results of list memory studies 
of concreteness to date is made difficult by these factors, and it would presumably be 
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a good thing if we could remove them. The main issue is that the midscale stimulus 
problem identified in the previous chapter applies to all of the experiments we will 
consider here. There are also various experiment-specific stimuli properties that 
potentially bias recall rates in favour of one experimental condition over another, and 
that also have nothing to do with concreteness. We shall now consider these 
problems in turn. 
Figures 5-1 to 5-4 below depict the stimuli featured in list memory 
experiments. All figures plot the mean concreteness ratings and standard deviations 
of concreteness ratings of every word in the Brysbaert et al. (2013) database. Each 
individual figure plots the mean ratings and standard deviations of the abstract and 
concrete stimuli featured in Romani et al. (2008), Allen and Hulme (2006), Miller and 
Roodenrys (2009), and Walker and Hulme (1999), respectively, over this whole 
distribution. The stimuli featured in Paivio and Csapo (1969) are available but not 
graphed because only 9 words in each condition featured in their experiments. This 
small stimuli pool generates its own problems and this will be discussed below. 
However, the criticisms I am about to level at the stimuli featured in Romani et al. 
(2008), Walker and Hulme (1999), Miller and Roodenrys (2009), and Allen and Hulme 
(2006) also apply to the stimuli featured in Paivio and Csapo (1969). The stimuli 
featured in Morr (1981) are not available for analysis. Note that although the 
experiments that I report below feature nominal stimuli, and most studies under 
discussion here also featured nouns, occasionally their stimulus sets did feature other 
word classes alongside nouns. In the case of Allen and Hulme (2006), many abstract 
items were not nominal. Therefore, in order to display the maximum number of stimuli 
for all experiments, I plot the entire Brysbaert et al. (2013) database instead of just 
the nominal subsection of it. 
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Figure 5-1 Stimuli featured in Romani et al. (2008) 
 
We saw in the previous chapter what the issue with these stimuli is. The problem is 
that is not clear that the stimuli that make up the abstract condition in Romani et al.’s 
experiments are actually abstract. The concrete words tend to have low standard 
deviations, whereas the abstract stimuli tend to have high standard deviations and 
are drawn from the middle of the scale, rather than the unequivocally abstract half of 
the scale. This is potentially problematic for the validity of Romani et al.’s (2008) 
conclusions regarding concreteness effects because the stimuli that made up their 
abstract stimuli were not actually abstract.  
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Figure 5-2 Stimuli featured in Allen and Hulme (2006) 
 
Figure 5-2 depicts the abstract and concrete stimuli featured in Allen and Hulme 
(2006). We can see that the abstract-midscale disagreement criticism does not apply 
quite so strongly to these items, but the issue is still present. That is, there are many 
‘abstract’ stimuli here that have standard deviations well above 1, indicating that 
people disagreed about whether they were abstract in the first place. The range of 
mean ratings of concreteness for the abstract condition is also clearly much higher 
than for the concrete condition. Once again, a relatively homogenous group of 
concrete words has been compared to a heterogeneous group of words about which 
participants tended to disagree. Figure 5-3 below plots the stimuli featured in Miller 
and Roodenrys (2009): 
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Figure 5-3 Stimuli featured in Miller and Roodenrys (2009) 
 
Again, there is a marked difference in standard deviations between the concrete 
stimuli and the abstract stimuli. Furthermore, the standard deviations of the abstract 
stimuli are so high (well above 1 in the majority of cases) that the mean value does 
not reflect the judgments that participants were actually making. Finally, consider 
Figure 5-4, which depicts the stimuli featured in Walker and Hulme (1999): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Stimuli featured in Walker and Hulme (1999) 
 
The midscale criticism perhaps applies least to this set of stimuli, although it is still 
clearly the case that the concrete stimuli tended to have lower standard deviations 
than the abstract stimuli. The reasons that this is concerning have already been 
expounded. The upshot of this is that it is not clear that these studies actually provide 
evidence for concreteness effects. The reason is that the comparison being made 
was meant to be between concrete and abstract items, but the comparison that was 
actually made was between concrete items on the one hand, and a group of stimuli 
about which participants disagree on the other. It could be the case that words that 
engender disagreement are those words that are hard to remember, and that this 
explains processing differences that were previously attributed to 
concreteness/abstractness. My experiments reported below were designed to test 
this possibility. 
I now consider issues that are specific to individual studies. Paivio and 
Csapo’s (1969) first set of experiments featured a very small number of stimuli: 9 
words per condition. Paivio and Csapo (1969) do not model item variability and so 
this issue is especially relevant.  In Allen and Hulme (2006), the majority of the 
concrete stimuli were unambiguously nominal by word form, whereas the majority of 
abstract stimuli were either ambiguous between nominal and verbal parts of speech, 
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or unambiguously verbal. This difference was compounded by the fact that before the 
list memory task was conducted, every participant took part in a speaking-to-definition 
task that required them to conceive of most of the concrete stimuli as nouns, and 
most of the abstract stimuli as verbs. That is, the definitions provided for the concrete 
stimuli biased a nominal interpretation, whereas the definitions provided for the 
abstract stimuli tended to bias a verbal interpretation (generally by beginning the 
definition with the infinitive particle ‘to’). This is an issue because the extent to which 
noun processing differs from verb processing has been the subject of fierce debate 
for decades. Vigliocco et al. (2011) provide a recent review in which they argue that 
once ‘semantic’ factors have been taken into account, much of the brain imaging 
evidence for a neuroanatomical difference in noun-verb processing disappears. 
However, they still note that ‘verb processing imposes greater demands than noun 
processing in most cases’ (Vigliocco et al., 2011, p. 422). Given that participants were 
biased to consider many of the abstract stimuli as verbs, and many of the concrete 
stimuli as nouns, it could be that the increased recall rate for the concrete condition 
in Allen and Hulme (2006) is really the result of the fact that verbs are generally harder 
to process than nouns. Once again, the point here is not that this confound definitely 
explains the concreteness effects that Allen and Hulme (2006) find. The point is rather 
that when confronted with a combination of numerous issues that might affect 
performance across conditions, we can be less sure that performance advantages in 
the concrete condition should be attributed solely to the concreteness of the stimuli 
presented. Finally, there is a confound present in Romani et al. (2008), Walker and 
Hulme (1999) and Miller and Roodenrys (2009) that might actually have supressed 
an advantage for concrete items over abstract items. In all three studies, the abstract 
stimuli had a significantly higher Age of Acquisition (AoA) than the concrete stimuli. 
Confirmatory independent-samples t-tests are summarised in Table 5-1: 
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Table 5-1 - Age of acquisition of stimuli in previous experiments 
Experiment Concrete 
mean  
Abstract 
mean 
T-statistic, 
df, p-value 
Lower 
95% CI  
Upper 
95% CI 
Romani et 
al. 
5.84 8.44 -8.52, 132, 
p<0.0001 
-3.2 -1.99 
Walker and 
Hulme 
6.67 8.21 -3.427, 
p=0.001 
-2.44 -0.64 
Miller and 
Roodenrys 
4.62 7.03 p<0.0001 -3.22 -1.59 
  
Kuperman et al. (2012) provide an Age of Acquisition norm database for 60,000 
English words and summarise evidence showing that AoA should be considered a 
major factor in single word processing paradigms alongside characteristics such as 
word frequency and word length. Morr (1981) presents data suggesting that the 
higher the AoA of a word, the easier it is to recall in list memory tasks. It should be 
noted that the stimuli featured in every experiment discussed in the current section 
had relatively high frequencies and relatively low AoAs compared to the stimuli 
featured in the experiment I report below. Morr (1981, p. 281) explicitly confines his 
explanation of his reported AoA effect (that high AoA words ‘facilitate distinctive 
encoding’ relative to low AoA words) to words with relatively high frequencies. In any 
case, controlling for AoA in the present experiment should eliminate this nuisance 
effect from consideration.  
We have seen that there are various issues with the list memory studies under 
discussion. These issues reduce certainty in the finding that concrete words are, by 
default, easier to remember than abstract words. Most importantly, it is not clear that 
concrete words were compared to truly abstract words in the first place. There are 
also some potentially relevant confounds in various stimuli sets employed that could 
account for at least some of the differential performance in favour of concrete word 
lists over abstract word lists. I will now report three new experiments that, hopefully, 
avoid the issues discussed throughout this section. These new experiments, 
therefore, provide a clearer test of default concreteness effects in list memory tasks. 
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5.3 Experiment 1 
 
The purpose of this experiment was to replicate an experiment reported in 
Romani et al. (2008) while controlling for the potentially problematic confound 
between the mean value of concreteness rating and the standard deviation of that 
rating, as well as the other stimuli confounds present in the other list memory studies 
discussed above. Romani et al. (2008) presented participants with lists of words, and 
asked them to recall words from a list immediately after the presentation of the last 
word of that list. They report a range of experiments designed to investigate the 
effects of different task demands and types of representation on task performance. 
Romani et al. report that participants were significantly better at recalling lists of words 
that consisted entirely of concrete words versus lists that consisted entirely of abstract 
words. The focus of the new experiment reported here is on investigating the reliability 
of this concreteness effect when the standard deviations of the concreteness value 
of words across lists is controlled, while also directly manipulating this standard 
deviation in order to ascertain whether the standard deviation itself has a significant 
effect on task performance. Figure 5-5 below plots the mean concreteness values 
and standard deviations of concreteness of the concrete and abstract stimuli used in 
the present experiment in the same way that the stimuli used in previous experiments 
were plotted in the previous section.  
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Figure 5-5 Stimuli featured in experiment 1 
 
We can see that the contrast in concreteness between conditions is maximised, and 
that the difference in the standard deviations of concreteness rating is controlled. Of 
interest is whether the concreteness effect still occurs when these new controls are 
enforced. Romani et al. (2008) report a range of list memory tasks that employ various 
manipulations. The specific experiment replicated here is Experiment 3B, which is a 
free recall task in which participants simply try and recall any word from the list that 
they can, regardless of order. This experiment was chosen over the serial recall tasks 
(in which participants must recall the words in the order they were presented) because 
Romani et al. (2008) report that concreteness effects are stronger in free recall tasks 
than in serial recall tasks. A free recall task, therefore, provides the most robust test 
of the concreteness effect. An additional two experimental conditions were added: 
agreement and disagreement conditions. Words in the agreement condition were 
taken from the middle of the scale and had relatively low standard deviations. Words 
in the disagreement condition were taken from the middle of the scale and had 
relatively high standard deviations. A comparison of these two new conditions with 
concrete and abstract conditions will help answer the question of whether midscale 
variability in concreteness ratings indexes a psycholinguistically relevant effect. In this 
way, the importance of the midscale problem outlined in the previous chapter can be 
assessed.  
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Participants 
Originally, 60 native speakers of English with no reported neurological disorders were 
recruited from the University College London SONA psychology pool. Of these, 50 
managed to complete the experiment (the other 10 either did not turn up or cancelled 
their session). 35 of the participants were male; mean age = 23.7 (7.3). All participants 
were either awarded course credit or paid £6 for their time.  
Materials 
Forty lists each containing 8 words were generated. There were 4 experimental 
conditions and each experimental condition comprised 10 lists. Stimuli were 
controlled for the following psycholinguistic variables: standard deviation of 
concreteness rating, frequency, age of acquisition, number of phonemes, number of 
letters, number of syllables. Table 5-2 below contains the mean values (standard 
deviations in parentheses) of each of these variables for each condition: 
Table 5-2 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 1 
Conditio
n 
Mean  
concretenes
s 
SD  
concretenes
s AoA 
Zipf 
frequency L Phon Length 
 
Syll 
                
concrete 4.38 (0.17) 1.02 (0.11) 
10.45 
(2.05) 3.34 (0.79) 
5.59 
(0.94) 
6.93 
(1.06) 2.00 
abstract 1.78 (0.14) 1.04 (0.12) 
10.58 
(2.09) 3.38 (0.83) 
5.56 
(0.93) 
6.84 
(1.17) 2.00 
agree 3.17 (0.7) 1.08 (0.07) 10.09 (1.9) 3.15 (0.85) 
5.63 
(1.03) 
6.93 
(1.21) 2.00 
disagree 3.1 (0.36) 1.65 (0.05) 
10.23 
(2.04) 3.13 (0.81) 
5.76 
(1.10) 6.9 (1.32) 2.00 
 
Table legend: 
Mean concreteness: Mean concreteness rating 
SD concreteness: The mean standard deviation of the concreteness ratings 
AoA: Age of acquisition 
Zipf frequency: Word frequency in Zipf units 
L Phon: Length of word in phonemes 
Length: Length of word in letters 
Syll: Number of syllables 
 
127 
 
Psycholinguistic variable information was gathered from Brysbaert et al. (2013), 
Kuperman et al. (2012b) and the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007). Word 
data was combined into a single master database. This master database was then 
searched using the MATCH program in order to create stimuli lists that near-optimally 
maximised the contrasts of interest while minimising the difference in nuisance 
variables across conditions (Van Casteren and Davis, 2007). The four conditions 
were: concrete, abstract, agreement, disagreement. Concrete lists contained words 
that had mean values between  4 and 5 on the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness 
scale. Abstract lists contained words that had mean values between 1 and 2 on the 
Brysbaert  (2013) concreteness scale. Agreement and disagreement lists contained 
words that had mean values between 2.5 and 3.5 on the Brysbaert et al. (2013) 
concreteness scale. Concrete, abstract, and agreement lists were constructed such 
that the standard deviations of the concreteness ratings of the words in those lists 
were similar. Regarding the concrete-abstract condition comparison, there was no 
difference in the standard deviation of concreteness rating (1.02 vs 1.04), but there 
was a difference in the mean rating of concreteness (4.38 vs 1.78). Therefore, the 
contrast in mean rating was maximised while contrast in standard deviation was 
minimised. Regarding the agree-disagree comparison, there was no difference in the 
mean rating of concreteness (3.17 vs 3.1), but there was a difference between the 
two conditions in the mean standard deviation of concreteness rating (1.08 vs 1.65). 
Therefore, the mean value of concreteness rating was held constant in this 
comparison while a contrast in standard deviation of concreteness rating was 
introduced. Table 5-3 below contains a sample list from each condition, and full lists 
of stimuli featured in all experiments reported in this study are included in Appendix 
A: 
Table 5-3 Example stimuli from experiment 1 
Condition         
Concrete Beaker, Clinic, Tango, Clothing, Amber, Jackal, Roulette, Survey 
Abstract Desire, Mystique, Intent, Vantage, Glory, Nuance, Unease, Motive 
Agree Diesel, Roughhouse, Attempt, Whiner, Viewpoint, Freshness, Stampede, 
Leader 
Disagree Slipstream, Audit, Poorhouse, Minute, Rival, Tribune, Abyss, Spectrum 
 
Procedure 
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The experimenter read all of the words from a list one after the other. There was a 
two second pause in between each word being read out. The order of the lists and 
the order of the words within each list were randomised for each participant. After the 
experimenter finished reading out a list, the participant spoke out loud any and all 
words that they could remember from that list. The experimenter recorded every word 
that the participant spoke. Because this was a free recall task, the order in which 
participants recalled the words did not matter. Participants were not penalised for 
making errors or substitutions, or for saying a word that had not actually been in the 
list. The experiment lasted approximately 35 minutes. The maximum score for a list 
was 8, because there were 8 words in each list. Each individual list was counted as 
an item in the statistical analyses. 
Results 
Table 5-4 below summarises the mean number of words remembered (and standard 
deviations) by condition. 
Table 5-4 Mean words recalled by condition for Experiment 1 
Condition Mean words recalled 
(SD) 
Mean percentage 
recalled 
Concrete 4.67 (1.35) 58.4% 
Abstract 4.48 (1.24) 56% 
Disagree 4.38 (1.28) 54.6% 
Agree 4.45 (1.35) 55.6% 
 
It is immediately apparent that the mean number of words remembered in the current 
experiment is lower than the mean number of recalled words reported in Romani et 
al. (2008) (83.3% for concrete lists; 70.3% for abstract lists compared to 58.4% and 
56% respectively). This may seem troubling because the aim here is replicate Romani 
et al.’s experiment, and differing levels of performance might suggest some error in 
the application of the methodology. However, there is a ready explanation for this 
discrepancy: Romani et al. ran two experiments, Experiment 3A and Experiment 3B, 
one after the other on the same participants. Experiment 3A was an order 
reconstruction task in which participants were presented with words on pieces of card 
which were then shuffled. The stimuli in Experiment 3A (and, presumably, the word 
cards) were the same as those used in Experiment 3B. Participants had therefore just 
encountered the stimuli they were required to remember in Experiment 3B in a 
previous experiment. 
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 The results were analysed with a mixed effects model in R using the lme4 
package (Bates et al., 2015). The lmertest package was used in order to obtain p-
values for the comparisons of interest via Satterthwaite Approximation (Kuznetsova 
et al., 2015). The mixed effects model examined the fixed effect of experimental 
condition on the number of words remembered per trial, with subjects and items being 
treated as random effects with varying intercepts.  
The statistical contrasts were abstract, disagreement, and agreement 
conditions versus the concrete condition; that is, a treatment contrast, with the 
concrete condition representing the baseline condition. Table 5-5 below displays the 
results of this analysis: 
 
Table 5-5 Summary of mixed effects model for Experiment 1 
Fixed 
effects 
Effect 
estimate 
Error df t p Lower 
95%CI  
Higher 
95%CI  
Abstract -0.19 -0.12 39.25 -1.56 0.13 -0.43 0.05 
Agree -0.22 -0.12 39.25 -1.79 0.08 -0.46 0.03 
Disagree -0.29 -0.12 39.25 -2.42 0.02 -0.54 -0.05 
 
Because three non-independent hypothesis tests were run on the same data, a 
Bonferroni correction was applied. Assuming a conventional alpha level of 0.05, the 
corrected alpha level is therefore 0.05/3 = 0.017. The concrete-abstract contrast was 
not statistically significant (p = 0.13). Therefore, there was no evidence for an 
advantage for concrete word lists over abstract word lists, contrary to the findings in 
Romani et al. (2008), Walker and Hulme (1999), Allen and Hulme (2006), and Miller 
and Roodenrys (2009). We might immediately wonder whether the results of this 
replication experiment are aberrant in some way: the previous four studies have all 
shown consistent concreteness effects over multiple experiments, and this new 
replication is the only experiment where this effect is absent. I have two responses to 
this suggestion. Firstly, in terms of effect sizes, the results across all studies are 
actually quite similar. No measure of effect size or 95% confidence intervals are 
presented in any of the previously conducted list memory experiments under 
discussion, so a formal comparison of effect size is not possible, but the results are 
not wildly discrepant: differences of less than a word on average across conditions 
are common.  Table 5-6 below summarises the mean differences in recall across 
concrete and abstract conditions in various list memory experiments. 
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Table 5-6 Mean differences in words remembered in concrete and abstract conditions in 
various list memory experiments 
Study Experiment Mean concrete 
words recalled 
Mean abstract 
words recalled 
Difference 
in means 
Present 
experiment 
n/a 4.76 4.48 0.28 
 
Romani et al. 3B 6.8 5.6 1.2 
Allen and 
Hulme 
1 4.2 3.7 0.5 
Miller and 
Roodenrys 
1 3.6 3.1 0.5 
  
Note that the list length varied across these four experiments from 6-word lists to 8-
word lists, and the second two experiments featured in the table were serial recall 
and not free recall. In the reporting of list memory experiments, the difference in 
concrete and abstract conditions is generally expressed in terms of a percentage. But 
these percentage formats might confuse the interpretation of these results somewhat. 
If the mean percentage of concrete words recalled from an 8-word list was 83.3%, as 
is the case in Romani et al. (2008), that means 6.8 concrete words were recalled on 
average. If the mean percentage of abstract words recalled from an 8-word list was 
70.3%, that means 5.6 abstract words were recalled on average. When these 
differences are expressed in terms of means rather than percentages, as is the case 
in table 6, the differences between conditions seem less dramatic. A 13% difference 
is really a difference of 1.2 words on average in an 8-word list experiment. Also, the 
results of the present experiment seem less divergent. In Allen and Hulme (2006) and 
Miller and Roodenrys (2009), the mean difference in recall across conditions was just 
0.5 words. In the present experiment, it was 0.28 words, meaning an informal 
difference in effect of just 0.22 words on average.  
 I now move to a discussion of the other two experimental contrasts. Neither 
contrast was statistically significant at the Bonferroni-corrected alpha-level (concrete 
versus agreement p = 0.08, concrete versus disagreement p = 0.02). There was 
therefore no evidence that it is simply words from the middle of the concreteness 
scale that are harder to remember than words from the extreme concrete end of the 
scale, and there was no evidence that words with high standard deviations in rating 
are harder to remember than words from the extreme concrete end of the scale. 
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However, it is important to note that experiment 1 suffers from a lack of power 
because there are only 10 items per condition. This could be the reason that no 
statistically significant results were obtained. In order to account for this possibility, 
the data were reanalysed using a Bayesian model comparison analysis in the 
BayesFactor package for R (Morey et al., 2015) with the default settings and priors. 
If the results of the frequentist analysis presented in the preceding paragraphs were 
due to low power, then the Bayes Factors produced by this analysis are likely to be 
between 1/3 and 3, which would indicate that the data do not decide the issue either 
way.  
Kruschke (2011, p. 310) argues that the Bayes Factor generated from a model 
comparison analysis of an experimental design with multiple conditions may be 
misleading for various reasons. Therefore, the total results dataset of experiment 1 
was partitioned into three smaller datasets that reflected the pairwise comparisons of 
interest between the conditions: one concrete/abstract comparison, one 
concrete/agree comparison, and one concrete/disagree comparison. In every case, 
a model including a parameter for the fixed effect of condition was compared to a null 
model that featured only subjects and items as random effects. The resulting Bayes 
Factors for each comparison were: 
Concrete vs abstract: 0.32 
Concrete vs agree: 0.38 
Concrete vs disagree: 0.66 
For the concrete-abstract comparison, there is positive evidence in favour of a null 
effect (BF = 0.32), according to the conventions discussed in (Wagenmakers, 2007). 
For the other two comparisons, the Bayes Factor indicates that the data do not decide 
between the null or alternative models. Taken together with the frequentist analysis 
presented previously (all p-values above the threshold for statistical significance), 
these results suggest that there really was no difference in recall between concrete 
and abstract conditions. However, the evidence for a null difference in the other 
comparisons is inconclusive. 
 Before moving on to the second replication experiment, I shall note some 
shortcomings of experiment 1 that were remedied in experiment 2. Firstly, the 
standard deviations of the concreteness ratings of both the concrete and abstract 
stimuli were relatively high: above 1 in many cases. It could be that, given the 
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concerns raised in previous sections, neither condition provided an accurate sample 
from the truly concrete or abstract sections of the scale. In the second experiment 
that I am about to report, the standard deviations of the conditions were more tightly 
constrained so that in the concrete and abstract conditions, all standard deviations 
were below 1. Secondly, the design of experiment 1 required that the researcher be 
in constant contact with the participant. Throughout the experiment, the researcher 
read out words and recorded the participant’s responses. In an ingenious series of 
experiments, Intons-Peterson (1983) shows that so-called ‘demand characteristics’, 
whereby a researcher can unwittingly affect a participant’s behaviour, can exert a 
huge influence over the results of imagery/concreteness experiments. Given that the 
expectation before the current replication experiments were run was that the 
concreteness effect should increase rather than disappear, this should not be too 
great a concern. Nevertheless, the second experiment was run online with no 
researcher-participant contact whatsoever in order to eliminate the possibility that this 
factor may have influenced the results of the experiment. I now turn to a report of this 
second replication attempt, which was a paired associate learning task. 
5.4 Experiment 2 
In paired associate learning, participants are presented with pairs of words, one after 
the other, and their task is to remember as many of the words as possible (Paivio et 
al., 1994). Paivio et al. (1994) presented participants with lists consisting of both 
concrete and abstract word pairs, and report that concrete word pairs were recalled 
better than abstract word pairs. This effect has been obtained in many list learning 
and paired associate learning experiments (Begg, 1972; Nelson and Schreiber, 1992; 
Paivio et al., 2000, 1994). Paired associate learning is therefore a good candidate for 
examining the midscale problem outlined in previous sections. 
 Paivio et al. (1994) employed a range of different manipulations across two 
experiments, but in this replication I focus on the simplest version of this paradigm, 
which is a free recall task. In free recall, after the list of word pairs has been presented, 
a participant simply has to write down any and all words that they remember from the 
entire pool of words that they have seen.  Note that although there is some 
disagreement about how strong concreteness effects are in paired associate free 
recall (Marschark and Hunt, 1989), generally studies do find the effect. The results of 
a free recall task are also more comparable to the results of experiment 1 above, 
because it was also a free recall task. The aim of the present experiment was to test 
whether a concreteness effect still occurs if the contrast between concrete and 
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abstract stimuli is maximised and the standard deviations of their concreteness 
scores are controlled. In addition to the concrete and abstract conditions featured in 
the paired associate learning studies mentioned in this section, the present 
experiment also included a midscale condition in order to provide a second test of the 
hypothesis that high-standard deviation midscale words are harder to remember than 
words from the concrete end of the concreteness scale. 
Participants 
Sixty native speakers of English with no reported neurological disorders were 
recruited from the Prolific Academic website. 38 participants were male; mean age = 
31.7 (10.0). All participants were paid £6 for their time.  
Materials 
Figure 5-6 depicts the means and standard deviations of the concreteness ratings for 
the concrete and abstract stimuli in experiment 2: 
Figure 5-6 Concrete and abstract stimuli featured in experiment 2 
 
Table 5-7 below displays the psycholinguistic characteristics of the stimuli featured in 
experiment 2 by condition.  
 
134 
 
 
 
Table 5-7 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 2 
Condition Mean 
concreteness 
SD 
concreteness 
AOA Zipf 
freq 
Phon Syll Lengt
h 
BG 
mean 
concrete 4.51 
(0.23) 
0.91 
(0.13) 
9.92 
(1.9) 
3.54 
(0.56) 
4.75 
(0.2) 
1.75 
(0.43) 
6.125 
(1.41) 
3573 
(1151) 
abstract 1.61 
(0.17) 
0.81 
(0.11) 
10.04 
(1.64
) 
3.48 
(0.69) 
5.25 
(1.44) 
1.75 
(0.43) 
6.44 
(1.5) 
3457 
(1176) 
disagree 3 
(0.23) 
1.33 
(0.02) 
9.78 
(1.95
) 
3.72 
(0.78) 
5.75 
(1.48) 
1.81 
(0.39) 
6.38 
(1.45) 
3218 
(957) 
 
Table legend 
Mean concreteness: Mean concreteness rating 
SD concreteness: The mean standard deviation of the concreteness ratings 
AoA: Age of acquisition 
Zipf freq: Word frequency in Zipf units 
Phon: Length of word in phonemes 
Syll: Number of syllables 
Length: Length of word in letters 
BG mean: Mean bigram frequency 
 
As in experiment 1, concrete words were only considered concrete if they were 4 or 
above on the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness scale, and abstract words were 
only considered abstract if they were 2 or below on this scale. In experiment 2, the 
additional control variable of mean bigram frequency was introduced, because 
participants would be reading and writing words as opposed to hearing and speaking 
them. Bigram frequency is a measure of orthographic regularity that has been 
regularly shown to have an impact on single word processing (Kuperman et al., 
2012b). There were eight pairs of words in each condition, and therefore there were 
16 words total in each condition and 24 critical item pairs overall.  
Procedure 
Participants undertook the experiment online via a Qualtrics survey distributed over 
the Prolific Academic service. Participants were presented with pairs of words, one 
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after the other. Following Marschark and Hunt (1989) and Paivio et al. (1994), each 
pair of words was presented on the participant’s computer screen for 8 seconds. 
There were 8 pairs in each of the three conditions, and all pairs were presented in a 
randomised non-blocked order for each participant. The ordering of the words in each 
pair from left to right on the computer screen was not randomised. At the beginning 
and end of the list, 3 pairs of filler items were included in order to soak up primacy 
and recency effects. Participants also received a short practice trial with words not 
included in the main experiment in order to ensure that they understood the task, and 
that their computers and internet connections were working properly. Once the list of 
pairs was finished, participants could type out any and all words that they 
remembered from the list. Once they were finished, they pressed a ‘submit’ button 
that ended the experiment. There were three experimental conditions: a word pair 
could either consist of concrete, abstract, or midscale ‘disagreement’ items. The 
experiment lasted approximately 15 minutes. The likelihood of remembering a single 
word was the dependent variable, and so individual words constituted the items in 
this experiment. 
Results 
Table 5-8 below displays the mean number of words remembered across conditions 
in experiment 2.  
Table 5-8 Mean words recalled by condition in experiment 2 
Condition  Mean words recalled Mean percentage 
recalled 
Concrete 3 (2.73) 18.6% 
Abstract 3.43 (3.07) 21.5% 
Disagree 3.05 (2.84) 19.1% 
 
We can immediately note a number of things. Firstly, the number of words recalled 
out of 16 was low but the variability across participants was large, as indicated by the 
high standard deviations of the mean number of words recalled: with standard 
deviations and means of approximately 3, many participants must only have 
responded with 1 or 2 words per trial. This could have been caused by two factors. It 
could be that the task was difficult, and so we are seeing floor effects for some 
participants. Alternatively, some participants may just not have been attending to the 
task properly. This makes the results of this experiment difficult to interpret because 
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there is no way of deciding between these two possibilities, and therefore no way of 
knowing which participants to exclude from statistical analyses. In any case, the mean 
number of words in the abstract condition was numerically larger than that of the 
concrete condition (3 < 3.43), and so already we have failed to find evidence in favour 
of concrete stimuli advantage in paired associate learning. Finally, the differences 
between the means of concrete and disagree conditions are miniscule (3 versus 3.05 
respectively).  
The data were analysed using a generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum 
likelihood (Laplace Approximation) using the glmer function from the lme4 package 
in R. The dependent variable in this analysis was therefore the likelihood of a 
participant recalling a word8. Individual words were treated as items. Subjects and 
items were included as random effects with varying intercepts, and the fixed effect of 
condition was the effect of interest. Both abstract and disagree conditions were 
compared to the concrete condition. The results of this analysis are presented in table 
5-9: 
Table 5-9 Summary of generalized linear mixed model analysis of experiment 2 
Effect Effect 
estimate 
Std. Error z p 
Abstract 0.19 0.15 1.3 0.2 
Disagree 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.88 
 
Experiment 2 generated no statistically significant effects: p = 0.2 for the concrete-
abstract contrast, and p = 0.88 for the concrete-disagree contrast. This pattern of 
results is the same as that found in experiment 1: under conditions that should have 
made a concreteness effect stronger, a concreteness effect was not obtained. 
However, ultimately we should be cautious in drawing any conclusions from the 
results of experiment 2, because floor effects and/or participant disengagement may 
be obscuring any differences between conditions.  
                                               
8 Analysing the data this way means that this experiment is arguably no longer a paired-associate learning task, 
presumably because it does not account for the paired relationship between words. In their free recall analyses, 
Paivio et al. (1994) calculate the proportions of words remembered and conduct by-subjects and by-items ANOVAs 
on these proportions. These analyses also ignore word-pair relationships and produce concreteness effects, and so 
I think we would still expect the analysis presented here to produce a concreteness effect.  
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Experiments 1 and 2 did not produce a concreteness effect. This is worrying 
given the concerns about the typically high standard deviations of abstract stimuli 
outlined above. If we increase a difference between conditions on some linear 
measure, then we would not expect experimental effects based on this measure to 
disappear. However, Kousta et al. (2009) show that words with a high emotional 
valence (whether positive or negative) enjoy a processing advantage over words with 
neutral emotional valance. Abstract words tend to be rated higher for emotional 
valance than concrete words, and this variable was not controlled in experiment 1 or 
2. So it could be that there is a confound in the stimuli used in experiments 1 and 2 
that obscured a concreteness effect. Warriner et al.’s (2013) emotional valance norms 
for ~14,000 English words allow us to check this possibility. Emotional valance is 
rated on a scale of 1 (highly negative) to 9 (highly positive), with a score of 5 indicating 
an emotionally neutral word. Given that either emotional positivity or negativity results 
in a processing advantage, the absolute value of 5 minus the emotional valance of a 
word provides a simple linear measure of emotional valance that ignores polarity (0 
= totally neutral, 4 = highly emotionally valenced). Table 5-10 below presents the 
mean absolute emotional valences of the stimuli featured in experiments 1 and 2: 
Table 5-10 Emotional valence of stimuli featured in experiments 1 and 2 
Experiment Concrete Abstract Disagree Agree 
1 0.82 1.17 0.88 1.15 
2 0.91 1.61 0.99 N/A 
 
In experiment 1, the emotional valence was more or less the same across concrete 
and abstract conditions. In experiment 2, the difference was larger, although as 
mentioned above experiment 2 may have been contaminated by floor effects in any 
case. 
Another potential issue is that the words featured in experiments 1 and 2 were 
of relatively low frequency (between 3 and 4 on the Zipf scale), and so it could be that 
participants did not know all of the words. This could obscure any effect of 
manipulating concreteness. Brysbaert et al. (2013) provide a measure of how many 
of their participants reported that they knew a word. Table 5-11 below displays the 
mean percentage of participants who reported knowing a word for each condition in 
experiments 1 and 2. 
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Table 5-11 Mean percentage of participants who reported knowing words featured in 
experiments 1 and 2 
Experiment Concrete Abstract Disagree Agree 
1 98.5% 98.3% 97.7% 98.5% 
2 99.5% 99.1% 98% N/A 
 
These percentages are high, and so it is likely that the number of participants in 
experiments 1 and 2 who did not know a word is very low. However, it would obviously 
be preferable if only words with known percentages of 100% were used.  
Unfortunately, for reasons detailed in the previous chapter, enforcing this control 
would mean that we would have less than 300 potential abstract stimuli to choose 
from.  I now report an additional list memory experiment in order to provide a third 
test of concreteness effects in list memory. 
5.5 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was a free recall list memory experiment in the vein of experiment 1. 
There were three changes to the paradigm. Firstly, 6-word lists were used instead of 
8-word lists. This change was made so that more trials per condition (15 in experiment 
3 compared to 10 in experiment 1) could be fitted into roughly the same amount of 
time. Romani et al. (2008) and Miller and Roodenrys (2009) both report concreteness 
effects with 6-word lists. Secondly, the words were presented visually and participants 
wrote out the words at the end of a list instead of speaking them out loud. This change 
was made because, in order to maximise efficiency, the experiment was run over the 
internet using the Gorilla.sc platform. Finally, only three conditions were included: 
concrete, abstract, and midscale words with high standard deviations.  
Participants  
70 participants were recruited from the Prolific Academic website. Of these, 62 
managed to complete the experiment. The other 8 did not respond to every trial, and 
so were excluded. 36 participants were male; mean age = 36.0 (11.7). The 
experiment was delivered via Gorilla.sc, and lasted approximately 35 minutes. 
Participants were paid £5 for their time.  
Materials 
Stimuli were controlled for the following psycholinguistic variables: standard deviation 
of concreteness rating, frequency, age of acquisition, number of syllables, number of 
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letters, mean bigram frequency, and emotional valence. Table 5-12 below contains 
the mean values (standard deviations in parentheses) of each of these variables for 
each condition, as well as the mean percentage of people in the Brysbaert et al. 
(2013) norms who reported knowing the words in each condition:  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-12 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 3 
Conditio
n 
Mean 
concretenes
s 
SD 
concretenes
s 
AoA Zipf 
freq 
Syll Lengt
h 
BG 
mean 
Absolut
e 
Valence 
% 
know
n 
Concrete 4.55 
 (0.17) 
0.81  
(0.12) 
10.11  
(1.28
) 
3.41  
(0.48
) 
2.42  
(0.86
) 
7.63  
(1.79) 
3649  
(1134
) 
1.12  
(0.77) 
99% 
Abstract 1.61  
(0.15) 
0.85 
 (0.11) 
10.2 
(1.95
) 
3.54 
(0.72
) 
2.53  
(0.89
) 
7.63  
(1.95) 
3710  
(1208
) 
1.15  
(0.78) 
99% 
Midscale 3.02  
(0.26) 
1.51 
 (0.77) 
10.11 
(1.99
) 
3.53 
(0.72
) 
2.54  
(0.86
) 
7.57  
(1.89) 
3737  
(1184
) 
1.15  
(0.77) 
98.7% 
 
Table legend: 
Mean concreteness: Mean concreteness rating 
SD concreteness: The mean standard deviation of the concreteness ratings 
AoA: Age of acquisition 
Zipf freq: Word frequency in Zipf units 
Syll: Number of syllables 
Length: Length of word in letters 
BG mean: Mean bigram frequency 
Absolute Valence: Absolute value of 5 minus the Warriner et al. (2013) emotional 
valence score 
% Known: Percentage of participants who reported knowing a word in the Brysbaert 
et al. (2013) concreteness norms 
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There were three experimental conditions: concrete, abstract, and midscale. There 
were 15 six-word lists in each condition. As with experiment 1, each individual list was 
counted as an item in the statistical analyses. 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with words in sequence one at a time in the centre of 
their computer screens. As in Romani et al.’s (2008) visual paradigms, each word 
remained on the screen for 3 seconds. After each list had been presented, 
participants typed out any and all words that they could remember. They were told 
that the order of the words did not matter, and not to worry about spelling. Participants 
received two practice trials in order to ensure that they understood how to complete 
the experiment. The order of the lists and the order of the words within each list were 
randomised for each participant. 
 
Results 
Table 5-13 below summarises the mean number of words remembered (and standard 
deviations) by condition. 
Table 5-13 Mean words recalled by condition for Experiment 3 
Condition Mean words recalled 
(SD) 
Mean percentage 
recalled 
Concrete 4.06 (1.31) 67.7% 
Abstract 3.7 (1.25) 61.7% 
Midscale 3.85 (1.28) 64.2% 
 
The results from experiment 3 were analysed in the same way as the results from 
experiment 1. Both frequentist and Bayesian analyses are presented. Table 5-14 
below displays the results of a mixed effects linear model with a fixed effect of 
condition and random intercepts for subjects and items. 
Table 5-14 Summary of frequentist mixed effects model for experiment 3 
Fixed 
effects 
Effect 
estimate 
Error df t p Lower 
95%CI  
Higher 
95%CI  
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Abstract -0.37 0.12 44.34 -3.11 0.003 -0.61 -0.13 
Midscale -0.21 0.12 44.34 -1.79 0.08 -0.45 0.03 
 
After controlling for the effects of emotional valence, these results are more 
encouraging for the status of concreteness as a useful psycholinguistic variable. The 
concrete-abstract comparison is statistically significant at p = 0.003, and the 
difference is in the direction we would expect. The contrast between concrete and 
midscale conditions was not statistically significant (p = 0.08). Because this 
experiment still featured a relatively small number of items, a Bayesian model 
comparison analysis was deployed in an attempt to offset a potential lack of power. 
Again, the default settings and priors of the BayesFactor package were used. As with 
experiment 1, the results from experiment 3 were split into subsets so that the abstract 
and midscale conditions were compared to the concrete condition individually. The 
resulting Bayes Factors for each comparison were: 
 
Concrete vs abstract: 5.85 
Concrete vs midscale: 0.47 
For the concrete/abstract comparison, the Bayesian analysis is comparable with the 
frequentist analysis. A model containing an effect of condition is 5.85 times more likely 
given the data than a model without this effect, which is positive in favour of a 
concreteness effect (Wagenmakers, 2007). Note however that the effect itself is small 
(a difference of 0.3 words on average). However, the concrete/midscale analysis was 
inconclusive. One thing to note is that experiment 3 featured words with similar rates 
of knowledge to those in experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 3 produced a concreteness 
effect, so this might partially allay any concern that experiments 1 and 2 produced 
null results because participants did not know the words used. I now turn to a general 
discussion of these results. 
5.6 General discussion 
The first two experiments did not produce a concreteness effect, but in Experiment 3 
the typical concreteness effect re-emerged. At first glance, this might suggest that the 
potential problems with concreteness that I have outlined so far might not be too 
important. But, despite the fact that we found evidence for a concreteness effect in 
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one list memory experiment, I still think there are reasons to be cautious about 
interpreting this result.  
Firstly, we need to consider what the explanation for this effect might be. The 
suggestion put forward by Romani et al. (2008) is that concrete representations are 
‘richer’ than abstract representations in such a way that facilitates their recall. We 
might reasonably ask what it is for a concrete representation to be ‘richer’ than an 
abstract representation. DCT and related theories explain how it is that the 
representations that support concrete concepts differ from those that support abstract 
concepts, but they do so in such a way that they do not predict ‘default’ concreteness 
effects. Paivio has consistently held that concreteness effects should only emerge in 
specific paradigms in which the task demands bias participants to make use of one 
type of representation over the other, and that there are indeed certain tasks in which 
abstract language is likely to show an advantage over concrete language. In list 
memory tasks, if participants are explicitly instructed to construct a mental sensory 
simulation of the referent of each word as it is encountered, DCT predicts that their 
recall rates will be higher for concrete words than for abstract words because imagens 
lend themselves to mental sensory simulation whereas logogens do not. However, 
from the point of view of DCT, in neither Romani et al.’s (2008) experiments nor my 
replications was there any instruction that might bias participants to use processing 
strategies that relied differentially on imagens over logogens. It is always possible 
that some participants may have employed such strategies independently, but highly 
unlikely that they all would have done so. Indeed, Schwanenflugel et al. (1992) report 
a series of experiments that show how dependent concreteness effects are on task-
specific factors and instructions (and note that they are admirably even-handed about 
these results given that they disconfirmed their own Context Availability hypothesis). 
So DCT does not necessarily predict a concreteness effect in the specific paradigm 
being discussed here.  
Furthermore, it is not the case that DCT considers concrete concepts to be 
‘richer’ than abstract concepts. It is therefore not clear that Romani et al. (2008) can 
rely on these frameworks in a definition of what constitutes representational richness. 
The only thing we seem to be left with is a folk appeal to intuitions concerning 
‘conceptual richness’. It is doubtful that this appeal can do the job as a plausible 
explanation for default concreteness effects. Consider the two nouns, ‘doorknob’ and 
‘spirituality’. According to the Brysbaert et al. (2013) norms, ‘doorknob’ has a mean 
concreteness rating of 4.97 (highly concrete) and ‘spirituality has a mean 
concreteness rating of 1.07 (highly abstract). It just does not seem to make sense to 
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maintain that concepts of doorknobs are somehow ‘conceptually richer’ than concepts 
of spirituality unless we have a clear definition of what constitutes this sort of richness. 
Indeed, pre-theoretically it might seem more attractive to be able to maintain that the 
set of representations attached to a concept of spirituality is, at least in some ways, 
considerably ‘richer’ than the set of representations attached to the concept of what 
a doorknob is. 
Walker and Hulme (1999, p. 1261) make a similar claim to Romani et al.:  
[concreteness effects] can be best explained in terms of the 
idea that concrete words benefit from a stronger semantic 
representation than do abstract words and that the quality or 
strength of a word’s semantic representation contributes 
directly to how well it can be recalled. 
In their discussion section, Walker and Hulme (1999, p. 1267) do spell out what might 
constitute the ‘quality or strength’ of a semantic representation. They cite a featured-
based model developed by Plaut and Shallice (1993). In this feature-based model, 
concrete items are ‘much richer’ than abstract items because they contain ‘more 
consistently accessed features’ (Plaut and Shallice, 1993, p. 92). Ultimately, Walker 
and Hulme’s explanation is potentially adequate to the extent that one accepts a 
feature-based account of meaning, but there are a number of well-known problems 
with such feature-based accounts (Prinz, 2004). For example, there is the problem of 
an infinite regress: presumably the features that constitute a concept must 
themselves be described by sets of features, and although it might be possible in 
principle to halt this regress, such a mechanism is required before a feature-based 
account works. More worryingly, it is very difficult to describe a large class of perfectly 
mundane concepts in terms of features alone: what is the feature list that describes 
the concept of ‘air’?  A related issue is that, even if the anti-regress mechanism just 
mentioned were in place, we do not have to go very far before we find a concept that 
is difficult to describe in terms of features, and yet is itself a central feature of another 
concept. For example, one feature of the concept ‘dog’ might be ‘loyal’. We can then 
ask: what are the features of the concept ‘loyal’? ‘Abstract’ concepts such as these 
are notoriously difficult to characterise in terms of features. This is problematic 
because we are dangerously close to having no description of the features of an 
abstract concept at all, but at the same time maintaining that concrete items are easier 
to recall than abstract items because concrete items are associated with ‘more 
features’, some of which may turn out to be abstract concepts themselves. There is 
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a troubling explanatory gap here. Allen and Hulme (2006, p. 79) suggest that ‘how 
well a word is recalled may partly depend on how effectively the semantic 
representation of that word elicits the appropriate speech output representation at 
recall’. However, they do not provide an account of what ‘effectiveness’ means in this 
context (and perhaps they should not be expected to, given that their focus is on other 
issues). This is the extent of their account of why these concreteness effects might 
emerge, although presumably they would at least partially endorse the account 
proposed in Walker and Hulme (1999). Finally, Miller and Roodenrys (2009) also 
seem to endorse a feature-based account, and so their explanation is subject to the 
challenges to feature-based models just discussed. 
There is another reason to be cautious about interpreting the concreteness effect 
in experiment 3. It is very difficult to make numerical predictions in lots of areas of 
psychology, and these list memory paradigms are no exception. However, I think we 
should consider how well the results we have obtained match up with theories of why 
concreteness is psychologically important in the first place. Essentially every 
theoretical explanation of a concreteness effect involves the idea that there is a 
fundamental ontological distinction between two categories of cognitive entity. The 
mental representations that constitute concrete concepts are different (richer; more 
multimodal, more ‘grounded’, etc.) to the mental representations that constitute 
abstract concepts. This difference shows up in experimental tasks because of the 
properties of the human mind-brain. But, if we imagine that these explanations are 
true, then we might wonder why this fundamental ontological distinction between two 
kinds of cognitive entity has only produced an effect of 0.3 words, on average. 
Perhaps this does not seem problematic. However, it is, arguably, not unreasonable 
to expect that default processing differences attributed to a profound difference in 
representational structure should manifest to a greater degree. Furthermore, this kind 
of theoretical explanation is not really compatible with the fragility of the effect: it is 
unclear why we obtained marginal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis in 
experiment 1, if the cause for the effect in experiment 3 is attributed to fundamental 
structural properties of the human mind-brain. If that were so, then the effect should 
be much more robust than this, especially given that the experimental design should 
have maximised its magnitude. 
5.7 Summary of Chapter 5 
I now summarise the main points of this chapter. List memory experiments 
have tended to produce concreteness effects such that concrete words are easier to 
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remember than abstract words. However, it turned out that the ‘abstract’ stimuli 
featured in these experiments were actually partially made up of midscale words for 
which the concreteness measure is uninterpretable. There were also other problems 
with previous list memory experiments, such as low numbers of stimulus controls. 
This reduces confidence in the reliability of concreteness effects.  
In three new experiments, I tried to solve these issues and provide a better 
test of the existence of concreteness effects. In no experiment was there any 
evidence for the hypothesis that midscale words are harder to remember than words 
at the extreme ends of the concreteness scale. The first two experiments returned 
either null results or marginal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of no difference 
between concrete and abstract conditions. The third experiment did produce a small 
concreteness effect. However, I think that in light of the considerations presented in 
this chapter and the previous one, we should not take this as incontrovertible 
evidence that concreteness is a psychologically important variable. The effect was 
extremely small, and comparable to previous concreteness experiments that featured 
a large source of noise. This is despite the fact that the design of experiment 3 was 
such that if the effect was due to concreteness, the effect should have been larger 
than previous experiments, assuming that concreteness is actually a linear variable. 
In any case, arguably, the effect was small enough that it is not compatible with the 
theories that explain it. This is suggestive that something other than concreteness as 
psycholinguists conceive of it was the reason that one set of words was easier to 
remember than another set of words. Also, because the midscale problem was 
present in all previously reported list memory experiments, we really only have one 
example of a concreteness effect in list memory, which is experiment 3 of this chapter. 
This is not a large amount of evidence to draw on, and so it seems reasonable to 
amass more evidence before committing to the idea that concreteness effects in list 
memory are robust.  
Having assessed the prevalence of concreteness effects in list memory, I now 
turn to concreteness effects in EEG paradigms. Here too we shall see that at first 
glance concreteness looks like a plausible explanation of the data. However, on 
closer examination the picture is more complicated, and there are other explanations 
for various patterns of results that do not require us to appeal to concreteness.   
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Chapter 6: Concreteness effects 
in EEG experiments 
 
In Chapter 5, we saw how, even in a standard list memory paradigm, concreteness 
effects are surprisingly difficult to obtain when the experimental contrast between 
concrete and abstract stimuli is maximised, and measurement noise is decreased. 
However, in experiment 3 we did see a small concreteness effect. I now want to 
consider data from electroencephalography (EEG) experiments. You might think that 
if the concreteness effect has survived in list memory paradigms, then we can be sure 
that the midscale disagreement phenomenon is not fatal to experimental 
concreteness research, and that the issues that this phenomenon raises are nothing 
to worry about. However, EEG concreteness research is especially interesting for our 
purposes because it is characterised by some counterintuitive and sometimes 
contradictory results. I will explain why this is, and then summarise the recent findings 
in EEG research on concreteness effects. In doing so, I shall point out what I take to 
be some areas of confusion. Finally, I report a new EEG experiment that measured 
responses to concrete, midscale, and abstract words in a sentence reading task. 
Conventional frequentist analysis suggested that there were no statistically significant 
differences between concrete and abstract conditions. A Bayesian ANOVA 
suggested that the evidence actually favoured the null hypothesis. I end this chapter 
with a discussion of the implications of these results, and I offer some 
reinterpretations of N400 results that have been obtained in previous concreteness 
experiments (Barber et al., 2013; Holcomb et al., 1999). 
6.1 Early EEG concreteness experiments 
I will only give a brief overview of the relatively early EEG concreteness work, 
because as we shall see shortly there are reasons to be cautious about the validity of 
the stimuli used in those experiments. Holcomb et al. (1999) provide a representative 
example of the kind of experiment we are interested in. They reported results from 
two tasks in which participants read sentences that ended either with a concrete word 
or with an abstract word. In the first task, the final word could also have been either 
congruent or incongruent with the sentence that preceded it (a 2 x 2 design). Holcomb 
et al. found that N400s to congruent concrete and abstract words were the same, in 
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line with work from Schwanenflugel and colleagues (1992; 1983; 1989) in which there 
were no behavioural differences between concrete and abstract conditions when the 
stimulus words were embedded in coherent discourse contexts. However, when the 
sentence-final words were incongruent, N400s to concrete words were larger than 
N400s to abstract words, even though concrete words were verified quicker than 
abstract words. One potential explanation of this result was that that the concrete 
sentences happened to be more anomalous than the abstract sentences because of 
the nature of the specific meanings of the words, rather than concreteness per se. To 
check this possibility, Holcomb et al. ran a second task that contained a ‘neutral’ 
sentence context which did not bias participants to expect any particular word at the 
end of the sentence. Interestingly, concrete words still showed higher N400s than 
abstract words in the neutral condition. Holcomb et al. interpret this finding as showing 
that the N400 effect in their experiments really is driven by concreteness, as opposed 
to a confound between how anomalous their sentence endings were across 
conditions. However, as I have already pointed out, this pattern of results is somewhat 
confusing: why should a measure that is correlated both with processing difficulty and 
‘semantic’ factors (the N400) produce lower amplitudes for abstract words, even 
though they are verified slower than concrete words?  
The reason that we should be cautious about accepting the results of early 
EEG concreteness studies is because, as Barber et al. (2013) have recently 
highlighted, all of these previous studies suffered from relatively poor stimulus 
controls. For example, Holcomb et al. (1999) only controlled for frequency and cloze 
probability, and nothing else. Since these early studies were conducted, a great many 
more psycholinguistic variables with behavioural effects have been discovered, such 
as age of acquisition (AoA) and emotional valence. It might be particularly important 
to control for AoA because it is now known to have relatively large behavioural effects 
(Kuperman et al., 2012a)  as well as to modulate fMRI and EEG responses (Fiebach 
et al., 2003; Tainturier et al., 2005). Because abstract words tend to have higher AoAs 
than concrete words, this could well have contributed to or even obscured differences 
in the EEG signal between conditions. Note also that the N400 is not the only 
component that might be affected by any number of lexical variables, and that an 
impact on one component might give the appearance of lower or higher amplitudes 
for other components earlier or later in the ERP waveform.  
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6.2 Barber et al. (2013) 
Barber et al. (2013) did control for pretty much every psycholinguistic variable 
known or suspected to be relevant to single word processing, and so their results are 
much more robust in this regard. They report a lexical decision task instead of a 
sentence processing task, in which participants made speeded judgements about the 
lexicality of concrete and abstract words. Consistent with another lexical decision 
study in which a higher than average number of lexical variables were controlled 
(Kousta et al., 2011), Barber et al. found that abstract words were actually recognised 
faster than concrete words. However, the ‘normal’ N400 differences were still found: 
concrete words elicited larger N400s than abstract words. At this point, I admit that I 
find Barber et al.’s report somewhat confusing. You might think that this is a nice 
result, because now the EEG data and the behavioural data point in the same 
direction: abstract words were processed faster and they elicited lower N400s, and 
vice versa for concrete words. One potential explanation for this is that it is something 
to do with the addition of extra stimulus controls in the Barber et al. experiment. 
However, this does not seem to be the interpretation that Barber et al. (2013, p. 52) 
come to: they repeatedly state that their results show a ‘dissociation’ between the 
behavioural data and the EEG data. This is confusing because what actually seems 
to have been obtained is evidence consistent with the opposite interpretation: now 
there is no dissociation between behavioural data and EEG data.  
This minor issue aside, there is another potential source of confusion here 
because some of the previous studies on concreteness effects in EEG paradigms 
involved sentence processing tasks (Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios and Holcomb, 
1994; West and Holcomb, 2000), and not lexical decision tasks. In Holcomb et al. 
(1999), participants read sentences one word at a time and judged whether the 
sentence as a whole ‘made sense’. In West and Holcomb (2000), participants judged 
whether the final word of a sentence was concrete or abstract. On the other hand, in 
Kounios and Holcomb (1994), one task was a simple lexical decision task, and 
another task required participants to judge whether words presented in lists were 
concrete or abstract. Barber et al. (2013) report a single lexical decision task. Given 
different task demands and stimulus sets, and the common assumption that the N400 
reflects a composite of different neural processes, it is difficult to compare results 
across these studies. This might not matter too much, because, to the extent that any 
of the stimulus confounds that Barber et al. tried to rectify had any effects in these 
previous studies, there is really only one EEG study of concreteness effects with 
“clean” stimuli, and that is Barber et al.’s lexical decision experiment.  
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However, the fact that Barber et al. used a lexical decision task as opposed 
to a sentence reading task raises some questions about their theoretical interpretation 
of their results. Barber et al. take their results to be incompatible with the ‘context-
extended dual-coding hypothesis’ proposed by Holcomb and colleagues for two 
reasons. First, Barber et al. obtained a behavioural advantage for abstract words, 
whereas they argue that the context-extended dual-coding hypothesis predicts a 
behavioural advantage for concrete words in the lexical decision paradigm. I don’t 
think this argument goes through, because as we saw in Chapter 2, Dual Coding 
Theory’s originator (Paivio, 2013) has repeatedly argued that Dual Coding Theory 
does not make any behavioural predictions either way in lexical decision tasks. 
Second, the context-extended dual coding hypothesis holds that the N400 effect in 
concreteness experiments is due to the higher “semantic richness” of the cognitive 
resources associated with concrete words. Words that trigger “richer” conceptual 
representations might prompt more computationally demanding integration or search 
processes than words that trigger “poorer” conceptual representations, and this might 
be what the higher N400 for concrete words is indexing. However, since Barber et al. 
controlled for variables that were supposed to reflect semantic richness and still found 
the N400 concreteness effect, they argue that this cannot be the case. I’m not sure 
that this argument goes through either, because, in my view, it’s open to question 
whether the variables that Barber et al. controlled actually do measure ‘semantic 
richness’ in the sense in which they seem to be using the term. In reference to 
previous studies, Barber et al.  (2013, p. 48) cite both ‘number of features’ and 
‘number of associates’ as being measures of semantic richness. But these seem like 
different and potentially independent measures: it’s not hard to think of a word that 
refers to something that has a small number of “features”, but which nevertheless has 
a relatively high number of first order word associates. For example, it’s hard to think 
of “features of” the word idea, but idea has non-negligible word association strengths 
with 17 other words in the Florida Free Association norms (Nelson et al., 2004). By 
comparison, a straightforwardly feature-ful word like dog only has five such 
associations. And even putting this point aside, in the experiment they report, Barber 
et al. did not actually control for either of these variables: they state that ‘context 
availability’ is the measure of semantic richness they used. A context availability 
measure is derived by asking participants how hard it is to think of a context in which 
a word straightforwardly applies. In order for contextual availability to be a measure 
of semantic richness, then we have to assume that the easier it is to think of such a 
context, the ‘richer’ the mental representations triggered by the word are likely to be. 
I don’t know of any evidence either way about whether that assumption is correct. 
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In any case, Barber et al.’s (2013, p. 51) preferred explanation of their results 
runs like this: encountering a concrete word triggers ‘modality-specific features’, by 
which they mean sensorimotor representations derived from perceptual experience. 
In contrast, an abstract word ‘[relies] on emotional associations as well as a variety 
of other situational and linguistic information’. In a lexical decision task, where words 
appear in isolation and a participant is told to respond as quickly as possible, ‘abstract 
meanings will therefore receive minimal processing’. This is presumably because in 
a lexical decision task, there is relatively little ‘situational’ and/or ‘linguistic’ information 
available. Concrete words, on the other hand, will still ‘activate and integrate 
multimodal (sensorimotor) features from distributed cortical networks’. In sum, the 
EEG concreteness effects are an ‘index of meaning activation processes, modulated 
by the degree of multimodality of the semantic information being integrated (greater 
for concrete than abstract words)’. The reason that abstract words are responded to 
quicker than concrete words is because of ‘decision and response-selection 
mechanisms that are extremely sensitive to control’. I now want to try to unpack some 
of this explanation. 
First, Barber et al. explain their behavioural abstractness advantage by 
appealing to ‘decision and response-selection mechanisms’, but as far as I can tell 
they don’t say what these are or why they would explain the decrease in response 
latency for abstract words. The hypothesis might be that, if the language 
parser/conceptual system detects that fewer multimodal representations have been 
triggered by a letter string, it can more quickly get to the business of deciding whether 
that string constitutes a known word. But that hypothesis is surely not more 
compelling than the completely contradictory hypothesis that if the language 
parser/conceptual system detects that a high number of multimodal representations 
have been triggered by a letter string, it can more quickly get to the business of 
deciding whether that string constitutes a known word. In fact, you might think that, if 
the language parser/conceptual system detects that a letter string has triggered a 
high number of any particular sort of representation, then it can be sure relatively 
quickly that the letter string does constitute a known word, because non-words aren’t 
likely to trigger a high number of mental representations of any sort. So before we 
accept this explanation, we need some independent evidence in favour of it. In 
previous work by some of the same authors (Kousta et al., 2011), it was suggested 
that an advantage for abstract words in lexical decision might be due to the increased 
amount of ‘emotional’ information associated with these words over concrete words. 
However, since emotional valance was controlled in the Barber et al. (2013) study, 
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that explanation can’t work here either: their concrete and abstract words were 
matched on the emotional valance measure. Finally, Barber et al. (2013, p. 51) 
suggest that ‘abstract words will activate a number of superficial associations with 
other words’ to a greater extent than concrete words. Perhaps the language parser 
can detect a large number of associative links, activated automatically in response to 
encountering a string of letters, and it uses this signal to quickly decide that a letter 
string constitutes a real word. Abstract words have more associative links with other 
words than concrete words, and this is why they are categorised quicker than 
concrete words. This would be a plausible enough explanation except for the fact that 
according to the Florida Word Association Norms, the mean average size of 
association networks of the abstract words in Barber et al.’s stimuli set were almost 
exactly the same size as the association networks of the concrete words (13.7 for 
concrete words; 14.0 for abstract words). So, although it could be true in general that 
abstract words have more associative links than concrete words, this cannot explain 
the behavioural advantage for the specific abstract stimuli that Barber et al. used. In 
short, the behavioural abstractness advantage is still something of a mystery.   
I think there is also a problem with their explanation of the N400 amplitude 
differences. According to Barber et al., the N400 indexes ‘meaning activation’ 
processes, and these processes are greater in magnitude for concrete stimuli when 
words are presented in isolation. These meaning activation processes are modulated 
by how much ‘multimodal’ information has to be ‘integrated’. Concrete words trigger 
more multimodal information by default than abstract words, and so that’s why N400 
amplitudes are larger for concrete words. For one thing, it isn’t clear that, in order to 
verify that a letter string is a word of English, any ‘multimodal’ information about the 
referent of the word should have to be ‘integrated’ at all. And, even if it did, it’s still 
hard to see how ‘integrating’ some sensorimotor experience of, say, my nephew, 
should help my language parser decide that <nephew> constitutes a word of English. 
However, let’s grant that in order to verify that the letter string <nephew> (a concrete 
stimulus featured in Barber et al.’s experiment) constitutes an English word, some 
multimodal experience of nephews does have to be ‘integrated’. It is still unclear why 
it should be that <nephew> requires more multimodal information to ‘integrate’ than 
<panic> does, which is an abstract stimulus featured in the same experiment. Other 
pairs of words chosen more or less at random from the stimulus list also illustrate the 
point: is it really plausible to suppose that <channel> and <pancreas> (concrete) 
trigger more multimodal information than <dream> and <concert> (abstract)? I am not 
even sure if I have any direct sensorimotor experience of an object I knew to be a 
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pancreas, but the same is not true of events I identified as being concerts. A potential 
objection to my line of argument here is that it is a grave mistake to consider individual 
pairs of stimuli, because of course the N400 concreteness effect is a general 
aggregate effect that only occurs after large numbers of trials and comes out in the 
wash after statistical analysis. The effect depends upon aggregate comparisons of 
responses to groups of stimuli, rather than individual stimuli. My response to this 
objection is that I do not think that the stimuli I have picked out are an exception.  
Unfortunately, Barber et al.’s stimuli suffer quite heavily from the midscale 
disagreement phenomenon, as Figure 6-1 illustrates: 
Figure 6-1 Stimuli featured in Barber et al. (2013) 
 
So here, all the conceptual problems relating to the distribution of the concreteness 
scale that we have seen in previous chapters apply. For a large number of these 
‘abstract’ stimuli, we have no basis for putting them in that category, because 
approximately half of the participants rated them as being concrete. This makes 
Barber et al.’s explanation of both the behavioural advantage for abstract words and 
the N400 amplitude differences less compelling. The theoretical explanation of why 
these effects are there is inconsistent with the properties that the stimuli which 
produced the effects seem to have. 
So, to summarise: historically it has been found in sentence processing tasks 
that concrete words are processed faster than abstract words, but that N400s to 
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concrete words are larger than N400s to abstract words. In a very well-controlled 
lexical decision study, Barber et al. (2013) found that abstract words were processed 
faster than concrete words, but N400s to concrete words were still larger than N400s 
to abstract words. However, although the stimuli were well-controlled with respect to 
lexical variables, they were not well-controlled with respect to the specific statistical 
properties of the concreteness measure itself. Given that there is still some doubt as 
to whether the behavioural and EEG data ‘match up’ in these EEG experiments, I will 
now describe and report a new sentence processing experiment that maximised the 
contrast between concrete and abstract conditions in the same way as with 
experiments 1-3.  
6.3 Experiment 4 
The new experiment reported here is a single word presentation sentence reading 
task. Critical trials consisted of a sentence that contained either a concrete word, an 
abstract word, or a word taken from the middle of the concreteness scale. As with the 
list memory tasks reported in Chapter 5 the standard deviations of the concreteness 
ratings of the concrete and abstract words were tightly controlled and minimised, 
whereas the standard deviations of the concreteness ratings of the midscale stimuli 
were maximised. Of interest were the N400 amplitudes to concrete and abstract 
words that were taken from the extreme ends of the scale, and those words about 
which participants disagreed. The midscale condition was included in order to check 
the possibility that EEG results may diverge from the behavioural results obtained in 
Chapter 5, where no behavioural difference between concrete and midscale 
conditions was obtained in list memory tasks. This possibility is worth checking 
precisely because, as we saw in the introductory sections of this chapter, EEG 
concreteness research is marked by the finding that the EEG data and the 
behavioural data do not match up in the way that we might expect. 
A sentence processing task was chosen over a lexical decision task for a 
number of reasons. If the N400 concreteness effect is driven by a need (or automatic 
tendency) to ‘integrate’ information (Barber et al., 2013), then we would expect more 
information to be integrated in a task in which a participant generates an interpretation 
of a sentence, than in a task in which all they do is verify whether unconnected letter 
strings are words or not, as is the case with a lexical decision task. Participants were 
instructed to read sentences presented one word at a time, and judge whether the 
sentence contained any errors. Half of the sentences in the experiment contained an 
anomalous word that obviously did not fit well with the rest of the sentence. This 
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ensured that participants were motivated to attend to every word in each sentence. A 
novel aspect of this new experiment was that the experimental manipulation itself did 
not involve any anomalous words. Instead, the target concrete, midscale, and 
abstract words appeared near the beginning of sentences, before it was possible to 
identify whether the sentence as a whole would be anomalous or not. This 
modification to the normal paradigm (Holcomb et al., 1999; Kutas and Hillyard, 1984), 
in which responses are measured to words at the end of a sentence, was also made 
for numerous reasons. It has been shown repeatedly that, if enough supporting 
context is provided, EEG and behavioural responses to concrete and abstract stimuli 
are similar (Holcomb et al., 1999; Schwanenflugel and Shoben, 1983). However, if 
the concrete/abstract words appear at the beginning of a sentence, then when the 
target word is encountered, a participant has no basis on which to expect anything in 
particular, because not enough context has been provided in order to support or 
predict any interpretation. In that sense, from the point of view of the language parser, 
the situation is somewhat similar to that found in a lexical decision task, when a word 
is presented in isolation. However, because the participant ultimately has to make a 
message-level decision that requires interpreting the whole sentence, they are still 
encouraged to process each word more fully than they would have to in order to 
complete a lexical decision task. Therefore, the chances of finding an N400 
concreteness effect should be maximised if, as Barber et al. (2013) suggest, this 
effect is driven by the integration of information triggered upon encountering a word. 
 This set-up provides the additional advantage that the cloze probability of the 
target concrete, abstract, and midscale words is essentially 0 in every case. Each 
target sentence started with a neutral frame (such as a definite article or possessive) 
that made it impossible to predict what word would follow (see stimuli section for 
details). This provides an easy way of controlling for cloze probability, which is 
especially important because of the large effect it exerts on N400 amplitudes (Kutas 
and Hillyard, 1984). One final advantage is that this experimental format allows us to 
analyse responses to all target words without worrying whether the sentence as a 
whole is anomalous or not, or indeed whether the participant made a correct decision 
about the validity of the sentence. That is because the anomalies all appeared after 
the initial part of the sentence, so that, from the parser’s point of view, words near the 
beginning of the sentence should not be considered anomalous, and so N400 
responses to them should be relatively ‘natural’ N400s that reflect normal reading and 
interpretation processes.  
Participants 
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Initially, 24 native English speakers with no reported neurological disorders were 
recruited from the University College London SONA subject pool, of which 21 turned 
up for their session. Of these, two participants were excluded from analysis because 
their EEG data contained too many artefacts and/or too much noise. Two more 
participants were excluded because their response accuracies for detecting 
anomalies were extremely low (58% and 65%). 15 participants were male; mean age 
= 26.8 (9.9). The number of participants included in the analysis was therefore 17. 
Each participant was paid £20 for their time.   
Procedure 
The experiment took place in an air-conditioned, sound-proof, electrically shielded 
booth specially constructed for the collection of EEG data. Participants read 
sentences presented one word at a time in the centre of a computer screen. Each 
word was presented for 300ms, and was then replaced by a blank screen lasting 
250ms. Then, the next word in the sentence was presented. The SOA was therefore 
550ms, which is a large enough window to examine the N400 effect of interest. At the 
end of each sentence, an on-screen prompt reminded participants to indicate whether 
the sentence contained any errors. Participants used the F and J keys on a standard 
computer keyboard; yes/no keys were counterbalanced across participants. While the 
sentences were being presented, the participant was instructed to try to keep 
movements and blinking to a minimum. At the end of each sentence, the participant 
could move and blink if they wanted to. The experiment was broken up into 6 blocks 
of sentences. After each block, the participant was prompted to rest for as long as 
they liked before continuing on the next block. During the rest breaks, the 
experimenter entered the booth to check on the participant and make adjustments to 
any electrodes that appeared to be noisy, or suffered from high impedence levels. 
Noise levels and impedence for every electrode were monitored constantly 
throughout the experiment, and if the impedence of any electrode rose above 25mV, 
the experiment was paused so that the impedence could be lowered.  
EEG recording and analyses 
EEG was recorded from 32 scalp electrodes using the 20-10 system. There were four 
external electrodes. Two electrodes were used in order to detect trials contaminated 
by blinks and other eye movements (one below the left eye; one next to the right eye). 
Two electrodes were placed on the left and right mastoids; the average of these 
mastoid electrodes provided the reference measure. EEG was digitised at a rate of 
512Hz. As per the recommendations of Luck ( 2014), a gentle bandpass filter was 
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applied offline (0.01-128Hz). EEG was epoched in 750ms segments, each consisting 
of a 200ms pre-stimulus baseline period and a 550ms post-stimulus period. The 
specific window of analysis for the N400 effect was 300-550ms post stimulus. This 
window was chosen because it overlapped maximally with the N400 windows chosen 
in other EEG concreteness experiments (Barber et al., 2013; Holcomb et al., 1999; 
Kounios and Holcomb, 1994; West and Holcomb, 2000), and independently of the 
obtained mean average amplitudes. Trials containing blinks and other artefacts were 
marked and removed from the averaging process (83% of trials remained, distributed 
equally across conditions).  
Statistical analyses were based on the repeated measures ANOVAs 
employed by Barber et al. (2013 ). The main analysis was a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design 
in which there were three levels of CONDITION (Concrete versus Midscale versus 
Abstract), two levels of LATERALTY (left versus right), and two levels of 
ROSTERALITY (front versus back). Midline and lateral line electrodes were omitted 
in order to partition the scalp into four quadrants, each consisting of six electrodes. 
The dependent measure was the mean amplitude between 300 and 550ms after the 
presentation of the stimulus word. The three terms of interest are: the main effect of 
condition, the interaction between condition and laterality, and the interaction 
between condition and rosterality. Note that this design is somewhat unusual in that 
there is no behavioural measure relevant to the concreteness effect of interest. 
Although some sentences were anomalous, and participants were asked to detect 
these anomalies, the point in the sentence at which the target words occurred was 
too early for there to be any evidence of an anomaly. Anomalous sentences were 
only included in order to provide a way of checking that participants were attending 
to the sentences.  
Stimuli 
There were three conditions in the experiment: concrete, abstract, and midscale. 
Each condition consisted of 66 sentences, and each sentence contained a target 
word that was concrete, abstract, or taken from the middle of the concreteness scale. 
Sentences were constructed according to the following constraints. The target word 
appeared near the beginning of the sentence in subject position. Within a condition, 
43 sentences started with the sequence “The [target word]…”, 9 started with “The 
man’s/woman’s [target word]…”, and 14 started with a name in the genitive (“David’s 
[target word]…”). Full example sentences and patterns are given below. For the first 
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three example sentences, the target words are in underlined bold font. For the final 
example sentence, the anomalous word is in underlined bold font.  
Concrete example: The man’s aftershave was cheap. 
Midscale example: Robin’s degree was in chemical engineering. 
Abstract example: The oversight was costing the company lots of money. 
Anomaly example: The vigilante was skipping from the law. 
The small number of different starting sequences was used in order to make it easier 
to generate natural-sounding sentences for each target word. The words that 
immediately followed the targets were also controlled. 46 sentences in each condition 
continued with the past tense of the verb ‘to be’: “The [target word] was…”. 22 
sentences in each condition continued with a prepositional phrase: “The [target word] 
of…”. These constraints were introduced in order to make sure that the ERPs to the 
words following the target words were all generated in response to the same stimuli, 
so that the impact of subsequent words on the ERP waveforms would be the same 
across conditions. Half of the sentences in the experiment contained a single word 
that created a semantic anomaly. The position of this anomalous word varied from 
sentence medial to sentence final positions so that participants could not predict 
where it would occur, and would therefore be motivated to read the whole of every 
sentence in order to detect anomalies. The experiment also contained filler trials of 
varying syntactic structure; half of these fillers also contained anomalies. Participants 
would therefore, hopefully, not notice any of the relatively small number of syntactic 
patterns that made up the sentences of the critical trials.  
 The target words in each condition were controlled for the following 
psycholinguistic variables: word frequency, age of acquisition, emotional valance, 
mean bigram frequency, number of syllables, number of morphemes, and length in 
letters. Cloze probability was also controlled by virtue of the fact that target words 
appeared near the beginning of sentences, after neutral sentence initial frames. The 
mean concreteness scores of the concrete words were all 4 and above, the mean 
concreteness scores of the abstract words were all 2 and below, and the scores of 
the midscale words were all between 2.5 and 3.5.  The standard deviations of the 
concreteness scores of the concrete and abstract words were all below 1. The 
standard deviations of the concreteness scores of the midscale words were all above 
1.4. Variable information was amalgamated from: the Brysbaert et al. (2013) 
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concreteness norms, the  Warriner et al. (2013) emotion norms, the Kuperman et al. 
(2012a) age of acquisition norms, and the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 
2007). The stimuli across conditions were controlled on these variables by using the 
MATCH algorithm (Van Casteren and Davis, 2007). Table 6-1 displays the 
psycholinguistic variable information for the stimuli featured in each condition. 
Table 6-1 Properties of stimuli featured in experiment 4 
Condition conc_m conc_sd AoA freq nsyll length bg_m valence nmorph 
Concrete 4.6 0.8 10 3.5 2.4 7.7 3639 1.1 1.8 
Midscale 3 1.5 10.2 3.6 2.5 7.5 3770 1.1 1.8 
Abstract 1.6 0.9 10.2 3.5 2.5 7.7 3643 1.1 1.8 
 
Table legend: 
conc_m mean concreteness 
conc_sd mean standard deviation of concreteness 
AoA  mean age of acquisition 
freq  mean Zipf frequency 
nsyll  mean number of syllables 
length  mean length in letters 
bg_m  mean bigram frequency 
valence mean emotional valence score (0 = neutral, 4 = highly valanced) 
nmorph  mean number of morphemes 
 
Results 
Response accuracies for each condition were: 
Concrete: 87.9% 
Midscale: 85.3% 
Abstract: 83.1% 
 
These accuracy rates indicate that participants were attending to the task, although 
they made slightly more mistakes with sentences which began with abstract subjects 
than sentences which began with concrete subjects.  
In a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, the main effect of condition was 
not statistically significant (F(2, 16) = 0.686, p = 0.511, partial η2 = 0.041), the 
interaction between condition and rosterality was not statistically significant (F(2, 16) 
= 0.038, p = 0.963, partial η2 = 0.002), but the interaction between condition and 
laterality was statistically significant (F(2,16) = 3.338, p = 0.048, partial η2 = 0.173). 
Table 6-2 below displays the mean amplitudes obtained between 300-550ms by 
condition and laterality. 
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Table 6-2 Mean amplitudes in mV between 300-550ms by laterality 
 Left Right 
Concrete 0.1 0.1 
Midscale 0.44 0.2 
Abstract 0.75 0.22 
 
Looking at table 6-2, the figures suggest that the interaction was driven by the fact 
that for concrete words, N400 amplitudes recorded on the left and right hemispheres 
were almost identical, whereas for abstract words, N400 amplitudes were lower on 
the left hemisphere than on the right (recall that the lower an N400 amplitude, the 
higher the mean voltage will be, because it is a negative-going deflection in voltage). 
In order to investigate the interaction, two post-hoc repeated measures ANOVAS 
were run. These analyses compared N400 amplitudes for concrete versus abstract 
words in the left hemisphere and the right hemisphere respectively. The left 
hemisphere ANOVA did not produce a statistically significant effect of concreteness: 
F(1, 16) =  2.373, p = 0.143, partial η2 = 0.129. The right hemisphere ANOVA did not 
produce a statistically significant effect of concreteness: F(1, 16) = 0.105, p = 0.75, 
partial η2 = 0.007. Grand average waveforms for concrete versus abstract words at 
two electrode sites are displayed in figure 6-3 below. These results do not provide 
evidence for a main effect of concreteness such that N400s to concrete words are 
larger than N400s to abstract words, and nor do they provide evidence that N400s to 
midscale words are different to N400s to words from the extreme ends of the 
concreteness scale.  
Figure 6-2 Grand average waveforms for concrete and abstract words at 2 electrode sites 
 
FC6 and Fz were chosen for two reasons. They are 
approximately the same scalp locations as ones Barber et 
al. (2013) graphed, and at Fz the difference between 
conditions is largest. Negative voltages are plotted down. 
The midscale waveform has been omitted in order to make 
the graphs clearer. 
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Of course, a p-value above 0.05 on its own cannot be taken as evidence in 
favour of a null effect, and, although the small number of participants featured in the 
present experiment (n = 17) is typical of EEG studies, we might also worry that the 
null results here are driven by a lack of statistical power. Therefore, as in Chapter 5, 
I will also present some simple Bayesian analyses designed to address these 
potential issues. If the Bayes Factors produced by a model comparison analysis of 
the data are between 1/3 and 3, then we have evidence for the experiment being 
inconclusive. However, if the Bayes Factors of this model comparison analysis are 
below 1/3, then we have evidence in favour of the null hypothesis, that is, we have 
evidence for there being no main effect of concreteness or interaction between 
concreteness and electrode location. 
The same data with the same 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design were entered into a 
Bayesian Repeated Measures ANOVA using JASP (JASP Team, 2018), using the 
default settings and priors, examining effects across matched models. This analysis 
compares the likelihood of all models that contain a particular term with the likelihood 
of otherwise equivalent models from which that term has been removed. We are 
particularly interested in the likelihood of models that contain a condition term 
(concrete, midscale, abstract), versus the likelihood of models that do not include that 
term. The Bayes Factor for the inclusion of the condition term (conceptually similar to 
assessing the main effect of condition) was 0.14. This indicates that models which 
include a condition term are 0.14 times as likely as models which do not include the 
term, given the data and the models. Or, equivalently, we could say that models which 
do not include the term are approximately 7 times more likely than models which do 
include the term. The Bayes Factor for the inclusion of the condition*rosterality 
interaction was 0.09. The Bayes Factor for the inclusion of the condition*laterality 
interaction was 0.15. Since these Bayes Factors are all below 1/3, this analysis 
suggests that instead of simply not finding evidence in favour of a concreteness effect, 
we have actually found evidence for an absence of this effect. Table 6-3 below 
displays the full results of the matched models analysis. 
Table 6-3 Summary of Bayesian ANOVA for experiment 4 
Effects P(incl) P(incl|data) BF Inclusion  
concreteness 0.263 0.125 0.146 
laterality 0.263 0.225 0.312 
rosterality 0.263 0.94 2.021e +17 
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concreteness  ✻ 
 laterality 
0.263 0.005 0.138 
concreteness  ✻ 
 rosterality 
0.263 0.012 0.092 
laterality  ✻  rosterality 0.263 0.048 0.211 
concreteness  ✻ 
 laterality  ✻  rosterality 
0.053 1.493e -5 0.199 
 
 
Interestingly, this is one instance in which the output of frequentist and 
Bayesian analyses is different. The frequentist analysis suggests that the 
condition*laterality interaction is statistically significant, whereas the Bayesian 
analysis suggests that we should prefer models of the data that do not include a term 
for that interaction. Given the lack of a main effect of concreteness in both the 
omnibus ANOVA and the post-hoc ANOVAS; the fact that the interaction was 
marginal; and the fact that other studies have not found a condition*laterality 
interaction, I am inclined to prefer the more conservative Bayesian interpretation of 
the data. 
6.4 General discussion 
The results presented here contrast with those presented in other concreteness EEG 
research (Barber et al., 2013; Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios and Holcomb, 1994; 
West and Holcomb, 2000). All of these studies found a statistically significant main 
effect of concreteness on the amplitude of the N400, whereas the current experiment 
did not. However, it has been found previously that concreteness effects in EEG 
paradigms do disappear under certain conditions. As noted above, Holcomb et al. 
(1999) found that when concrete and abstract words ended sentences in a congruent 
and expected way, the N400s to each type of word were the same. One potential 
reason for the lack of a main effect in the experiment presented here is that perhaps 
the concrete and abstract target words appeared in congruent sentence frames, and 
so that explains the lack of a main effect. I don’t think this explanation is valid for two 
reasons. Firstly, the target words in the current experiment appeared near the 
beginning of the sentences, and were preceded only by bare definite articles or 
generic possessives. So the participants had no basis on which to expect any 
particular word at this point in a sentence. There was therefore no supporting context 
of the kind that eliminated the concreteness effect in Holcomb et al.’s experiment. 
Secondly, Holcomb et al. demonstrated that N400s to concrete words were still larger 
than N400s to abstract words even in neutral sentence contexts, and so if 
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concreteness was the reason that N400 differences were obtained, I think we would 
also expect an N400 difference in the current experiment, where the beginnings of 
each sentence were also neutral with respect to which word would follow. 
Furthermore, Van Petten and Kutas (1990) found that lower frequency words elicited 
larger N400s than higher frequency words, but only when they were presented near 
the beginning of sentences, and not when the words appeared at the end of 
sentences. Therefore, we have at least one other experiment which suggests that 
N400 differences occur at the beginning of sentences to a greater extent than at the 
end. If concreteness does drive a difference in N400 amplitude, then we should 
therefore expect to see this difference for target words near the beginning of 
sentences. 
The results obtained in the present experiment suggest that concreteness 
may not be the reason for N400 amplitude differences, after all. If that is the case, 
then we need explanations for why it is that other researchers have found EEG 
concreteness effects in other experiments. I will offer two such explanations for the 
studies we have considered in most detail: Holcomb et al. (1999) and Barber et al. 
(2013). One alternative reason for why Holcomb et al. (1999) found a difference in 
N400 amplitude in their neutral condition was that, although the cloze probabilities of 
the concrete and abstract target words in their neutral sentences might have been 
closer than in the anomalous sentences, these cloze probabilities still might have 
been unequal in absolute terms. The example neutral sentences they give are: 
“It happened because of her mood.” 
“Larry said it must have been the wine.” 
 
“Wine” is a target concrete word, whereas “mood” is a target abstract word. Note that 
although these sentence frames are relatively neutral, it still is quite unlikely that the 
true cloze probabilities of the sentence-final words are the same across conditions. 
To see why this might be, consider the following sentences: 
 “It happened because of her wine” 
 “Larry said it must have been the mood” 
 
It seems to me that these latter two sentences are less natural-sounding than the first 
two sentences, but all we have done is swapped the sentence-final target words. If 
these sentences really were neutral with respect to expectations about the final word, 
as Holcomb et al. hoped, then this just wouldn’t be the case. For this reason, it’s 
possible that the cloze probabilities of the target words in the experiment I report in 
this chapter were more similar (and smaller) than in the experiments reported in 
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Holcomb et al., because the target words appeared near the beginning of sentences. 
This suggests that in Holcomb et al.’s experiment, the N400 differences that have 
been found so far between concrete and abstract words might not be due to 
concreteness, but instead might still be due to a confound between the cloze 
probabilities of the concrete words versus the abstract words. And indeed, as Barber 
et al. (2013) highlight, it could also be due to any number of other psycholinguistic 
variables that tend to be correlated with the concreteness measure (e.g., AoA) which 
Holcomb et al. did not control for. 
As we saw above, Barber et al.’s preferred explanation of their lexical decision 
EEG results is that concrete words trigger more multimodal information by default 
than abstract words. So, if that’s true, it is unclear why it would be that the 
concreteness N400 effect does not occur for words near the beginning of sentences, 
where presumably at least as much multimodal information is triggered as in a lexical 
decision task. However, it is still the case that Barber et al. (2013) found a difference 
between the N400 amplitudes to concrete and abstract words in their lexical decision 
task, and if we entertain the idea that concreteness is not really the driving factor 
behind differences in N400 amplitudes obtained in other experiments, then we also 
need an explanation of this result. Here is a potential explanation. The amplitude of 
the N400 is correlated with how expected a word is (Kutas and Hillyard, 1984). 
Consider Table 6-3 below, which displays all of the stimulus words featured in Barber 
et al.’s experiment.  
Table 6-4 Words featured in Barber et al.'s experiment 
Concrete Abstract 
gig rod Voice corridor mood maternity horror protest 
cue nephew Tribe liquor amour apology marriage reflection 
disease column product prong woe quest flutter number 
guest monsoon channel cable delirium fury temper slumber 
ounce rack freight machinery fun sum bargain demon 
cancer block author sound pleasure magic luxury peep 
ether drape material weapon marvel joke happiness warmth 
date synagogue starch plate triumph spree dream fashion 
duke manure palette garment romance beauty burden space 
bureau university widow medicine confusion crime wealth sneer 
creature pocket troop pancreas haste plunge danger whiteness 
relic warehouse clove equipment frenzy panic expanse angel 
air lobby jack insect joy minute grief concert 
estate cartilage jersey stomach agony midnight love whoop 
mountain thong thyme belt thrill ghost paradise dozen 
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The concrete words in Barber et al.’s stimulus list nearly all refer to conceptually 
unrelated medium sized objects. Where there are connections between the referents 
of the concrete words, they tend to be only between pairs (e.g., cable-machinery, 
cancer-disease). Although individual intuitions about the abstract stimuli will vary, it’s 
still clearly the case that, in contrast to the concrete stimuli, a large number of them 
form a semantically coherent group that we might characterise roughly as ‘physical 
or emotional human states’ (highlighted in grey in Table 6-3). By my count, there are 
25 of these in the abstract condition, which is nearly half of the 60 stimuli that made 
up the whole condition. That means that, of the real words of English that participants 
saw over the course of the experiment, approximately one quarter were potentially 
semantically related to each other, and these were all part of the abstract condition. 
Although the stimuli were presented in a random order and interspersed with concrete 
words and non-words, repeated exposure to exemplars of this set may have primed 
other members of this set, which would make them more expected than the rest of 
the stimuli in the experiment. This could be why the N400s to the abstract words in 
Barber et al.’s experiment were lower than the concrete words: it is well known that 
expected stimuli prompt smaller N400s than unexpected stimuli. Indeed, this was one 
of the original considerations when hypotheses about the cognitive processes 
underlying the N400 were being formed (Kutas and Hillyard, 1984).  
To put the point another way: suppose that I ran a lexical decision experiment 
in which 25% of the real-word stimuli referred to household tools (hammer, spade, 
trowel, drill…), and the other 75% were randomly drawn from truly unrelated domains. 
My guess is that, on average, N400s to these tool words would be lower than to the 
unconnected non-tool words, but this would have nothing to do with any particular 
properties of the tools or the words we use to refer to them. This explanation is 
admittedly speculative, but I think that it is at least as plausible as the explanation that 
we would have to entertain if we accepted that the N400 amplitude differences really 
were driven by concreteness (that is, the explanation that requires that it be the case 
that encountering the letter string <pancreas> triggers more sensorimotor information 
than encountering the letter string <concert>). Furthermore, decreased N400 
amplitudes for semantically primed words in lexical decision tasks have been found 
in other experiments (Bentin et al., 1985; Holcomb, 1993), and so it would not be 
surprising to observe them in Barber et al.’s experiment. This alternative explanation 
also has the benefit that it appeals to what is already known and (relatively) 
uncontroversial about the amplitude of the N400: it decreases as a function of how 
expected a stimulus is. Of course, this alternative explanation also might equally apply 
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to the behavioural advantage Barber et al. found for abstract words. A large number 
of the words in their abstract condition could potentially prime other abstract words in 
that condition, and this could plausibly decrease decision latency for those words.  
6.5 Summary of Chapter 6 
To conclude: in this chapter, we considered evidence that N400 amplitudes to 
concrete words are larger than N400 amplitudes to abstract words, as has been found 
in a number of previous studies (Barber et al., 2013; Holcomb et al., 1999; Kounios 
and Holcomb, 1994; West and Holcomb, 2000). This has been the typical finding in 
EEG concreteness research, despite the behavioural evidence that concrete words 
are easier to process than abstract words. These two findings are in tension because 
N400 amplitudes are typically larger for stimuli that are harder to process than stimuli 
that are easier to process. However, Barber et al. (2013) showed that earlier 
concreteness EEG studies potentially suffered from a large number of stimulus 
confounds. In their well-controlled lexical decision task, they still obtained larger N400 
amplitudes for concrete words, but they found a behavioural advantage for abstract 
words. I argue that their theoretical explanations of these results are not consistent 
with the properties of the specific stimuli that featured in their experiment. They claim 
that concrete words trigger more ‘multimodal information’ than abstract words, which 
explains the larger N400 for concrete words, whereas abstract words are more 
susceptible to ‘decision mechanisms’, which explains the behavioural advantage for 
abstract words. However, absent any evidence, it is not plausible to suppose that the 
concrete stimuli featured in their experiment actually do trigger more ‘multimodal 
information’ than the abstract stimuli. I also suggest that it is very hard to think of a 
‘decision mechanism’ that would actually explain the behavioural abstractness 
advantage. In any case, the stimuli featured in Barber et al.’s abstract condition 
suffered from the midscale disagreement phenomenon we have examined in 
previous chapters. 
 In order to address this problem, I reported the results of a new sentence 
processing experiment that was designed to maximise the chance of finding an N400 
concreteness effect, assuming that Barber et al.’s hypothesis was correct. Not only 
did this experiment not find evidence for a statistically significant difference between 
N400s to concrete and abstract words, Bayesian analyses suggest that we should 
actually prefer the null hypothesis that there is no such difference. I have offered some 
explanations for why it is that previous studies found an N400 concreteness effect, 
whereas the current one did not. Although Holcomb et al. (1999) tried to control for 
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cloze probability in the neutral condition of their experiment 2, it is unclear whether 
their neutral sentences really did create equal cloze probabilities across conditions. 
And Barber et al. are right to point out that other stimulus confounds may well have 
affected the results of all of Holcomb et al.’s experiments. Although Barber et al. 
(2013) controlled for an impressive array of psycholinguistic variables, nearly half of 
the words that made up their abstract condition could have potentially primed each 
other. These issues could potentially have contributed to a lower N400 amplitude to 
abstract  stimuli. This point, coupled with the fact that evidence against an N400 
difference between concrete and abstract stimuli was obtained in the experiment 
reported here, suggests that evidence for the N400 concreteness effect in general is 
not as strong as is generally believed. Although this might seem like a potentially 
unwelcome conclusion, I think that, if the analyses I have presented in this chapter 
are along the right lines, then actually we are in a much better position than we were 
in before regarding concreteness EEG research. That is because, as McRae and 
Jones (2013 ) note, a satisfying explanation of the alleged N400 concreteness effect 
has been someone elusive. If I am right, then this explanation has been elusive 
because these effects were not due to concreteness, after all. The upshot of all this 
is that we have more evidence against the general validity and utility of the 
concreteness measure in psycholinguistic investigations of the conceptual system. In 
the next chapter, I shall summarise what we have seen in Chapters 4-6, and draw 
together my response to objection 1.  
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Chapter 7: Response to 
objection 1 (concreteness 
effects are fragile) 
 
In Chapter 3, I argued that we do not possess a concept (a unitary cognitive resource) 
for every word we know. Using the alleged abstract concept JUSTICE as an example, 
I tried to convince you that positing this concept comes with lots of costs but no 
theoretical benefit. I suggested that we can get by without positing JUSTICE, and that 
explanations of human behaviour and cognitive processes that we communicate 
about by using the word ‘justice’ do not contain JUSTICE. I also tried to show that this 
position comes with a substantial benefit: theories of concepts are in a much better 
shape if they do not have to deal with the problems that JUSTICE causes them. I also 
suggested that this strategy could be used to rule out other potentially problematic 
‘abstract’ concepts. We considered two important objections to my arguments. The 
first objection was: 
 
If some proposed abstract concepts don’t actually exist, then 
how can it be that reliable experimental effects are obtained 
by measuring responses to ‘concrete’ stimuli and comparing 
them to responses to ‘abstract’ stimuli? Surely this empirical 
evidence indicates that there must be something neuro-
psychologically real and theoretically principled about the 
concrete-abstract distinction, and that there is a reliable 
relationship between words and concepts.  
 
The response I want to make to this objection will probably seem obvious by 
now. In Chapters 4-6, I presented evidence and analyses to the effect that 
experimental concreteness effects are just not as reliable as is generally assumed. In 
Chapter 4, we saw that the way that concreteness is operationalised in 
psycholinguistic experiments is hugely problematic. At the concrete end of the scale, 
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perhaps the measure functions more or less adequately. But at the abstract end and 
in the middle of the scale, the validity of concreteness norms is highly dubious. If we 
want to construct psycholinguistic experiments featuring ‘truly’ abstract words that 
participants are highly likely to be familiar with, then we end up with a pool of less 
than 300 items to draw on. And, as we saw in Chapter 4, a large number of these are 
very morphologically complex and/or idiomatic. If there is a reliable relationship 
between words and concepts, and concreteness is supposed to index a 
psychologically instantiated difference between two kinds of mental resource, then it 
is very strange that there are fewer than 300 words of English that reliably pick out 
one of these kinds. In the middle of the concreteness scale, the problem is worse. 
Taking the mean value of diametrically opposing judgements gives the illusion that 
participants treat concreteness as a scale, but in fact they do not. For nearly every 
word in the middle of the concreteness scale, mean values do not reflect participants’ 
judgements. Even more worryingly, in every stimulus list that I have looked at, the 
‘abstract’ stimuli used in experiments were not actually abstract. Instead, they were 
simply those words about which participants tended to disagree. This undermines the 
reliability of concreteness effects because we just have not been comparing 
responses to concrete stimuli with responses to abstract stimuli.  
In chapters 5 and 6, I presented some new experiments that were designed 
to assess the implications of these issues with the concreteness scale. I tried to both 
maximise the experimental contrast between concrete and abstract items, and 
significantly reduce the presence of noise created by variability in ratings. In all 
experiments, the conditions were such that both the chances of finding a 
concreteness effect and the magnitude of that effect should have been maximised. 
Despite this, in 3 out of 4 experiments, I obtained evidence for the null hypothesis. I 
also pointed out that, even if we had obtained evidence for concreteness effects, the 
theoretical explanations of why these effects occur all fail in various ways. Typically, 
researchers assume that words with lower concreteness ratings trigger less 
‘multimodal’ information than words with higher ratings, but, if we actually look at 
these words that feature in experiments, we see that this simply isn’t true. There is no 
reason to believe that the words featured in the abstract conditions (e.g. ‘concert’) in 
experiments do trigger less multimodal information than the words featured in the 
concrete conditions (e.g. ‘pancreas’). In Chapter 6, I also suggested that there may 
be other reasons for why researchers appear to have obtained evidence for 
concreteness effects that do not appeal to concreteness, such as priming effects and 
differences in cloze probability across experimental conditions. 
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I take all of this to show that concreteness is just not as reliable a 
psycholinguistic variable as it is believed to be. Note that I am not arguing that there 
definitely are no such things as concreteness effects. I have simply presented 
evidence that they are much more elusive than we would expect them to be, if the 
theories that explain them are true. Furthermore, if there are such things as 
concreteness effects, then the way we operationalise the variable now is a flawed 
way of trying to find them, for the reasons detailed in Chapter 3. I think that if we put 
all of this together, then we are left with the conclusion that evidence for concreteness 
effects is not very strong. Explanations of concreteness effects often require that 
words and concepts are in a reliable correspondence with one another. I am trying to 
convince you that words and concepts are not in a reliable correspondence with one 
another. In order to do this, I have presented evidence that concreteness effects are 
not actually reliable experimental outcomes. We need more evidence in order to 
determine the status of concreteness effects. That being so, I hope this provides a 
way of mitigating objection 1, at least for moment. I argued in Chapter 3 that at least 
some words of English do not pick out elements of a theory of concepts. If there were 
strong evidence that the concreteness scale indexes reliable processing differences 
between concrete and abstract words, then this would be problematic for my 
argument. This is because the concreteness scale assumes that there is a reliable 
correspondence between words and concepts. However, we don’t have to assume 
that words and concepts stand in a reliable correspondence with one another in order 
to explain concreteness effects, because the experiments I have reported here 
suggest that that concreteness effects do not obtain in a way that licences this 
assumption. I will now move on to provide a response to objection 2.  
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Chapter 8: Response to 
objection 2 (there is more to 
meaning than concepts) 
 
Recall from Chapter 3 the second objection to my arguments about the relationship 
between words and concepts: 
 
If there is no unitary cognitive resource that corresponds to 
the word ‘justice’, then what is the meaning of the word 
‘justice’ – how do we understand each other when we use the 
word ‘justice’, or other abstract words for that matter? 
 
My response to objection 2 will take the form of a sketch of a theory of communicative 
success that does not require that words encode concepts. I argue that Relevance 
Theory, a popular theory of communication, works better if it relaxes certain 
assumptions about word meanings and concepts. It’s very often assumed that ‘the 
meaning’ of a word is a theoretically important notion, and that this meaning is a 
concept. As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, all of the psycholinguistic research on the 
concrete-abstract distinction assumes that word meanings and concepts are the very 
same things, and philosophical theories of thought also assume that words encode 
concepts. Instead of providing a knock-down argument that this is not the case, I wish 
to show that with regard to explaining how communication occurs, there is an 
alternative view that is just as viable. This alternative view denies that meanings and 
concepts are the same things, and it emphasises that it is more useful to think of 
meaning as being a property of an interpretation of an utterance, as opposed to a 
property that a word ‘has’. If this alternative view really is just as viable as the 
conceptual view (the view that word meanings just are concepts), then the default 
assumption that word meanings just are concepts is not justified. Instead, it would 
have to be shown that the conceptual view has advantages that the alternative does 
not. I hope that this deflates objection 2, because with this alternative view in hand, 
we would have a story to tell about the word ‘justice’ and meaning. 
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8.1 JUSTICE, ‘justice’, and meaning 
 Consider the question: “what is the meaning of the word ‘justice’?”. We might 
be asking, “what cognitive resources should we attribute to Smith in order to explain 
how he generated a felicitous interpretation of an utterance containing the word 
‘justice’?”. Or, we might be asking, “if we polled every member of a language 
community, how would they respond to the question of what the meaning of the word 
‘justice’ is?”. I think it is clear that these two questions are about different things. The 
first question is a question that a certain kind of cognitive theory should answer. The 
second question is a question that a certain kind of sociolinguistic investigation could 
answer. I take it that the philosophers and psychologists we discussed in Chapter 3 
are generally interested in the first question when they talk of meanings and concepts, 
although they do not necessarily couch it in those terms.  
 So, what resources would we need to attribute to Smith in order to explain his 
generating a conversationally felicitous interpretation of an utterance containing the 
word ‘justice’?  What is there, “in the mind”, that corresponds to the word ‘justice’? 
The standard answer is that we need to attribute to Smith a concept, JUSTICE. I have 
spent much of this thesis exploring various problems that the notion of JUSTICE 
raises. So here is my alternative suggestion. Smith needs some grammatical 
knowledge of English (which everybody would accept), the ability to draw inferences 
(which is the cornerstone of many accounts of utterance interpretation), and a stored 
set of episodes of past encounters with/usages of9 the word ‘justice’. I should note 
that this is far from being a novel idea (see, for example, Recanati’s (2004) brief 
discussion of what he calls ‘meaning eliminativism’ and Allott and Textor (2017)), 
although I hope to draw out some new issues in a particular way. Smith can attempt 
to understand what his interlocutor meant by their use of an utterance containing the 
word ‘justice’, by drawing inferences on the basis of the specifics of the context of the 
conversation, and the information instantiated in one or more of his past usage 
episodes. But he doesn’t necessarily need a JUSTICE concept.   
 An obvious concern here is that we need some explanation of what a context 
is, and how Smith draws appropriate inferences with respect to it. But there are 
already powerful theories of language interpretation and communication that make 
detailed suggestions about how we draw inferences with respect to elements of the 
discourse context and what principles govern these inferences. Relevance Theory is 
                                               
9 I will use ‘past usage’ as a blanket term to refer to both of these options  
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one prominent example (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). These theories tend to be 
committed to the idea that words encode concepts, and, at first glance, they might 
look incompatible with my account for this reason. But I don’t think this is necessarily 
true: the mechanics of, say, Relevance Theory (accessibility of encyclopaedic 
information, contextual assumptions/implications, the presumption of Optimal 
Relevance, chains of inference) might just as well operate on information contained 
in stored episodes of past usages of words, as on information stored with concepts 
encoded by words. So I am not suggesting that Smith understands someone’s use of 
the word ‘justice’ just by consulting an appropriate stored episode of a past usage: I 
think I can avail myself of the kinds of capabilities that feature in other accounts of 
language interpretation.  
I will attempt to give a rough outline of how the alternative view might look on 
a Relevance Theory-style account.  I will not be able to provide a fully fleshed-out 
story. I just want to motivate the idea that at least it’s plausible that Relevance Theory 
(or an account like it) could work without holding that word meanings are necessarily 
concepts (or, equivalently, that words encode concepts as a rule). In fact, by the end 
of this chapter, we will see that in some ways, other recent developments of 
Relevance Theory are not so far from the position I will outline here (Sperber and 
Wilson, 2015).  If something like Relevance Theory is compatible with my suggestion 
that words do not stand in a reliable correspondence with concepts, then I think it 
really is a large benefit for that theory. If a theory of concepts or meanings implies 
that there is such a thing as JUSTICE, then that theory should be able to give an 
account of what properties JUSTICE has; JUSTICE has to be able to fit in with the 
rest of the theory’s commitments; and JUSTICE should explain something. But that 
doesn’t actually seem to be the case when we try and spell out properties of JUSTICE 
in terms of any given theory. So, if we can get by without positing JUSTICE, then we 
have solved quite a serious problem for theories of meanings and concepts in 
general. First, I give a brief overview of a traditional conceptual version of Relevance 
Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Wilson and Carston, 2007), and show how it is 
supposed to explain the interpretation of utterances by appealing to concepts. Then, 
I hope to show that Relevance Theory still works in spirit (better, in fact) if some of 
the burden of explanation is shifted away from concepts, and onto past usage 
episodes instead. Finally, I consider some objections and potential responses. In 
considering some of these objections, I also want to show that the suggestions I make 
in this chapter are not as radical as they might first appear: it is certainly possible to 
be a Relevance Theorist and dispense with JUSTICE.  
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8.2 Overview of Relevance Theory 
 Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) is a general theory of human 
cognition with an emphasis on explaining utterance interpretation. It starts with the 
assumption that human cognition is specially adapted to maximise the Relevance of 
the results of processing stimuli. The Relevance of a stimulus is defined as a trade-
off between the cost of processing it, and the benefits that processing it might bring. 
The benefits of processing a stimulus are called Positive Cognitive Effects (roughly; 
beneficial pieces of information; useful adjustments to a mental model of how the 
world is). So highly Relevant stimuli are those stimuli that produce lots of positive 
cognitive effects for relatively little processing effort. What exactly contributes to 
increased effort in processing a stimulus is vague and varied. But the kinds of thing 
Relevance Theorists have in mind regarding utterance interpretation are relatively 
uncontroversial assumptions such as: interpreting the sound [baʊ] as referring to a 
part of a ship as opposed to part of a tree will be easier in some contexts than in 
others, because of the nature of those contexts and the frequency with which each 
interpretation has been encountered before. Contexts are psychological constructs: 
they involve arrays of so-called Contextual Assumptions. Contextual Assumptions are 
pieces of information represented in memory (or perceptually available from the 
context of the utterance) that can be combined with information derived from a 
stimulus in order to make Relevant inferences. These Contextual Assumptions could, 
in principle, be almost anything that would help an interlocutor draw Relevant 
inferences. For example, in a context in which I respond to my supervisor’s question 
of whether our 14.00 meeting is still going ahead, my utterance of “I just realised I left 
the oven on” might make the following Contextual Assumption ‘accessible’ to my 
supervisor: 
Input: Lewis has said that he has left the oven on 
CA1: Ovens that are left on can cause fires 
This Contextual Assumption could, when combined with other such assumptions and 
the specifics of the conversation, yield the Relevant implication that I cannot attend 
the meeting because I intend to rush home and check that my house has not burned 
down: 
CA2: People generally want to be sure that their house is not on fire 
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CA3: Attributing to Lewis the intention to check his house is not on fire instead 
of attend the meeting would provide an answer to my question as to whether 
the meeting is going ahead  
Contextual Implications: Lewis cannot attend our 14.00 meeting because he 
will shortly rush home to check his house is not on fire; the meeting is not 
going ahead 
These contextual implications are Relevant because they provide positive cognitive 
effects (they provide my supervisor with the information she wants) and because they 
were easy to arrive at given the context. On the Relevance Theory view, speakers 
exploit a bias in hearers to expect that their utterances will have an Optimally Relevant 
interpretation: interpreting the speaker’s utterance with respect to certain constraints 
will give rise to a worthwhile number of positive cognitive effects for relatively little 
processing effort. Hearers assume that a speaker has designed their utterance such 
that the interpretation that is easiest and seems most useful (i.e. has sufficient positive 
cognitive effects) in a given context is precisely the interpretation that the speaker 
intended them to generate in that context.  
The final element of Relevance Theory that concerns us here is what 
information an utterance itself actually contains (or makes accessible to the cognitive 
system). This information is cashed out in terms of the relation between words and 
concepts, and what properties concepts have. Sperber and Wilson’s (1998, p. 189) 
description of what they take concepts to be is very much in line with my notion of 
unitary cognitive resources, outlined in Chapter 3: ‘a concept… is an enduring 
elementary mental structure, which is capable of playing different discriminatory or 
inferential roles on different occasions in an individual’s life’. They also endorse the 
view that thought is composed of concepts in the standard way: ‘we assume that 
mental representations have a structure not wholly unlike that of a sentence, and 
combine elements from a mental repertoire not wholly unlike that of a lexicon’. 
However, Sperber and Wilson (1998) argue that the relationship between the number 
of words we have and the number of concepts we have is not one-to-one. Instead, 
we have a great many more concepts than we do words. When we have a concept 
but no corresponding word for it, it is an ‘unlexicalised concept’. Crucially, Sperber 
and Wilson (1998, p. 43) do still seem to think that words encode concepts generally: 
‘a word which encodes a given concept can be used to convey… another concept… 
almost any word can be used in this way… it may so happen that the intended concept 
is the very one encoded by the word, which is therefore used in its strictly literal 
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sense’. So, on the traditional Relevance Theory approach to word meaning, words do 
encode concepts as a rule. This suggests that, for example, the word ‘justice’ encodes 
the concept, JUSTICE. The concepts encoded by words (and the context of the 
utterance) provide evidence that points towards a speaker’s meaning, but this 
evidence doesn’t fully determine a speaker’s meaning all by itself.  
An innovation of Relevance Theory is the idea that the concept encoded by a 
word is not ready-made to fit into any and all possible interpretations of any and all 
utterances that contain that word. Instead, the concept is a kind of file address for an 
array of logical and encyclopaedic information. This logical and encyclopaedic 
information is then used to construct an occasion-specific interpretation of the word; 
a so-called ‘ad-hoc concept’ (Wilson and Carston, 2007). To give an idea about how 
this works, consider a standard kind of example from the literature: 
 
(1) I won’t be having a drink tonight. 
 
It is not hard to imagine a context in which an utterance of (1) is used to express the 
proposition that the speaker will not be having alcoholic drinks specifically, as 
opposed to making a blanket claim about not ingesting any fluid at all. Relevance 
Theory has a very neat explanation for this. The word ‘drink’ encodes the concept, 
DRINK. DRINK is a file address that points to, or makes available, logical and 
encyclopaedic information associated with DRINK. Encyclopaedic properties are 
mentally represented bits and pieces of information associated with (members of) the 
category that a concept stands for. Encyclopaedic properties are relatively 
unconstrained: the encyclopaedic properties that the encoded concept DRINK points 
to could include: that drinks come in various colours; that some drinks are alcoholic, 
an association between Irn Bru and the phrase, ‘Scotland’s other national drink’, and 
so on. The unconstrained nature of these encyclopaedic properties is what gives 
Relevance Theory much of the desired flexibility in order to explain utterance 
interpretation. And, as an aside, I don’t mean to suggest that this unconstrained-ness 
is a bad thing: it is clear to me that I know all of these things; that they all have 
something to do with drinks; that they might mediate my drink-related behaviour in 
some contexts, and so it seems plausible to me that they would make up part of the 
resources associated with my DRINK concept. Logical properties, on the other hand, 
are representations of information that provide the basis for deductive reasoning 
about category membership and inferential relations between concepts (‘meaning 
postulates’). One such logical property pointed to by the concept DRINK might be an 
‘elimination rule’ that takes the concept DRINK as input, and returns a property such 
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as EDIBLE FLUID. Logical properties license deductive and other inferential 
reasoning processes, but they are not supposed to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for category membership, or definitions of extensions (Sperber and Wilson, 
1995, p. 92). The important difference between encyclopaedic and logical properties 
is that according to this picture, there is nothing about experience of Irn Bru that is 
constitutive of the DRINK concept. It could turn out that in the near future, scientists 
decide that some chemical contained in Irn Bru is deadly poisonous. However, 
gaining an appreciation of this fact would not change DRINK fundamentally, because 
its logical properties are still in place. I assume that it is in this way that the DRINK 
concept is able to play ‘different discriminatory or inferential roles on different 
occasions’, while still being characterisable as an ‘enduring’ mental structure.  
Relevance Theory holds that, quite generally, encyclopaedic and logical 
properties of the concepts encoded by content words are manipulated by the hearer 
according to constraints of Relevance in order to produce ad-hoc, occasion-specific 
concepts. In the case of (1), uttered just as a particularly wild party is about to 
commence, certain Contextual Assumptions would be accessible, such as “people 
stereotypically drink alcohol at wild parties”. The hearer would then ‘narrow’ the 
encoded concept DRINK by focusing on certain of the encyclopaedic properties that 
it points to (those encyclopaedic properties that describe alcoholic drinks). This 
results in the ad-hoc concept, DRINK*. DRINK* denotes not all drinks, but only those 
drinks that are alcoholic. This decision on the part of the hearer is licenced by the 
constraints of Relevance discussed above and the context of the utterance. The 
context of the utterance has the same kinds of effects as in the oven case above. 
Suppose (1) was uttered in response to Smith, who is proffering a can of Oranjeboom: 
narrowing DRINK to DRINK* provides Smith with an interpretation that is Relevant in 
this context: the speaker does not want a can of Oranjeboom because the speaker 
will not be having any DRINK*s, and DRINK* includes Oranjeboom in its denotation. 
Note that on this account, if a speaker of (1) downs a glass of water immediately after 
making their utterance (in the party context), then on the Relevance Theory account 
the proposition they have expressed is still true. That is because water is not denoted 
by DRINK*; only alcoholic drinks are.  If (1) was uttered in a different context, say one 
in which body builders are preparing for a competition by intentionally dehydrating 
themselves, then ‘drink’ could be used to express a different ad-hoc concept (perhaps 
an ad-hoc concept closer to the one encoded by ‘drink’). In that case, the speaker 
would express a different proposition even though the sentence type they have 
uttered is the same in both scenarios. 
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So, that is roughly how concepts figure in utterance interpretation on the 
Relevance Theory account. To summarise: words encode concepts. Concepts point 
to, or make accessible, encyclopaedic and logical properties. A subset of these 
encyclopaedic and logical properties is selected on the fly in utterance interpretation 
in order to generate ad-hoc concepts that promote Relevant inferences. 
8.3 The meaning of ‘dog’ and ‘justice’ in 
Relevance Theory 
 Let us now consider two utterances from the Relevance Theory perspective, one of 
which turns on the concepts encoded and conveyed by a use of the word ‘dog’, the 
other turning on those concepts encoded and conveyed by a use of the word ‘justice’. 
A familiar pattern emerges: in the case of ‘dog’, the relation between the 
interpretations, the theoretical constructs, and their properties is straightforward 
enough. However, in the case of ‘justice’, I argue that things are much less clear. 
Suppose that (2) is uttered by someone (A) wanting to give advice to a friend (B), who 
is scared of their new neighbourhood. Relevance Theory has a nice account of why 
we have certain intuitions about what A is likely to mean, and what proposition they 
are committing to.  
 
(2) A: If you’ve got a dog then you don’t have to worry about being burgled  
 
We don’t take A to mean that just any old dog would do. If B comes into possession 
of a 2-month-old mute, blind Chihuahua, gets burgled, and then complains to A, then 
we might feel that it is B’s behaviour that is strange, as opposed to A’s.  Ad-hoc 
concepts can explain why this is. Setting the rest of the utterance aside and focussing 
just on the word ‘dog’ and its encoded concept, we could say that that the intended 
interpretation of (2) involves a narrowing of DOG so that encyclopaedic properties 
describing loyalty, size, fierceness, intelligence, and so on, are emphasised. The 
result is DOG*: an ad-hoc concept that denotes those dogs that are good at guarding 
houses, and does not denote 2-month-old mute, blind Chihuahuas. A Contextual 
Implication that B could draw in this case could be something glossable in English as, 
“A is suggesting that I should buy a DOG*”.  
 Now, consider an utterance of (3), uttered by a campaigner (C) who is trying 
to combat the recent fashion for subjecting strangers to insults over the internet:  
 (3) 
D: Why has Charity Z made so little progress in making the internet a safer place? 
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C:  It’s hard to get justice for online abuse.10  
 
My own intuition about this example is that the proposition that C is committing to is 
not as determinate as in the case of (1) or (2). And, although this is just an intuition, 
you might wonder why that should be, if reconstructing the speaker’s meaning in (3) 
is a matter of building a proposition from encoded concepts and/or ad-hoc concepts. 
If concepts function as categories and compose into thoughts, and words encode 
these concepts, then it seems to me that we should expect the proposition that we 
attribute to a speaker to be relatively clear.11 But, as a rough approximation, suppose 
that C is trying to express a proposition that might be glossed as: “it is difficult to get 
society to punish people who engage in online abuse”. Even if you think this gloss 
characterises the proposition that is definitely the one that C intends to communicate, 
I still don’t think it’s straightforward to gloss what the specific contribution of the word 
‘justice’ is to the interpretation of this utterance. A suite of problems arises here. 
Sperber and Wilson (1998) suggest that a ‘strictly literal’ use of a word occurs when 
it is used to convey the very concept that it encodes, as opposed to an ad-hoc 
concept. So we should also be able to say what would count as a literal use of the 
word ‘justice’. Is (3) a literal use of the word ‘justice’? There does not seem to be a 
principled way of answering this question. In some contexts, the word ‘justice’ can be 
used to refer to or describe situations that involve capital punishment, but our 
campaigner is not necessarily indicating that she believes that Twitter arguments 
could or should be resolved in this way. So, as with ‘dog’ in (2), the speaker here does 
not intend to denote just anything that could be felicitously described with the word 
‘justice’. She has a specific kind of thing in mind; perhaps a hefty fine for perpetrators, 
newspaper articles that draw attention to the plight of victims, and so forth. But it 
doesn’t seem like this “kind” of justice has any more claim to literality than capital 
punishment. 
 A potential objection to this interpretation of C’s utterance is that it assumes 
that C is using the word ‘justice’ (and, therefore, the concept JUSTICE) to talk about 
things which more plausibly fall under other concepts. For example, a hefty fine 
seems like a prime example of a punishment (and so is plausibly denoted by the 
                                               
10 Some commentators on drafts of this chapter have complained that this particular 
sentence sounds unnatural. However, it is a slightly modified version of an attested instance 
of the word ‘justice’ taken at random from a newspaper article search (“Why it’s so hard for 
women to get justice for online abuse”). That being the case, I think we should expect a 
theory of language interpretation to be able to account for it. In any case, I do not think too 
much turns on the specific example we will consider here. 
11 I return to this issue below. 
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concept PUNISHMENT), but a punishment is not necessarily the same thing as 
justice. My response is that I completely agree: here we seem to have a case where 
the word ‘justice’ is used in such a way as to token mental resources that don’t seem 
to correspond neatly to the alleged concept, JUSTICE. In fact, this is another example 
of the phenomenon I discussed in sections 3.5 and 3.6: any time we try to use the 
concept JUSTICE to explain human behaviour or cognition, some other theoretical 
entity ends up doing all of the explanatory work. Still, you might further object that this 
can’t be a felicitous interpretation of the utterance, because it doesn’t contain the 
concept, JUSTICE. My response here is that this simply begs the question: the issue 
at stake is precisely whether interpretations of utterances containing the word ‘justice’ 
do in fact require the concept, JUSTICE. My point is that these interpretations do not 
require us to posit the concept, JUSTICE, and so I won’t grant that assumption.  
Still, you might object, why can’t we say that the concept JUSTICE makes 
available some notion of ‘appropriate punishment’ via its encyclopaedic properties? 
Then, surely, there is a role for JUSTICE to play in utterance interpretation. I want to 
spend a while considering this idea, because I think that it raises issues that are 
deeply troubling for traditional conceptual relevance theory, and that the past-usage 
account I will sketch out later may provide a way around such difficulties. Let’s 
suppose that here we have another situation in which we need to derive an ad-hoc 
concept, JUSTICE*, from an encoded concept, JUSTICE. It seems to me that we 
immediately run into the same issue facing Barsalou, Fodor, et al., as discussed in 
chapter 3, but in a slightly different guise. We now have to provide an account of the 
concept encoded by the word ‘justice’, and so there should be some plausible 
encyclopaedic and logical properties of JUSTICE that help to explain how we interpret 
the utterance in the way that we do. We do not, as a matter of course, take the 
campaigner to be indicating that online abusers should receive capital punishment, 
and instead we reliably come to a different interpretation. The Relevance Theoretic 
notions of ad-hoc concepts, encyclopaedic properties, and logical properties seem 
designed to account for situations like this.  
However, for me, it is immediately much more difficult to come up with 
straightforward encyclopaedic properties for JUSTICE than for DRINK or DOG. 
Perhaps some candidates for encyclopaedic properties made available by JUSTICE 
could be: that historically, people were hung for committing certain crimes; that some 
people have been falsely imprisoned and subsequently had their sentences 
overturned; that if you are wronged then cultural norms dictate that you are entitled 
to some redress, and so on. Perhaps some such properties are focussed on in order 
to generate the ad-hoc concept, JUSTICE*, which denotes, say, hefty fines and 
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advocacy in periodicals. The problem here is that these are, arguably, very different 
kinds of properties than the ones pointed to by DRINK and DOG. The encyclopaedic 
properties pointed to by DRINK and DOG were properties of drinks and dogs. But it 
does not seem to me that the knowledge that historically, people were hung for 
committing certain crimes is a ‘property of’ justice. Likewise, the view that the wronged 
should be able to seek redress is not a ’property of’ justice. Furthermore, these 
‘properties’ seem like they contain very complex propositional attitudes (“I believe that 
if someone is wronged then they should be able to seek redress”). A propositional 
attitude is a paradigm case of a thought, and in the general model, thoughts are built 
out of concepts. This is the point that I think might cause some major issues for 
traditional conceptual Relevance Theory. If we allow that encyclopaedic properties 
made accessible by concepts can themselves be built out of concepts, then we have 
the danger of an infinite regress, and no obvious way of breaking it. 
Here is how we get trapped in an infinite regress. Recall that encyclopaedic 
and logical properties are supposed to license Relevant implications and inferences. 
Ultimately, the point of all of this is that we want to explain how hearers generate 
interpretations of utterances. The hearer needs to work out what it is that a speaker 
means. Here, the speaker has said: 
 
(3) It’s hard to get justice for online abuse. 
 
Focussing just on the word ‘justice’ for the time being, traditional Relevance Theory 
has it that the word ‘justice’ activates the concept, JUSTICE. The concept, JUSTICE, 
is a mental file address that makes an array of encyclopaedic and logical properties 
available. Let’s suppose that one such property is a propositional mental 
representation, which we can gloss as:  
 
(4) (JUSTICE IS) SOCIETY’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FAIR TREATMENT 
OF ITS CITIZENS.  
 
Well, if this mental representation is itself a propositional structure built out of 
concepts (SOCIETY, IMPLEMENTATION, FAIR…), then so far we haven’t gotten any 
closer to working out what the speaker meant by their use of the word ‘justice’. The 
hearer needs to work out how they should modulate JUSTICE, to generate the ad-
hoc concept, JUSTICE*. But concepts themselves are just file addresses, on the 
traditional Relevance Theory account. In order to cash out (4), a hearer needs to 
consult some encyclopaedic properties made available by the concepts in (4). One 
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way of putting this is that it’s reasonable to ask: what counts as ‘fair’ in this case (what 
are the encyclopaedic properties activated by FAIR)? But if these subsequent 
encyclopaedic properties are again just propositional structures built out of more 
concepts, then all a hearer has achieved is the activation of another set of file 
addresses that do not themselves provide the resources that the hearer needs in 
order to work out what the speaker of (3) meant by their use of the word ‘justice’. If 
we simply define concepts in terms of other concepts, as seems to be the case in (4), 
then it is unclear how any of this hypothetical cognitive processing eventuates in 
“meaning” (or, “interpretation”). It seems like all we get is file names pointing to more 
file names, without ever actually getting to the “stuff” that the files contain. The 
problems do not stop here. Remember that I am only using the alleged concept 
JUSTICE as an example. I think that at least some other alleged abstract concepts 
might also be vulnerable to the criticisms I level against JUSTICE (as we saw with 
DEMOCRACY at the end of Chapter 3). The elements of (4) are supposed to be 
concepts themselves, so we can ask: are these concepts any less problematic than 
JUSTICE? For example, in order for the activation of the concept IMPLEMENTATION 
to provide the hearer with the resources they require to interpret the speaker, 
IMPLEMENTATION also needs to activate some Relevant encyclopaedic properties. 
It just isn’t clear to me that we’re going to be able to say much about what these 
properties are.  
As I just pointed out, if these other encyclopaedic properties are built from 
more concepts, then we are getting further and further away from what we initially 
wanted, which was an explanation of how the ad-hoc concept JUSTICE* is derived 
from the encoded concept, JUSTICE. And this leads me back to one of my original 
arguments against the explanatory value of JUSTICE as a theoretical posit 
(presented in Chapter 3). Suppose that we grant the conceptual Relevance Theorist 
that (4) characterises a legitimate encyclopaedic property of JUSTICE, and 
furthermore, we even grant that the concepts in (4) somehow bottom out in such a 
way that the interpretation of utterance (3) is explained. Well, even if that were true, 
once again we have a situation in which JUSTICE itself isn’t doing any of the 
explaining! The concept JUSTICE does not appear in (4). Instead, it’s other concepts 
that explain how a hearer ultimately interprets a speaker of (3), namely SOCIETY, 
FAIR, TREATMENT, and so on. All the concept JUSTICE seems to do is activate 
other concepts. Why should we bother stipulating this? It seems to me that we could 
easily allow that the word ‘justice’ activates the Relevant concepts immediately, 
without an intermediate step in which a seemingly content-less concept is activated 
that does not actually aid interpretation.  
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Before we move on, I want to address a potential further worry that one might 
have in light of the arguments I just presented, but which I think is unfounded. If the 
encyclopaedic properties made available by concepts can themselves be made of 
concepts, then we might worry that conceptual Relevance Theory wouldn’t be able to 
explain the interpretation of any utterance. Why shouldn’t we also worry that the 
concept DOG, activated by the word ‘dog’, suffers from the same regress problem as 
JUSTICE? The reason I think this worry is unfounded is that Relevance Theorists 
allow that there are some encyclopaedic properties that don’t seem to be 
propositional structures built out of concepts: 
 
[encyclopaedic information can include] conceptually 
represented assumptions and beliefs… and also… imagistic 
and/or sensory-perceptual representations… kinds of bodily 
movements… idiosyncratic information (episodic memories) 
based on one’s own observations and experiences… 
(Carston, 2010, p. 246, emphasis mine) 
 
So, when it’s not the case that an encyclopaedic property just is a propositional 
structure built out of more concepts, then there could be some mental representations 
that can licence an inference about what a speaker might mean. As we saw in the 
previous sections in this chapter, it seems much easier to come up with plausible non-
propositional encyclopaedic properties for DOG than JUSTICE, and so for that reason 
the traditional conceptual Relevance Theorist hopefully does not have to worry too 
much about utterances containing the word ‘dog’. 
I take the above to show that conceptualist Relevance Theory has some 
explaining to do when it comes to what properties JUSTICE points to. However, I 
want to stress that I don’t think that, on its own, this forces the conclusion that 
conceptualist Relevance Theory is wrong about words and concepts. The conceptual 
Relevance Theorist has at least two possible ways of dealing with the issues I have 
outlined here. Firstly, the conceptualist Relevance Theorist could take up the gauntlet 
and provide convincing derivations of interpretations of utterances involving the word 
‘justice’ with reference to plausible encyclopaedic and logical properties. I hope to 
have convinced you that this will be difficult, but I certainly haven’t proven that it is 
impossible. Secondly, the Relevance Theorist could simply accept that some words 
encode concepts that point to encyclopaedic and logical properties that are ineffable: 
we can’t gloss what kinds of encyclopaedic properties JUSTICE points to because 
they’re not the kinds of things that it’s possible to render in English. I am not sure if 
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that’s compatible with all of the other commitments that one might want to hold as a 
Relevance Theorist, and I suspect that, in any case, most would find that move 
unpalatable, but the option is there.  
8.4 A sketch of a non-conceptual account of 
word meaning 
 Now, I will attempt to sketch out how an alternative view might explain how 
we interpret (2) and (3) without holding that the only kind of information a word makes 
available is the concept it encodes. To reiterate, I think the right question to ask when 
it comes to explaining the phenomenon of communication (which is a major goal of 
Relevance Theory) is not, “what is the meaning of the word X?”, but instead, it is “what 
cognitive resources could we attribute to Smith in order to explain his understanding 
of a use of the word X?”.  Instead of content words just encoding concepts, I think it 
is plausible that, over time, starting early in ontogeny and continuing throughout a 
lifetime, humans build up a library of episodes of the use of a lexeme or phrase. Again, 
the goal here is not to convince you wholeheartedly that this account is correct, but 
merely to show that there are viable alternatives to the conceptual view of word 
meaning.  Reconstructing the proposition that a speaker intends to express is a matter 
of building an interpretation on the basis of information contained in these stored past 
usage-episodes, as well as information present in the discourse context. 
A pressing concern here is: what is the nature of the ‘information’ stored in 
these past-usage episodes? Whatever it turns out to be, it had better not just 
exclusively be ‘concepts’, because then my account will collapse into the conceptual 
word meaning account. In this first stab at outlining an alternative, I see no reason to 
put all that many limits on what information could be stored as a result of a past-usage 
episode12, or, if you prefer, on what ways this information could act as a constraint on 
interpretation. A large part of it could simply be a record of those inferences and 
responses that an interlocutor seemed to accept on previous occasions of use, 
instantiated as patterns of brain activity. Other kinds of information could consist of 
perceptual representations of what happened to be in the visual field on previous 
occasions of use, partial imprints of affective states on previous occasions of use, 
and so on. Couching things in Relevance Theoretic terms, past usage information 
could be just any subset of the state of the mind-brain that was involved in producing 
Relevant results when words and phrases were heard or used. It strikes me that this 
                                               
12 From now on, I will use the phrases ‘past-usage episode’ and ‘stored past-usage’ as a 
shorthand for ‘information that is stored as a result of a past-usage episode’. 
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kind of information is no more or less constrained than what Relevance Theorists 
seem to have in mind when they talk of the encyclopaedic properties that are made 
available by concepts, although they are of a different nature. Concepts are supposed 
to function as cognitive stand-ins for categories, and do double duty as the kinds of 
things that compose into thoughts, but I am not suggesting that past-usage 
information necessarily determines the extension of a category or is necessarily 
available to the procedures that produce propositional thought. And so there are good 
reasons to hold that a set of past usages does not constitute a concept. A concept is 
a unitary cognitive resource that composes into thoughts in a systematic way, and it 
must also support cognising about and categorising entities as such. A stored set of 
past usages of the word ‘justice’ does not seem to correspond to a concept on 
anyone’s account, because there is no category that it picks out. On this kind of view, 
a stored past usage really could just be ‘some sub-state the mind-brain was in when 
it encountered a word’. Relevance Theory hypothesises that humans are geared 
towards maximising the Relevance of processing stimuli, and so over time, those 
subsets of the mind-brain that did actually produce Relevant results will stabilise to a 
degree, and noise will tend to average out.   
So, very broadly, anything that could be represented as a memory trace could 
in principle be a component of a stored past-usage of a word. Over time, Smith could 
amass a large and varied pool of information of this sort captured from encounters of 
usages of the words ‘dog’, ‘justice’, and so on. In a given context, some pieces of this 
past-usage information will be more or less accessible as a function of factors such 
as how structurally similar an incoming linguistic string is to previously encountered 
linguistic strings, how easy they are to combine with contextual assumptions in order 
to derive inferences, and all of the factors that Relevance Theory, or any other theory 
for that matter, incorporates. I think that Relevance Theoretic principles could operate 
on these past usage episodes in more or less the same way as they supposedly 
operate on concepts. Speakers are still assumed to be trying to express propositions 
in an Optimally Relevant way, Contextual Assumptions are still more or less 
accessible as a function of discourse context, and Contextual Implications still follow 
from combining the information extracted from processing an utterance with 
Contextual Assumptions.  
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8.5 The meaning of ‘dog’ and ‘justice’ in a non-
conceptual account of word meaning 
So, on to utterances (2) and (3). Here, I just want to show that the past-usage 
account does a reasonable job of reconstructing how a hearer generates an 
interpretation of these utterances. If you accept that the past-usage account does 
actually do a reasonable job, then objection 2 is dealt with.  Consider (2) again: 
 
(2) If you’ve got a dog then you don’t have to worry about being burgled. 
 
In order to be just as viable as standard Relevance Theory, the past-usage account 
has to be able to explain what the role of the word ‘dog’ is in the interpretation of this 
utterance in terms of information stored in past-usages, instead of an encoded 
concept. I think that “in the real world”, the kinds of chains of cause and effect, 
inference, input, output, contextual influence, and so on could potentially be both very 
complex and not necessarily amenable to glossing in English. So I just want to show 
the kind of thing that could take place on the past usage account, but I don’t take 
myself to be providing ‘the’ full explanation of how any hearer might interpret (2). With 
that caveat, B’s interpretation might be reconstructed in the following way: 
 
Contextual assumption: B is worried about being burgled in her new 
neighbourhood (NB: this was given) 
Input: A’s utterance contains, among others, the words ‘dog’ and ‘burgled’ 
arranged syntactically in a certain way 
B has stored past-usages of the word ‘dog’, encountered in such contexts 
as seeing a ‘Beware of the dog’ sign, among many others. Some of these 
past-usage encounters occurred while a particularly fierce-looking animal 
was making a lot of noise.  
 
Contextual assumption: B wouldn’t like to be in the shoes of a burglar 
confronting that kind of animal (made accessible by a combination of the 
context and past-usage episode information) 
Contextual assumption: People acquire such animals (and signs) to put 
potential burglars off 
Contextual assumption: People who have put potential burglars off are less 
worried about being burgled 
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Contextual implication: if B bought the kind of animal she associates with 
‘Beware of the dog’ signs, she could worry less about being burgled. 
Contextual implication: A is suggesting B buy that kind of animal 
 
In this way, B can come to an interpretation that agrees with our intuitions about what 
A meant. But explaining this interpretation didn’t require the assumption that the 
cognitive resources made available by the word ‘dog’ begin and end with the concept, 
DOG. Note that this does not imply that A or B lack a DOG concept. It’s just that A 
and B can understand each other verbally in a way that isn’t necessarily mediated by 
something that we would want to call a concept. Now is a good time to stress this 
important feature of the account I am sketching here. I am not claiming that concepts 
never feature in interpretations of utterances. Rather, I am claiming that concepts are 
not a necessary feature of an interpretation of an utterance.  Given certain contexts 
and utterances, it could be that a successful interpretation does involve a mental 
structure built out of concepts. So, it could contingently be the case that a successful 
interpretation of a particular utterance does involve something we would want to call 
a concept. The difference, to the extent that there is one, between the words ‘dog’ 
and ‘justice’ is just that in the case of ‘dog’, a successful interpretation might typically 
involve a tokening of a hearer’s DOG concept (along with information stored in past 
usage episodes of the word ‘dog’). However, in the case of ‘justice’, any concept that 
does get tokened will not correspond to a unitary cognitive resource, JUSTICE. And, 
in any case, for interpretations of utterances containing either ‘dog’ or ‘justice’, past-
usage information plays a large role in generating interpretations.  I accept that right 
now, you might be concerned about exactly how this past-usage information affects 
utterance interpretation, and interacts with contextual assumptions. I will address 
these issues below I consider possible objections to the position I am sketching here.  
For now though, on to utterance (3): 
(3) 
D: Why has Charity Z made so little progress in making the internet a safer place? 
C:  It’s hard to get justice for online abuse.  
 
Assuming that C’s interlocutor (D) has had a typical exposure to the word ‘justice’ 
throughout her life, then there are any number of previously drawn inferences, 
memory traces, and occasion specific Contextual Assumptions that she could draw 
on in order to generate an interpretation of C’s utterance that is Relevant to her: 
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Input: C’s utterance contains, among others, the words ‘abuse’, ‘get’, and ‘justice’ 
arranged syntactically in a certain way 
 
D has stored past-usages of the word ‘justice’ that include: it being used 
to label a state of equity; D has stored past-usages of the phrase ‘get 
justice’ that include it being used to describe situations in which an 
attempt was made to right a wrong; D has stored past-usages of the word 
‘abuse’… 
 
Contextual assumption (motived by past-use): Situations labelled by the word 
‘abuse’ are iniquitous  
Contextual assumption: Iniquity should be remedied 
Contextual assumption: (motivated by past-use): to ‘get justice’ may involve 
remedying iniquity  
Contextual assumption: People have different ideas about what response is 
appropriate when remedying iniquity  
Contextual assumption: People who work for Charity Z tend to have a certain 
kind of view about remedying iniquity 
Contextual assumption: People who work for Charity Z don’t generally believe 
in capital punishment 
Contextual Implication: Remedying iniquity in this case does not involve 
capital punishment, but some other kind of societal response 
Contextual Implication: C believes that it’s hard to effect that kind of societal 
response regarding online abuse 
Contextual Implication: If it were the case that something is hard, that would 
be a reason why it hasn’t been achieved… 
 
Note that the contextual assumptions suggested above are just as available to the 
conceptual Relevance Theorist (modulo mentions of past-usage) as they are to me. 
But this does not get the conceptual Relevance Theorist off the hook, because these 
contextual assumptions and implications were supposed to licence the generation of 
an ad-hoc concept, JUSTICE*, and it’s at that point that I argue the account runs into 
trouble. On the past-usage account, the contextual assumptions and resulting 
implications serve as a gloss of what D’s interpretation of C’s utterance is likely to be. 
These contextual assumptions and implications are Relevant for the same reasons 
that anything is Relevant according to Relevance Theory. They were easy to derive 
given the occasion of use, and the information made accessible by the linguistic string 
188 
 
C uttered. They also provide D with the cognitive effects she is after: a certain kind of 
societal response being hard to effect would provide a reason why Charity Z has not 
made the progress she desires. Again, although the details are obviously somewhat 
sketchy, the resulting interpretation seems felicitous enough given the context and 
what C uttered, and there is a clear path from the input D receives, to the interpretation 
she generates, via general pragmatic principles. We could tell the same kind of story 
for the other words in the utterance (‘hard’, ‘abuse’) and the past usages of those 
words are likely to contain information that will be mutually reinforcing with regards to 
the interpretation that D generates. The past-usage account can explain how we 
generate interpretations of utterances without holding that we must interpret the 
linguistic content of utterances only by composing concepts encoded by words into 
propositions. Now I shall consider some objections and potential responses. 
8.6 Objections to a non-conceptual account of 
word meaning 
Perhaps the most pressing objection stems from a worry about just how much 
work these Contextual Assumptions are doing: where do they come from, and what 
are they made of, such that they can promote the kinds of inferences that produce 
the interpretation that B and D come to? Are they, for instance, thoughts made of 
concepts? If they are not thoughts made of concepts, then how do they figure in 
inferences at all? I have a few responses to these lines of inquiry. The first thing I 
want to stress is that I am not claiming that there are no such things as concepts, or 
indeed that there are no such things as thoughts built from concepts. I accept the 
explanatory power of concepts as a psychological construct, and I think that in many 
cases, words of English are likely to pick out concepts (such as with DOG). I also 
accept that the only successful model of the mind that anyone has come up with so 
far assumes that thoughts have parts. In this thesis, my point is just that JUSTICE 
isn’t one of these parts. So it could well be that, in the course of interpreting a specific 
utterance, a hearer does entertain contextual assumptions which licence Relevant 
inferences, and these contextual assumptions are made of concepts. The issue I have 
been trying to raise in this chapter is just that, if it turns out that a Relevance Theory 
derivation requires the concept JUSTICE, hidden away in a contextual assumption or 
elsewhere, then we run into the (serious) problems I have been expounding. One 
major benefit of the past-usage account is that using the word ‘justice’ in a derivation 
doesn’t require a commitment to the existence of the concept, JUSTICE. It simply 
requires a commitment to there being some memory traces of past-usages of the 
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word ‘justice’ that could plausibly motivate some Relevant cognitive effects. We gloss 
in English the effects of these memory traces, and the result of the processes they 
play a part in, because we have to gloss them in something. But the gloss isn’t 
supposed to mirror exactly the semantical structure of these cognitive processes and 
representations.  
That being so, a Relevance Theorist might still worry about the questions 
raised in the previous paragraph. The traditional story has it that words encode 
concepts, concepts stand for categories, and concepts compose into thoughts. This 
goes a long way towards explaining how interlocutors draw inferences in conversation 
(the speaker said they want an X; a Y is a kind of X; so the speaker might be satisfied 
if I give them a Y…). If at least some of what we call an ‘interpretation’ of an utterance 
is non-conceptual past-usage information, then how does this past-usage information 
feature in inferences, or affect the results of inferential processes? Furthermore, how 
do we work out what a speaker has asserted, unless this assertion is representable 
as a propositional mental structure built from concepts? If you are worried about these 
questions, then my response may make you feel short-changed. As I mentioned in 
section 8.1, at least one modern development of Relevance Theory makes somewhat 
similar moves to the ones I have been trying to motivate in this chapter (Sperber and 
Wilson, 2015). Here is a choice quote: 
 
Not all inferences involve step by logical step derivations of 
explicit conclusions from explicit premises… What 
[sometimes] happens… might be better described as 
changes in patterns of activation, none of which would 
properly speaking amount to the fixation of a distinct credal 
representation, but the totality of which would correspond to 
the formation of an impression… More generally, many (if not 
all) inferences can be described not as more or less standard 
logical derivations but as competitions between alternative 
conclusions (it will rain/it won’t rain, let’s go for a walk/let’s not, 
and so on). The winner of such competitions is determined by 
activation or inhibition caused by brain states that represent 
information in all kind of ways. 
(Sperber and Wilson, 2015, p. 137) 
Here, Sperber and Wilson appeal to conscious and unconscious collections of results 
from the processing of a stimulus, which we cannot paraphrase in any metalanguage. 
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Furthermore, they allow that such mental representations can play a causal role in 
utterance interpretation. Sperber and Wilson also argue in this paper against the idea 
that hearers and speakers necessarily entertain distinct, unitary propositions, and 
they explicitly state there are cases in which ‘pinpointing a proposition that would 
constitute the speaker’s meaning is difficult or impossible’ (Sperber and Wilson, 2015, 
p. 146). Now: as far as I can tell, Sperber and Wilson would not endorse my past-
usage account, and it seems to me that I take a more radical position than they do 
regarding the (in)determinacy of propositions. However, they clearly allow that non-
conceptual sources can have effects on utterance interpretation and inference. So if 
you’re a Relevance Theorist, as Sperber and Wilson certainly are, the idea that there 
are such cognitive entities and effects can’t on its own be grounds for claiming that 
my position is incompatible with Relevance Theory. And again: I am not trying to 
argue against Relevance Theory. I am trying to find a way of reconciling Relevance 
Theory with the issues that the alleged concept JUSTICE causes, because it is a 
popular and (at least partially) successful theory of communication. My solution is to 
avoid positing JUSTICE. I have tried to show in these sections that if we avoid positing 
JUSTICE, Relevance Theory can work just as well, while getting shot of some serious 
problems. And furthermore, where concepts do enter the picture on my account, the 
machinery of ad-hoc concept generation is still as powerful as it ever was. 
Another potential objection is that you might be worried by my reliance on the 
phrase ‘arranged syntactically in a certain way’. You might wonder what exactly the 
role of this syntactic arrangement is. I take my proposal to be neutral with respect to 
any particular syntactic theory. In the account I am sketching, the syntactic structure 
of a linguistic string acts as a constraint on what a speaker could have meant by 
uttering something in much the same way as in other theories of utterance 
interpretation. I have in mind here such constraints as: in English, there is a certain 
structural element called a subject, and subjects are more likely to have certain 
message-relevant properties than others. These kinds of constraints could make 
some past-usage information for a particular word or phrase more Relevant than other 
such information, but the existence of past-usage information itself doesn’t seem to 
me to be incompatible with whatever syntactic structure a theorist wants to assign to 
a linguistic string. In fact, there is at least one recent study of the interface of syntax 
and word meaning that seems to fully endorse a past-usage style position and 
explicitly denies the traditional conceptual position (Wechsler, 2015). 
A further potential objection related to the issues just discussed is, if we 
endorse the past-usage account, then we lose an important link between the structure 
and semantics of natural language sentences and the structure and semantics of 
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thoughts. Conceptual Relevance Theory comes with a very compelling story about 
the relationships between the structure of linguistic strings and the structure of the 
thoughts that an interpretation of them consists of. Interpretations of utterances in 
Relevance Theory are made up of encoded and ad-hoc concepts that compose to 
form propositions. So the thought that a hearer generates in response to processing 
an utterance has more or less the same structure and content (or, the same kind of 
structure and content) as that which they assign to an incoming linguistic string. This 
is considered to be a nice benefit of all theories that hold that words encode concepts: 
both thought and natural languages are held to be productive, systematic and 
compositional, and so it’s generally held that the structure of a linguistic string and 
the structure of the thought that serves as its interpretation mirror each other in an 
interesting way. If you hold that words encode concepts, then you have an 
explanation of how these structures do mirror each other: word meanings and parts 
of thoughts compose in the same way because they’re the same things. However, on 
my account, it’s less clear how the ‘meaning’ of an utterance is composed from the 
meanings of its parts. This is because on my view, individual words don’t contribute 
concepts that slot into a syntactic structure; instead they contribute information 
derived from past usages in a way that is constrained by syntactic structure.  
However, I think this language-thought-structure objection rests on an 
assumption that we should be much more cautious about accepting. The assumption 
is that natural languages (although almost invariably the discussion is just about 
English) have a compositional semantics independently of any particular semantic 
theory of a language. It’s taken to be axiomatic that ‘English is compositional’; we just 
have to work out in what way it is in fact compositional. But it seems to me that this 
gets things backwards. Semanticists have set themselves the task of constructing a 
formal system that will take any grammatical (English) sentence as input, and produce 
a truth condition as an output. This truth condition should correspond to our 
psychological intuitions about what the right interpretation of the sentence is. One 
way to get started on this interesting task is to assume that the ‘correct’ (read: 
congruent with intuition) truth condition of a sentence is computable from the words 
contained in that sentence, along with a syntactic theory that specifies structural 
relations between those words. Put another way, semanticists are constructing a very 
interesting model. Compositionality is a modelling assumption that makes the 
problem of coming up with a formal system that can produce the right truth conditions 
from given linguistic strings tractable. But it is a completely separate thesis that this 
modelling assumption (or any of the other modelling assumptions the semanticist 
wants to make) has any psychological ‘reality’ with respect to what properties 
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‘language’ as a psychological object turns out to have. All that Fodor’s language of 
thought hypothesis requires is that it’s thought that is compositional, and likewise, 
Barsalou claims that simulators produce representations that can enter into structural 
relations with each other,  but neither of these theories is supposed to be ‘about 
English’. And I think this is more or less the conclusion that Fodor (2001) himself 
came to when he talked of ‘the more or less patent uncompositionality of English’, 
and it’s being the case that ‘thought, rather than language, has content in the first 
instance’. So the thoughts that interpreting a linguistic string provokes could be 
compositional, but that does not require that an utterance itself is compositional, 
whatever that might mean. And nor does it require that the bits that compose in 
thought have direct analogues in the surface structure of linguistic strings. A theory 
of concepts and/or thought should not be a theory of English semantics, unless that’s 
an explicit commitment on the part of the theorist. I am suggesting that we avoid 
making this commitment unless some evidence suggests that we have to. 
There are two more objections that might look dangerous, but I think the past-
usage account can deal with them. The first objection is that the past-usage account 
is profligate: perhaps it seems very implausible to suppose that the human mind-brain 
could store a library of episodes of past usages for every content word in a vocabulary 
containing tens of thousands of items. This line of attack can be deflected by the 
observation that the very same ‘criticism’ applies to any conceptualist’s account. 
There is no reason to suppose that encyclopaedic and logical properties associated 
with every concept encoded in an adult human vocabulary would be more space 
efficient than a library of past usage episodes. The last objection I will consider is that: 
if we understand people by way of past usages of words, then that seems to imply 
that the proposition that a speaker intends to express and the proposition that a 
hearer reconstructs might be different. They might be different because the speaker 
and the hearer will have different libraries of past usages for any given word, and so 
they must be generating interpretations by using slightly different sets of tools. So that 
implies that we could never ‘truly’ grasp the propositions that our interlocutors are 
trying to express. Concepts might still be public, but we don’t have a way of making 
sure that libraries of past usages are public. Doesn’t that seem somewhat incongruent 
with our day-to-day experience, in which we seem to understand each other very 
well? I have two potential responses to this objection. The first potential response is 
to simply accept this result as a consequence of the view (and, actually, this is the 
response I prefer). It could be that, as a matter of fact, speakers and hearers will 
always entertain at least slightly different propositions. However, human beings 
generally communicate in order to achieve goals, and so they will design their 
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utterances in order to achieve those goals, and if a hearer gives a response that 
seems like it is more or less what the speaker was hoping for or expecting, then a 
speaker can be satisfied that at the very least, their hearer appears to have 
understood them. If we want to explain communication, then do we need to suppose 
more than this? It could be that you are still deeply sceptical of this result. In that case, 
my second potential response to the objection is that, assuming that speakers and 
hearers really do grasp the same proposition (whatever that might amount to), 
perhaps this could be explained by regularities in human brains, biology, and the 
environment. I have in mind here such regularities as the fact that the table-shaped 
collection of particles sitting in the corner of my living room looks similar enough to 
most (English-speaking) humans that they have all decided to use the same word to 
refer to it.  
 The past-usage account also has the benefit of being empirically falsifiable, in 
theory. For example, one or both of two results would be fatal for my account. If it 
could be shown that stored episodes of usages of a word could not, in principle, 
explain how we generate our interpretations of what other people mean when they 
use that word, then my account will be false. And if it could be shown that the 
psycholinguistic evidence is incompatible with there being stored episodes of usages 
of the words, then my account will be false. 
8.7 Summary of Chapter 8 
 I will now clean up some loose ends. One major result from the preceding 
discussion is that in terms of interpreting an utterance, the word ‘dog’ is not much 
different to the word ‘justice’: interpretation in both cases occurs largely on the basis 
of non-conceptual information instantiated in past usage episodes of those words. I 
think that is a plausible story for all content words. The only connection (albeit an 
important one) between the word ‘dog’ and the concept, DOG, is that the word ‘dog’ 
may often be used by a speaker in such a way that it is likely that a hearer’s DOG 
concept is tokened. But tokening a DOG concept is just one way in which the word 
‘dog’ might be used, and this is not a necessary component of all interpretations of 
the word ‘dog’. As I have been trying to argue, there is no connection between the 
word ‘justice’ and the concept, JUSTICE, because there is no such concept. 
Interpreting an utterance that contains the word ‘justice’ may contingently involve 
unlexicalised concepts that do not correspond directly with any lexeme of English. 
But in both cases (‘justice’ and ‘dog’), non-conceptual information stored in past 
usage episodes of these words plays a large role in generating interpretations of 
utterances which contain these words. One last worry with the theory I have sketched 
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in this chapter concerns what concepts are involved in thoughts that we try and 
express by using the word ‘justice’. For example, you might think a thought 
expressible with an utterance of the sentence, “justice has been done”. You might 
then suppose that this thought must have a semantics and structure that looks 
something like this: JUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE. I am arguing that this supposition 
is incorrect: the structure and semantics of thought do not necessarily map on to the 
structure and semantics that a compositional semantic theory assigns to English 
sentences. When you try and express a thought with the utterance, “justice has been 
done”, you are simply using these words because the past usage information 
associated with them is such that you think these words are most likely to get a hearer 
to grasp the thought you are trying to express. However, this does not require that 
your conceptual repertoire contains the unitary cognitive resource, JUSTICE. 
 To summarise: in this chapter, I offered my response to objection 2 to my claim 
that not all words of English pick out concepts. In Chapter 3, I argued that there is no 
such thing as the concept, JUSTICE, because JUSTICE does not help us explain any 
human behaviour or cognitive processes. Objection 2 to this argument was that there 
must be a concept, JUSTICE, because it’s commonly assumed that word meanings 
just are concepts. There is an English word, ‘justice’, and therefore its meaning must 
be the concept, JUSTICE. My response to this objection was to sketch a theory of 
word meaning that does not require that word meanings and concepts are the same 
things. Using Relevance Theory as an example, I showed how accounts of 
communicative success that hold that word meanings are concepts can be adapted 
so that this assumption is not in force. Furthermore, I suggested that any account of 
communication that holds that word meanings are concepts faces a serious challenge 
on the basis of the arguments I have been making throughout this thesis: if you think 
that the meaning of the word ‘justice’ is JUSTICE, then you must be able to provide 
an account of what properties JUSTICE has, or your theory is incomplete. If any of 
the analyses I have presented so far is along the right lines, then I think this will be a 
very difficult account to provide. On the other hand, if we abandon the assumption 
that word meanings and concepts are the same things, then we have found a way to 
avoid this problem altogether.  
 The main consequence of the theory I have sketched here is that the elements 
of a theory of concepts are not necessarily the same things as the elements of a 
theory of utterance interpretation. I think that, in the general case, the cognitive 
structures that result from interpreting utterances are not necessarily propositional 
thoughts built out of concepts (although such structures may be contingently 
generated in the interpretation of many utterances). There are also non-conceptual 
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cognitive structures involved in interpreting utterances, which are generated from 
information stored as a result of past usage episodes, and constrained by syntactic 
structure. These information contained in these past usage episodes of words and 
phrases is relatively unconstrained: from the Relevance Theory point of view, past 
usage information could take the form of any memory trace or any result of a cognitive 
process that was involved in producing a seemingly felicitous interpretation of a word 
on a previous occasion of use. Note however, that this information is not completely 
unconstrained.  There is a reason that, in the absence of a strongly supportive 
context, we are unlikely to be successful if we use the word ‘justice’ to try and express 
thoughts about, say, the reproductive behaviour of cephalopods. The reason is that, 
as a matter of fact, in our language community people do not use the word ‘justice’ to 
try and express thoughts like these. In the next and final chapter, I will draw together 
all of the different arguments I have made throughout this thesis, and emphasise 
some positive implications from the preceding discussions. Hopefully, I will be able to 
convince you that abandoning the concrete-abstract distinction is no great loss to the 
study of concepts or cognition in general, and in fact has some clear benefits.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, I will draw together the various issues we have considered and 
emphasise some positive implications of the arguments I have been making. The goal 
of this thesis has been to convince you of two claims. The first claim is that the 
concrete-abstract distinction is not a useful psychological construct, and we should 
abandon it. The second claim is that the common assumption that words stand in a 
reliable correspondence with concepts is incorrect. Some words that we might think 
of as being ‘abstract’ do not pick out concepts, where concepts are construed as 
unitary cognitive resources. In the opening sections of this chapter, I will rehearse my 
arguments in support of these claims.  
We started out in Chapter 2 by examining the notion of concreteness in 
psycholinguistic experiments. Concreteness has historically been an extremely 
important psycholinguistic variable for a number of reasons. The literature is generally 
presented as containing strong evidence for concreteness effects, whereby words 
with low concreteness scores exhibit processing differences relative to words with 
high concreteness scores. These findings are taken to be especially significant 
because of the common assumption that words stand in a reliable relationship with 
concepts. The thinking is that, if words with low concreteness scores exhibit 
processing differences relative to words with high concreteness scores, then the 
cause of these processing differences must ultimately reside in the conceptual 
system. The concrete-abstract distinction has, therefore, been used most extensively 
in order to investigate the conceptual system, and many theories and suggestions 
about its contents and format have been advanced on the basis of concreteness 
effects. I noted that, in list memory and EEG paradigms, concreteness effects seem 
relatively stable. Words with low concreteness scores are harder to remember than 
words with high concreteness scores, and N400 amplitudes to concrete words are 
larger than N400 amplitudes to abstract words. 
  However, in Chapter 2 we began to see that, in many other paradigms, 
evidence for concreteness effects is not as consistent as it first appears. In fMRI 
paradigms, results are highly variable and often in direct conflict. In lexical decision 
experiments, a decision latency advantage for both types of words has been 
repeatedly demonstrated, and at least one recent investigation concluded that 
concreteness is not actually correlated with lexical decision latencies at all (Brysbaert 
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et al., 2016). This is important because there have been many attempts to incorporate 
concreteness lexical decision data into theories of the conceptual system (Barber et 
al., 2013; Connell and Lynott, 2012; Kousta et al., 2011). However, if in reality there 
is no consistent effect of concreteness on lexical decision latencies, then this 
suggests that these attempts are in vain. Furthermore, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 
6, even if there was a lexical decision advantage for one type of word over another, 
we would not be able to explain why this advantage exists. This is because the 
properties attributed to concrete and abstract concepts (e.g. multimodal information 
for concrete concepts; emotional-affective information for abstract concepts) do not 
obviously explain why there would be differences in lexical decision latencies across 
conditions. Finally, we saw in Chapter 2 that it has recently been claimed, on the basis 
of lexical decision data, that emotional affect is especially characteristic of (alleged) 
abstract concepts (Kousta et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2013). I argue that this claim 
is incorrect because the concrete-abstract distinction does not separate emotion 
concepts from concepts of medium-sized objects in a principled way. We can tell the 
same causal story about the acquisition and ‘representation’ of emotion concepts as 
we can about object  concepts, and so we have no grounds for calling emotion 
concepts abstract. So far then, we see that, although there do seem to be some 
consistent concreteness effects in list memory and EEG, in general the literature 
contains conflicting results, and the concrete-abstract distinction is sometimes drawn 
in an unprincipled way. 
 In Chapter 3, we changed tack somewhat, and we considered what 
philosophical and psychological theories have to say about concepts themselves. I 
suggested that, although there is clearly some disagreement about the nature of 
concepts, there is relatively widespread acceptance of a general model of concepts 
and thought. This model holds that words stand in a reliable correspondence with 
concepts, that thought is made out of parts, and that concepts are these parts of 
thought. I further suggested that, despite some important differences between them, 
both a Fodorian language of thought and a Barsalou-ian simulator theory are 
instantiations of this general model. Next, I presented some of my core arguments 
against the claim that words stand in a reliable correspondence with concepts. If it 
were true that this correspondence held, then that would imply that humans possess 
a JUSTICE concept (in virtue of knowing the word, ‘justice’). However, I argue that 
neither a Fodorian language of thought nor a Barsalou-ian simulator theory gains 
anything from positing JUSTICE. There is no behaviour or cognitive process that 
JUSTICE plays an explanatory role in. Instead, both theories might do better if we 
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posit more specific mental representations that mediate specific cognitive processes 
and behaviours. Furthermore, the notion of JUSTICE raises deep problems no matter 
which kind of theory you want to endorse. A Fodorian cannot provide the individuation 
conditions that make JUSTICE the concept that it supposedly is. A Barsalou-ian 
cannot provide an account of how JUSTICE is acquired or what mental 
representations constitute it. However, both accounts fare better if we apply them to 
more specific concepts that might feature in situations that we use the word ‘justice’ 
to describe.  As recent debates about the prospects of embodied cognition have 
shown (Barsalou, 2016; Goldinger et al., 2016; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008), this is 
an extremely important issue. If we could avoid the problems that JUSTICE raises, 
then our theories of concepts and cognition would be in a much better shape across 
the board. I think this is a substantial benefit of accepting my two primary claims and 
the implications that follow from them.  The only change that needs to be made to a 
Fodorian language of thought or a Barsalou-ian simulator theory in order to 
accommodate the arguments I have tried to make is that we abandon the assumption 
that words stand in a reliable correspondence with concepts.  
 At the end of Chapter 3, we considered two important objections to the view 
that JUSTICE does not belong in a theory of concepts. Objection 1 was that the 
psycholinguistic literature has produced hundreds of concreteness effects, and 
explanations of these concreteness effects require it to be the case that words and 
concepts do stand in a reliable correspondence, such that reading a word ‘activates’ 
its corresponding concept. If this were true, it would suggest that the claim that 
JUSTICE does not belong in a theory of concepts must be false. Objection 2 was that 
theories of communication and psycholinguistic investigations of concepts frequently 
assume that word meanings and concepts are the same things. If this assumption is 
correct, then the claim that JUSTICE does not belong in a theory of concepts must 
be false, because the meaning of the word ‘justice’ must be the concept JUSTICE. I 
spent the rest of the thesis providing my responses to these two objections.  
 In Chapter 4, I started laying out my response to objection 1. My response to 
this objection is ultimately to argue that evidence for concreteness effects is just not 
as strong as it is believed to be. We saw that the concreteness measure itself has 
statistical properties that arguably invalidate it as a psycholinguistic tool. In the 
Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness norm database of 40,000 words, there is no 
word with a mean value in the middle of the scale for which that mean value is an 
accurate representation of participants’ judgements. This means that concreteness 
ratings in the middle of the scale are essentially the product of noise. Worryingly, in a 
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survey of many different concreteness experiments, we saw that the ‘abstract’ stimuli 
featured in these experiments actually tended to come from the middle of scale, 
where the concreteness measure becomes uninterpretable. This on its own severely 
weakens the force of objection 1, because it means that so far psycholinguists have 
not actually been producing concreteness effects. Instead, they have been producing 
experimental differences between words that people agree about how to rate, and 
words that people disagree about how to rate. I also showed that if we wanted to only 
include words which 100% of the norming population claimed to know, and with 
standard deviations below 1, there are less than 300 abstract nouns to choose from, 
and many of these are morphologically complex oddities such as ‘purposefulness’. 
This is also evidence against the utility of the concrete-abstract distinction. The 
concreteness measure is supposed to tap into a fundamental ontological distinction 
between two different kinds of cognitive entity. The problem is that on the truly 
abstract end of the scale there don’t seem to be many representatives of one of these 
kinds. Finally, in Chapter 4 I showed that the midscale disagreement phenomenon 
does not just apply to Brysbaert et al.’s (2013) database. It applies to other scales 
that measure similar things to concreteness, such as imageability, for instance 
(Connell and Lynott, 2012; Cortese and Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012), but it does 
not apply to scales that measure different things to concreteness, such as emotional 
valence (Warriner et al., 2013). This shows that the problem is specific to the 
concrete-abstract distinction as it is operationalised in psycholinguistics.  
 Now, even though I demonstrated that there are problems with how 
concreteness is operationalised in psycholinguistic experiments, and that in lexical 
decision and fMRI paradigms, results have not been consistent, it is still the case that 
statistically significant contrasts between concrete and abstract items have been 
obtained in list memory and EEG paradigms. So we might still think that objection 1 
holds some weight. In Chapters 5 and 6, I report my own list memory and EEG 
experiments, which ensured that the contrast between concrete and abstract items 
was genuinely in force. Counterintuitively, under conditions that should have made 
concreteness effects more likely and stronger, no such effect was obtained in 3 out 
of 4 experiments (two of the memory experiments, and the EEG experiment). Indeed, 
experiments 1 and 4 produced evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. In the third 
list memory experiment, a small concreteness effect of 0.3 words on average was 
obtained. I take all of this to show that evidence for concreteness effects is not very 
strong. The reason that I stress the word ‘concreteness’ in the previous sentence is 
because, although we did obtain a statistically significant difference in experiment 3, 
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we must bear in mind that we obtained evidence in favour of the null hypothesis in 
two other experiments. It could be that some words with high concreteness values 
are easier to remember in list memory paradigms, but this could just as well be due 
to factors other than concreteness itself. The theories that predict a memory 
advantage for concrete words in list memory are, arguably, not compatible with the 
properties that items at the extreme ends of the concreteness scale actually have. 
For example, Walker and Hulme (1999) suggest that the advantage for concrete items 
is due to the fact that the representations that instantiate concrete concepts are richer 
than those that instantiate abstract concepts. However, in many cases, it seems much 
more attractive to suppose that the mental resources that we think of as being 
‘abstract’ are instantiated by much ‘richer’ representations than those we think of as 
being concrete (again, consider what kinds of mental representations might be 
associated with ‘doorknobs’ versus those associated with ‘spirituality’).  
 My response to objection 1 is not to argue that there definitely are no such 
things as concreteness effects (from the point of view of the explanations that we 
have of these effects). Rather, the point is that the concreteness scales we use could 
not provide this evidence even if the effects are ‘real’. This is because of the 
methodological problems with the scale which we explored in Chapter 4, and also 
because maximising a contrast along the scale did not produce unequivocal 
concreteness effects in the way that we would expect it to (as we saw in Chapters 5 
and 6). Putting all of this together, I think we have gone some way to mitigating 
objection 1: a lot more work has to be done in order to show that concreteness effects 
are reliable enough to support this objection.  
 In Chapter 8, I set out my response to objection 2. This response consisted of 
a sketch of a theory of communication that does not require that word meanings and 
concepts are the same things. On this view, the cognitive structures generated during 
the interpretation of utterances are not necessarily conceptual. Instead, non-
conceptual past-usage information constrains interpretations according to general 
pragmatic principles. I also showed how a popular theory of communication, 
Relevance Theory, could be adapted in this way. I also hope to have convinced you 
that, in many respects, the past-usage account of meaning does better than a 
conceptual account of meaning. This is because conceptual accounts of meaning that 
hold that the meaning of the word ‘justice’ is the concept JUSTICE cannot provide a 
satisfactory account of what properties JUSTICE has. On the non-conceptual view, 
this problem disappears, because the non-conceptual view is not committed to there 
being such a thing as JUSTICE in the first place.  
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 I hope that, if we put all of this together, then we will have established the 
claims that I want to convince you of. The first claim is that the concrete-abstract 
distinction is not a useful psychological construct. Here are the reasons why I think 
you should endorse this claim. Evidence for concreteness effects is not strong. There 
are serious statistical and methodological problems with how concreteness is 
operationalised in psycholinguistic experiments. Theoretical explanations of 
concreteness effects suffer from deep problems, the most pressing of which is that 
supposedly ‘abstract’ stimuli do not plausibly have the properties that psycholinguists 
seem to assume they have. A recent trend to talk of abstract concepts as being 
specially characterised by emotional-affective information is not justified by any 
independent principles. We have no reason to suppose that emotion concepts are 
not concrete on any standard use of the term, and so this particular way of carving 
the concrete-abstract distinction falls apart. The second claim was that words and 
concepts do not stand in a reliable correspondence with each other. There is one 
main reason for you to endorse this claim: theories of concepts, cognition, and 
meaning do much better if the claim is true. Using JUSTICE as an example, I showed 
that some alleged concepts do not have any explanatory role in theories, and that 
JUSTICE is incapable of having the properties that theories of concepts and meaning 
want to ascribe to it. Ultimately, what guarantees the status of a theoretical posit is 
whether it helps us explain and/or understand some phenomenon. I think concepts 
will help us explain and understand human cognition. However, we have been making 
life very difficult for ourselves by assuming that all words of natural language naturally 
match up with the elements of these explanations. We have been trying to build 
theories of concepts that accommodate this assumption, without examining the 
assumption itself. If we abandon the assumption that words reliably pick out concepts, 
then we lose no explanatory power while dispensing with some deep problems for 
philosophical and psychological accounts of the conceptual system. 
 I want to end with a quote from Brysbaert et al. (2013, p. 909) themselves, 
and which I like very much: ‘collecting a lot of information about a variable does not 
by itself make the variable more “real”’.  
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Appendix A 
 
1. Experiment 1 stimuli 
 
Lis
t 
conditio
n 
Word1 Word2 Word3 Word4 Word5 Word6 Word7 Word8 
1 disagree polling dipstick decade centaur exhaust foreword limbo spender 
2 disagree physic sequel deacon nettle output earshot deadline cackle 
3 disagree brethren zenith deluge silence lawsuit theorist polka margin 
4 disagree nappy degree panic bearings legend request physics prefect 
5 disagree sponsor delta dropper phantom egghead rightness aerial eyesight 
6 disagree halter brainwave mankind nightlife surname scrounge
r 
tunic omen 
7 disagree pariah divorce cosmos sundries purveyor demon crosswind alias 
8 disagree grammar conveyanc
e 
easement blackball woodland giantess weeknigh
t 
instant 
9 disagree tidbit shallows photon plural hallmark grafting sandman nature 
10 disagree slipstream audit poorhous
e 
minute rival tribune abyss spectrum 
11 agree menace bookie tinting flicker rebound squatter tempo pusher 
12 agree uprise digest tiling region charmer joyride outbreak nutrient 
13 agree hubbub matron median nuthous
e 
pullout partner distaste refill 
14 agree burial backwash mover career event footing caper peacetim
e 
15 agree jailbreak torment hazard instinct guru downpour richness glucose 
16 agree bunting rhythm stalker dullness ascent headache gunpoint welfare 
17 agree ringside archduke turmoil shyness posse gangway shipping outreach 
18 agree sunburst mishap bumpkin deceit villain bloodlust misdeed hunting 
19 agree diesel roughhous
e 
attempt whiner viewpoint freshness stampede leader 
20 agree semblanc
e 
havoc broadside dining image dissent goner culprit 
21 abstract setback vagueness spirit notion loyalty esteem phrasing credence 
22 abstract charade rapture betrayal logic backlash renown letdown affront 
23 abstract desire mystique intent vantage glory nuance unease motive 
24 abstract amends prestige godsend satire leeway wordplay pretense calmness 
25 abstract accord whimsy disdain hardship virtue manner regard effect 
26 abstract freelance mischief respite folly pureness repute courage meantime 
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27 abstract merit standpoint future allure rapport wisdom prudence insight 
28 abstract mistake quantum dogma function purpose willpower hearsay meaning 
29 abstract patience aspect debut fairness pity taboo riddance appeal 
30 abstract piety finesse foresight longshot loathing stigma concern control 
31 concrete leaflet roadhouse artist lighting parsley seabed ironwork lacrosse 
32 concrete clipper pewter cauldron quarry blockade earwig clubfoot logbook 
33 concrete summit breeches abscess foreman award entree funnel beacon 
34 concrete corset template pigment fuchsia urchin ringworm crewman mansion 
35 concrete jester gasket sternum backdro
p 
bouncer chapel resort county 
36 concrete penthouse fracture entrails vinyl buckskin tundra barrier plumbing 
37 concrete timepiece methane record tiller grindston
e 
merchant shrapnel duchess 
38 concrete quarter bulkhead sarong tenant chamber canon bailiff machine 
39 concrete beaker clinic tango clothing amber jackal roulette survey 
40 concrete spiral marrow billiard bootlace scabies saffron captain product 
 
2. Experiment 2 stimuli 
Pair Condition Word1 Word2 
1 concrete cauldron hike 
2 concrete footman band 
3 concrete blazer creature 
4 concrete rubble liqueur 
5 concrete throttle ulcer 
6 concrete ranch gauntlet 
7 concrete cadet concert 
8 concrete ledge manor 
9 abstract betrayal urge 
10 abstract revenge foresight 
11 abstract godsend risk 
12 abstract wisdom psyche 
13 abstract hardship malice 
14 abstract greed riddance 
15 abstract loyalty lenience 
16 abstract bliss mercy 
17 midscale genius royalty 
18 midscale foreground district 
19 midscale gleam patriot 
20 midscale view approach 
21 midscale upstart brawn 
22 midscale expanse profit 
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23 midscale asset vortex 
24 midscale habit encore 
 
3. Experiment 3 stimuli 
List  condition word 1 word 2 word 3 word 4 word 5 word 6 
1 concrete pad harpoon stretcher kennel ulcer aftershave 
2 concrete trachea parsley fuselage rifleman plaster medallion 
3 concrete cedar rubble trinket composer liver dormitory 
4 concrete scale shipment gladiator guesthouse morgue marrow 
5 concrete vineyard porcelain cocktail warship advisor slate 
6 concrete supervisor infirmary bouquet manicure bay tomb 
7 concrete graphics sage smoothie wildfire prosecutor sapphire 
8 concrete inspector minefield tourist stub horseradish frostbite 
9 concrete guitarist notch gauntlet orphanage vegetation bomber 
10 concrete greenhouse sedative museum silicon wreckage accountant 
11 concrete incubator lavender surgeon violinist courtroom embroidery 
12 concrete landlord measles dictator pacemaker minibus plumber 
13 concrete newsletter bodyguard stockbroker foliage petroleum liqueur 
14 concrete plantation attorney blockade antibiotic concert currency 
15 concrete stroke titanium bile sniper massage adhesive 
16 abstract urge renown patience motive malice quandary 
17 abstract penance belief indulgence reproach version fixation 
18 abstract mercy glory charade aptitude manner formality 
19 abstract risk psyche rhetoric foresight fraud regard 
20 abstract prudence oblivion hardship mood sarcasm fate 
21 abstract extent imposition purpose competence luck whim 
22 abstract willpower bias indecision loyalty seriousness knowledge 
23 abstract involvement existence coincidence ruse principles betrayal 
24 abstract detriment subtlety tradition damnation wisdom fantasy 
25 abstract forgiveness semantics value sanctity godsend discretion 
26 abstract eternity politeness concept reasoning anomaly symbolism 
27 abstract suspicion goodness arrogance mortality chance theory 
28 abstract precedent privacy likelihood lunacy oversight revenge 
29 abstract affirmative repentance leniency similarity merit expertise 
30 abstract wickedness analogy bliss coercion courage avoidance 
31 midscale plot molecule mankind format swindle motherland 
32 midscale hormone reply tarot tribune routine pushover 
33 midscale delay gossip slumber bandwagon response vigilante 
34 midscale zone shallows pinnacle wavelength grief degree 
35 midscale envoy character fallout clue vacancy tone 
36 midscale circulation drunkenness midsummer doctorate goal hoax 
37 midscale cutthroat rift corporation lawsuit translation sweetness 
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38 midscale announcement activist process slack formation whiplash 
39 midscale chronicle monologue overlap motherhood virus penalty 
40 midscale exhaustion delegate magic rebuttal crackpot diversion 
41 midscale entirety ugliness factor ancestry confidant purgatory 
42 midscale engagement accident insomnia regulator utility egghead 
43 midscale repellent takeover provision dioxide offence thinker 
44 midscale equivalent oracle ignition visibility ransom narrative 
45 midscale sense extremity content lunatic divorce casualty 
 
4. Experiment 4 stimuli 
Sentence Condition 
1 Concrete The bay was a beautiful place.      
2 Concrete The plumber was coming to fix the car.    
3 Concrete The surgeon was preparing for the operation.     
4 Concrete The stretcher was brought out for the camel.    
5 Concrete The notch in the door had been repaired.    
6 Concrete The courtroom was cold and pink.      
7 Concrete Amy's newsletter was informative and well written.     
8 Concrete The sage was plucked fresh from Danielle's herb garden.   
9 Concrete The advisor of the defendant told him to lick the deal. 
10 Concrete The graphics were particularly impressive.       
11 Concrete The man's medallion was made of rice.     
12 Concrete The scale was broken and useless.      
13 Concrete The rubble was uncooked and difficult to climb.    
14 Concrete The marrow was cooked perfectly.       
15 Concrete The horseradish was invisible and tangy.      
16 Concrete The wildfire was decimating the forest.      
17 Concrete Luke's plantation of weeds had an excellent harvest.    
18 Concrete The dictator of the country was removed from power.   
19 Concrete Gabby's manicure was making her feel much better.    
20 Concrete Laura's guesthouse was highly rated on the wall.    
21 Concrete The infirmary was running out of space.     
22 Concrete The lavender was arguing in the summer sun.    
23 Concrete The man's plaster was coming off in the rain.   
24 Concrete The morgue was still singing for the body.    
25 Concrete David's liver was causing him problems.      
26 Concrete The guitarist of the hospital was renowned for his unusual technique. 
27 Concrete The bile was rising in Gary's throat.     
28 Concrete The petroleum was costly to paint.      
29 Concrete The woman's liqueur was upsetting her stomach.     
30 Concrete The man’s aftershave was cheap.       
31 Concrete The bodyguard of the president was awarded for his lunch.  
32 Concrete The orphanage of the asteroid needed donations urgently.    
33 Concrete The gauntlet was from the medieval period.     
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34 Concrete The museum of fine eggs closed yesterday.     
35 Concrete The porcelain was filthy and chipped.      
36 Concrete The slate was covered in strange carrots.     
37 Concrete The woman’s landlord was strict but fair.     
38 Concrete The supervisor of the donkey told him to take a break. 
39 Concrete The stockbroker was afraid of losing his money.    
40 Concrete Martin's dormitory was on the second floor.     
41 Concrete Carol's embroidery was admired by the giraffe.     
42 Concrete Nigel's antibiotic was prescribed by the doctor.     
43 Concrete Paul's shipment of jokes was always late.     
44 Concrete The rifleman was cleaning his flower.      
45 Concrete The man’s cocktail was far too comfortable.     
46 Concrete The tourist was enjoying his time away.     
47 Concrete Billy's massage was crispy and relaxing.      
48 Concrete The inspector of the crime scene discovered the important evidence.  
49 Concrete The accountant of the firm was rewarded for malpractice.   
50 Concrete The greenhouse of exotic flowers was Vanessa's favourite place to play. 
51 Concrete The violinist was practising the sonata.      
52 Concrete The tomb of the ancient cat was never found.   
53 Concrete The woman’s ulcer was becoming infected.      
54 Concrete The foliage of the bricks obscured the view.    
55 Concrete The sniper on the oven lined up his shot.   
56 Concrete John's pad of paper was nearly volcanic.     
57 Concrete The parsley was the key ingredient in the meal.   
58 Concrete The composer of the window basked in the applause.   
59 Concrete The woman’s smoothie was cool and refreshing.     
60 Concrete Henry's kennel was full of hungry ants.     
61 Concrete The frostbite was starting to take its toll.    
62 Concrete The gladiator was victorious every time.      
63 Concrete Jane's minibus was packed full of frogs.     
64 Concrete The vegetation of the valley was lush and diverse.   
65 Concrete The woman’s trinket of paper sparkled in the light.   
66 Concrete Sarah's adhesive was not funny enough for the job.   
67 Midscale The goal of the initiative was to reduce cooking in schools. 
68 Midscale The character in the TV show was very popular.   
69 Midscale The woman’s divorce was chatting amicably.      
70 Midscale The woman’s plot was foiled by the investigator.    
71 Midscale The diversion was causing huge parties along the entire motorway.  
72 Midscale The provision was set out in the legal document.   
73 Midscale The woman’s doctorate was awarded on the moon.    
74 Midscale The hoax was planned out in incredible detail.    
75 Midscale The cutthroat was boarding the apple.      
76 Midscale The pushover was letting Jake get away with everything.   
77 Midscale The thinker was cartwheeling alone in his study.    
78 Midscale The sweetness of the purple girl was charming.    
79 Midscale The man’s reply was vague and unhelpful.     
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80 Midscale Tammy's response was encouraging for the concerned giants.    
81 Midscale The circulation of the newspaper was very high.    
82 Midscale The pinnacle of the bookshelf was difficult to reach.   
83 Midscale The man’s whiplash was causing him problems at work.   
84 Midscale The envoy of the spoon was rewarded for his efficiency.  
85 Midscale The utility of the plan was questionable.     
86 Midscale The man’s drunkenness was ruining the rock.     
87 Midscale The hormone was activated by the treatment.     
88 Midscale The regulator of the industry fined the infants millions of dollars. 
89 Midscale The woman’s offence was struck off the record by the alien. 
90 Midscale The tone was annoying and played repeatedly.     
91 Midscale The activist was kicking an angry letter.     
92 Midscale The lawsuit was based on an obscure technicality.    
93 Midscale Molly's exhaustion was showing on her ear.     
94 Midscale Leo's translation was well received by the publisher.    
95 Midscale The vigilante was skipping from the law.     
96 Midscale The man’s corporation was filing for bankruptcy.     
97 Midscale The molecule was discovered in a playground.     
98 Midscale The lunatic was threatening the hostages.      
99 Midscale The delay of the train service pleased the travellers.   
100 Midscale The zone was declared off limits to the public.   
101 Midscale The process was drawn out over many centimetres.    
102 Midscale Robin's degree was in chemical engineering.      
103 Midscale The penalty was extremely delicious for the child.    
104 Midscale Danny's ransom was paid in full.      
105 Midscale The fallout of the dance lingered for weeks.    
106 Midscale The extremity of the injury soon became apparent.    
107 Midscale The visibility on the sofa was poor.     
108 Midscale The shallows were full of small fish.     
109 Midscale The chronicle of the kingdom was hated for its detail.  
110 Midscale The content of the speech was provocative.     
111 Midscale Jack's routine was starting to make him feel more energised.  
112 Midscale Anna's gossip was sparkly and hurtful.      
113 Midscale Ryan's engagement of seven months ended abruptly.     
114 Midscale The narrative was complex but the dogs praised it.   
115 Midscale The format of the TV show was innovative.    
116 Midscale The repellent was keeping the dinosaurs at bay.    
117 Midscale Julie's ancestry was a source of great pride.    
118 Midscale The vacancy was filled three centuries ago.     
119 Midscale Michael's slumber was interrupted by the doorbell.     
120 Midscale The ignition of the spatula was faulty.     
121 Midscale Oliver's accident was preventing him from training for the event.  
122 Midscale The clue was puzzling the detective.      
123 Midscale Phoebe's grief was finally coming to a roundabout.    
124 Midscale The man’s announcement was shocking to the nation.    
125 Midscale The virus was polite to all the animals in the area. 
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126 Midscale The casualty of the incident was a young boy.   
127 Midscale Lucy's insomnia was a cause of celebration.     
128 Midscale The takeover of the business worried the shareholders.    
129 Midscale Charlie's monologue was spicy and boring.      
130 Midscale The rift was growing between the two political factions.   
131 Midscale The oracle was unsure of the colour of the battle.  
132 Midscale The delegate of the foreign country disagreed with the minister.  
133 Abstract The aptitude of the child was very impressive.    
134 Abstract The coercion of the termites was the subject of an  
135 Abstract The extent of the problem soon became clear to the  
136 Abstract Connor's forgiveness was easy to earn.      
137 Abstract The indecision was helping the team make progress.    
138 Abstract The woman’s malice was making her many friends.    
139 Abstract The oversight was costing the company lots of money.   
140 Abstract The quandary was resolved to everyone’s satisfaction.     
141 Abstract The similarity was easy for the shark to spot.   
142 Abstract The theory was ridiculed by the academic community.    
143 Abstract The wisdom of old woman was undisputed.     
144 Abstract The man’s arrogance was getting on Helen's nerves.    
145 Abstract The woman’s competence was plain to see so they fired  
146 Abstract Emily's fantasy was to become unemployed.      
147 Abstract The hardship was too much for the little boy to  
148 Abstract Colin's knowledge of the subject took him seconds to acquire.  
149 Abstract The mood was extremely tense in the ocean.    
150 Abstract Lauren's patience was running thin.       
151 Abstract The reasoning of the proof was flawless.     
152 Abstract The suspicion of the authorities was unfounded because Bob was  
153 Abstract The urge was difficult for Tim to resist.    
154 Abstract The charade was getting hard to maintain.     
155 Abstract The belief was widespread but incorrect.      
156 Abstract The concept was difficult for the snails to understand.   
157 Abstract Simon's fixation on meeting astronauts was bad for morale.   
158 Abstract The imposition was awkward for the diplomat.     
159 Abstract Ruby's leniency was despised by the children.     
160 Abstract The penance of the monk lasted forty days.    
161 Abstract The man’s politeness was insulting.       
162 Abstract Philip's repentance was unconvincing to his stern mother.    
163 Abstract The symbolism was lost on the cows.     
164 Abstract The version of the program was out of date.   
165 Abstract The purpose of Eric's actions was not obvious.    
166 Abstract The analogy was not very tasty.      
167 Abstract The betrayal was difficult for Diane to forgive.    
168 Abstract The discretion was greatly appreciated by the butler's cat.   
169 Abstract The formality was delightful but necessary.      
170 Abstract The man’s indulgence was starting to get expensive.    
171 Abstract Hugh's loyalty was unquestionably the worst thing about him.   
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172 Abstract The precedent was ignored by the judge.     
173 Abstract The rhetoric of the campaign was divisive.     
174 Abstract The risk was too small for the explorers to take.  
175 Abstract The tradition was upheld for two minutes.     
176 Abstract The man’s whim was something he was coming to regret.  
177 Abstract The anomaly was detected by the incompetent footballer.    
178 Abstract Oscar's courage was failing him.       
179 Abstract The existence of forks on other planets is certain.   
180 Abstract The fraud was investigated by the burglars.     
181 Abstract The involvement of the police escalated the situation.    
182 Abstract Nina's luck was running quickly.       
183 Abstract The principles were impossible to argue with.     
184 Abstract The ruse was fooling everyone.       
185 Abstract Tom's sarcasm was welcomed by his tutor.     
186 Abstract The woman’s psyche was damaged by the relaxing day.   
187 Abstract Claudia's wickedness was revealed for the first time.    
188 Abstract The bias in the newspaper won it many awards.   
189 Abstract Chloe's expertise was reason she was sacked.     
190 Abstract The woman’s fate was yet to be decided.    
191 Abstract The glory of losing was good for the team's spirits.  
192 Abstract The lunacy of the idea made it popular with everyone.  
193 Abstract The motive of the criminal was clear.     
194 Abstract The prudence of the decision was widely recognised.    
195 Abstract The woman’s seriousness was making the situation more lighthearted.   
196 Abstract The subtlety of the argument made it hard to follow.  
197 Abstract Mark's willpower was fading quickly.       
198 Abstract The coincidence was particularly surprising for the butterfly.    
 
 
